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# SECURITIZATION OF THE ENERGY SECTORS IN ESTONIA, LITHUANIA, POLAND AND UKRAINE: MOTIVES AND EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES

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## *Abstract*

The article provides a comparative analysis of how the securitization of an energy sector is related to the actual energy situation of a country, the intensity of the securitization proclamation, and the “practical outcomes” of the securitization process. The energy strategies and implementation processes of “untypical” energy projects in four Central and Eastern European countries have been explored. The analysis of the securitization of energy sectors in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine has served as a basis for introducing the concept of a “securitization intensity” in the energy-security sector. The article also contributes to the debate about the “explanatory role” of securitization theory by suggesting that the actual level of energy dependence (on an external supply) relates to the level of securitization intensity but not necessarily to the extraordinary measures or practical outcomes in the form of untypical projects in energy sectors.

## **Introduction**

The energy sector has become a highly securitized object of governmental policies. Although energy security is not a new issue in security studies, in recent decades it has received more political attention and in some cases has even been proclaimed as a priority for national security. The securitization process of energy issues has been formalised and has become part of the national security agenda. More and more governments are including energy security in their official national security documents, adopting energy security strategies and striving to “increase

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energy security”. The securitizing speech-act is transformed into written form and becomes a part of the official discourse on the security agenda.

However, this process of securitizing the energy sector often leaves open the questions: why has securitization of the energy sector happened? What motives lay behind attempts to securitize the energy sector? And was securitization needed at all? All these questions are essential in the context of securitization as an empirical theory.<sup>1</sup>

As Ole Wæver wrote, securitization theory could be used not only to explain “who does securitization and how” or “when it happens”, but also “what securitization does”.<sup>2</sup> In other words, an analysis of securitizing practices can reveal some causal mechanisms and provide hypotheses as to why specific issues were securitized and what changes that securitization brought. “The difference between securitized or not lies in the causal mechanisms”, states Wæver; “it is the effects that securitization has that make it attractive (or not) for various actors to pursue”.<sup>3</sup>

This article seeks to give new insights in exploring the causal mechanism of securitizing the energy sector. The comparative analysis of four countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine – provides a good background to answer questions such as:

- how securitization of the of energy sector happened in selected cases;
- what reasons led governments to increase awareness of energy-security issues;
- what changes in energy security brought about formal securitization; and
- whether securitization was needed to justify all extraordinary measures.

As the recent debates of the Copenhagen School show, there are a number of views about the purpose of securitizing selected issues. Securitisation is not identified with illocutionary speech act any more.<sup>4</sup> Rita Floyd, for instance, argues that original securitization theory cannot be used in normative analysis and provides a revised formulation of the theory that enables judgment about when it is “right” to employ securitization practice.<sup>5</sup> As Floyd states, the securitization of some issues can be positive, when it is morally justified. Meanwhile, references to

<sup>1</sup> Guzzini, S., “Securitization as a causal mechanism.” In *Security Dialogue* 42(4-5) 2011, pp. 329-341.

<sup>2</sup> Wæver, O., “Politics, Security, Theory.” In *Security Dialogue* 42(4-5), 2011, pp. 465–480.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 465–480.

<sup>4</sup> Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & De Wilde J., *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner., 1998.

<sup>5</sup> Floyd, R., “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory”. In *Security Dialogue*, 42(4-5), 2011, p. 429.

justifiable securitization, to objective existential threat, a legitimate referent object and intentions to secure the referent object appropriately determine the legitimacy and success of securitization.<sup>6</sup>

This article holds that the full spectrum of the securitization process should include four elements of analysis: 1) the circumstances of securitization; 2) formal securitization; 3) security practice; and 4) the outcome of the securitization process.

This article employs the arguments of Floyd and Wæver and tries to extend them to a more specific issue – how the securitization of the energy sector was carried out and why the very core of the securitizing act is different among selected states (Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine). It should be noted, though, that the article focuses mainly on Eastern European energy-importing countries facing common challenges in the energy sector, i.e., dependence on the dominant external energy supplier – Russia – which is treated as the main external threat to national security. This indicates that energy dependence in this article is an essential factor deciding the level of securitization of the energy sector.<sup>7</sup>

Although the securitization of energy is present in all four countries, the very essence of securitizing varies. In other words, the “intensity of securitization”, a new term introduced in this article, is different. Some countries give highest priority to the energy sector in terms of national security and treat energy issues as an autonomous security sector in their security strategies. According to the logic of securitization theory, such countries need to increase audience support for extraordinary measures (for example, unusual or “untypical” energy projects). These measures should be very specific in order to be termed “extraordinary”, and a significant number of unusual projects or radical changes in energy politics should be implemented. Other countries see energy as only “an ordinary security issue”, which is dealt with in a more incremental way.

A hypothesis is raised that different levels of “intensity of securitization” are related to the actual conditions of the energy sector in each country. More precisely, the level of energy dependence on an outside supply affects the level of intensity of securitization: the higher the energy dependence, the more extraordinary measures

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<sup>6</sup> Floyd, p. 429.

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that energy dependence is not the only factor stimulating the securitization of the energy sector. Securitisation may be caused by a number of factors, such as concerns about the security of the energy infrastructure, environmental impact, diversification of energy export routes and markets, competition for energy sources, low energy prices, etc. However, it wouldn't be reasonable to compare the securitization process in different types of countries, for example, energy importers *versus* energy exporters, because of different perceptions of threats and energy security *per se*.

are needed to overcome it and the more intense the securitization to support such measures formalised in security documents and strategies.

To test this hypothesis, a comparative analysis has been conducted on the national security and energy strategies and previously proposed energy projects of Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine.

## 1. Energy dependence and intensity of securitization

Energy dependence is an essential variable in testing the aforementioned hypothesis. However, before analysing selected countries' levels of energy dependence, some clarifications are needed. As noted previously, only energy-importing countries have been analysed. Countries with similarly structured energy sources and reliance on energy import usually identify the same energy security threats and form similar visions of energy security. Besides, the concept of energy dependence is usually analysed through the level of vulnerability of energy security.<sup>8</sup> In other words, the more energy resources are imported, the higher the dependence on the exporting country, and the less secure the importer feels. Following this logic, four countries – Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Ukraine – have been selected. All four countries are more or less dependent on one dominant or single external energy supplier – Russia.

According to *Eurostat* data, energy dependence is expressed as an indicator showing the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs. Taking into consideration Lithuania, Estonia and Poland's energy imports and gross inland consumption in 2010, Lithuania's energy dependence rate was 82%, Poland's was 32%, and Estonia's was 13%. Following this logic, Ukraine's energy dependence indicator has been calculated and, in 2010, was 69%.<sup>9</sup> These calculations represent the countries' dependence on total imports, but actually confirm the general tendency of the countries' dependence on Russian energy due to Russia's dominance in their energy market.

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<sup>8</sup> The main threats caused by energy dependence are supply cut-off, high prices of energy sources, etc. In the case of the EU, for instance, the main risk that energy dependence on Russia may pose is thought to be the threat of inflation that can cause a downward spiral of growth rates and lead to social unrest and potential state failure (for more detail see Ehn, pp. 3-25)

<sup>9</sup> The indicator of energy dependence is calculated as net imports divided by the sum of gross inland energy consumption, plus bunkers. Eurostat: <<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/graph.do?tab=graph&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc310&toolbox=type>>

Lithuania and Estonia are typical energy consumers, with no or irrelevant energy export flows. Poland and Ukraine are not only consumers of imported materials, but also key transit countries for energy resources being transported from Russia to the EU. Although the share of Russian energy sources imported by Poland and Ukraine is almost the same, their levels of dependence on the dominant supplier differs. In 2011 Poland consumed 15,134 billion cubic metres of natural gas, of which almost 30% came from domestic sources. Its domestic production of natural gas was supplemented by 10,325 billion cubic metres of imported resource. However, only 27.53 million cubic metres (0.19%) of natural gas was exported to Western Europe. This is similar to the situation regarding the Russian oil that is transported to Europe though the Polish pipelines. In other words, the transit of energy resources imported from Russia constitutes a pretty small proportion of overall Polish energy exports and is not a main revenue source for Poland's national budget. Meanwhile Ukraine's energy statistics mark it out as not only an export but also a transit denominator. Being the largest European transit country, Ukraine transported 104.2 billion cubic metres of natural gas and 17.8 million tonnes of oil to Western Europe in 2011. In other words, Ukraine sold 67% of Russian natural gas and 24% of oil imported from Russia.

An economy's reliance on energy imports should not be considered as a threat *per se*. Many countries cannot fulfil their energy needs using domestic resources only. However, there is a big difference in relation to whether the diversification of energy import is assured. As Daniel Yergin states, "since Churchill's day, the key to energy security has been diversification".<sup>10</sup> Reliance on a single or dominant external energy supplier increases the risk of various negative effects on energy security: starting from natural disruptions to supply flow and ending with politically motivated cut-offs or radical increases in the prices of energy resources. In Yergin's words, the diversification of the energy supply was the first, and still is, a major principle for ensuring energy security.<sup>11</sup>

All four selected countries face the challenge of energy diversification, but the extent of dependency on the dominant supplier varies among the countries. Does the actual level of dependency on a single supplier affect the different methods of securitization in the selected countries?

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<sup>10</sup> Yergin D., "Ensuring energy security". In *Foreign Affairs* 85(2), 2006, pp. 69-82.

<sup>11</sup> Yergin provides further principles as well: resilience; recognising the reality of integration; and the importance of information (for more detail see Yergin, pp. 69-82). In this article there is no intention to analyse the "objective" situation of energy security in selected states; the focus is on the motives for securitization. However, some "objective" facts, as reasons for raising concerns about energy security, could play a very important role in the process of securitization.

The existence of one dominant energy supplier in the structure of energy import has a substantial role in the process of securitization of the energy sector. An external actor, dominant in the energy market, might be more easily associated with some “other” who poses an external threat for ‘us’. Being a dominant energy supplier, Russia becomes a “perfect target” as the “other” in securitizing energy threats.

## 2. The concept of securitization intensity: How is energy securitized?

Although the securitization of energy is more or less characteristic of all four countries, the intensity of securitization differs in each state. Criteria to evaluate the intensity of securitization are related to specific questions: *how*, *why* and *do* countries securitize energy in their strategic documents? All these criteria provide characteristics not only of the act of securitization (i.e., the particular proclamation of “a threat”) but of the entire securitization process as well, including reasons, sources and eventual consequences as the main rationale of securitization. The more criteria for securitization that are found, the more elaborate and intense securitization is.

**1. The inclusion of energy security (as a point of concern) in national security strategies.** The formal designation of energy issues as an object of concern for national security is the most general result of a securitization act. If energy security is mentioned in the national security strategy, it expresses the national consensus to call energy issues “a threat” and could be evaluated as a securitization act.

**2. The status of the energy sector in security strategies.** The relationship between energy security issues with other fields of security concern should be evaluated: a) is the energy sector described in strategic documents as an independent security sector with specific objects, risks and objectives, or b) does energy security refer only to energy supply at reasonable prices in order to promote economic growth (this notion would determine energy security mainly as part of the economic sector, but not as an independent security sector)? The status of energy issues as an “independent sector” would demonstrate intentions to provide specific means of solving energy issues.

**3. The significance of energy threats.** Are energy threats prioritised among other security risks or threats? If the answer is positive, it would mean that energy issues prevail over other security issues and require the most attention.

**4. The timing of energy concerns.** The timing of energy issues may be related to the means and urgency when referring to an energy threat to be solved. Specific energy issues that already exist and should be resolved straight away would have higher priority than potential energy risks and problems that may become *de facto* problems in the future. A presumption is that current energy problems seem to be more threatening than eventual ones.

**5. Sources of energy threats.** A presumption is made that the dominance of external energy threats (in comparison to domestic sources of threats) is more prone to energy securitization. This is because the concept of the “other” is used, which usually indicates a certain country or actors who are identified with the main source of the threat. Moreover, the distinction between “us” versus the “other” helps to legitimise the securitization act.

**6. Extraordinary measures.** Does securitization of the energy sector create preconditions for using extraordinary measures in order to solve securitized problems? Specific measures to solve energy issues that could be called ‘extraordinary’ would indicate that the securitization process has a clear purpose – to result in specific changes that would be unachievable within a certain time without securitization attempts.

The distinguishing feature of securitization is that it justifies the breaking of established rules in order to respond to an existential threat. Although for Wæver, desecuritization might be more effective than securitizing problems; in particular cases emergency measures that are extraordinary in nature may be legitimised. But what does “extraordinary” measures actually mean? According to Roe, extraordinary politics is what normal politics is not in liberal democratic states. As Roe puts it, the concern here lies in the context within which issues are handled.<sup>12</sup> In other words, “normal politics” refers to routine, quite slow and deliberate procedures; whereas “securitized politics” is about exceptional and speedy security responses. Considering the concept of securitization as “silence and speed” rather than deliberation and debate, its “extraordinariness” may be recognised as negative and harmful to democratic problem-solving mechanisms.

However, democracies, where conflicts of interests are a distinguishing characteristic, are even more prone to securitize their energy problems in order to

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<sup>12</sup> Roe P., “Is securitization a “negative” concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics”. In *Security Dialogue* 43(3), 2011, pp. 249-266.

solve them. Paradoxically, due to the complexity of energy issues, constant debates about energy projects related to strengthening energy security only delay the real solution. How should specific energy projects as “extraordinary measures” be separated from “business as usual” activities?

While recognising the specific difficulties, the Copenhagen School addresses, in describing the concept of “extraordinary measures”, certain criteria that could help to determine how “untypical” an energy project is.

**1. The novelty of a certain energy project:** New energy initiatives in comparison to those that are continued and already characteristic to specific political and economic conditions may be treated as exceptional and extraordinary.

**2. The cost of an energy project:** The more investment required by a certain energy project, the more untypical as an energy security measure it should be.

**3. The scale of an energy project:** The more actors that are involved in a project, the more difficult it is to reach agreed solutions. In this sense, regional (transnational) and national energy projects should be separated. Regional initiatives with partners from several states or other international actors require more time and funds for implementation, and are treated as untypical in comparison to national, usually small-scale projects.

**4. The implementation term:** The following general rule should be applied – the more time it takes to implement a project, the more difficult and untypical it is. There should be a greater need to maintain public and political support for time-intensive projects. A simple classification into short-term projects (up to 3 years), mid-term projects (3–5 years) and long-term projects (from 5 years) could be proposed.

Next, specific cases of energy securitization in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine are analysed, and the previously mentioned characteristics of “intensity of securitization” and “extraordinary measures” are applied.

### **3. Securitisation of energy in Estonian strategic documents**

The Estonian balance of primary energy resources is based on domestic oil shale, which constitutes 78% of total energy production. The share of other domestic fuels is modest – the production of wood constitutes 19%, production of peat 2%, and wind and hydro-energy 1%. Although 65% of primary energy is produced from local energy resources, Estonia cannot meet its total demand for energy and is forced to import liquid fuels. Together with natural gas, these consist

of more than 90% of Estonian imports.<sup>13</sup> Almost all liquid fuel and natural gas is imported from Russia. However, the overall dependency on imports from Russia is quite small because of the large proportion of domestic production. Due to the small proportion of natural gas in the energy balance, Estonia's dependence on Russia is not significant.<sup>14</sup>

### **3.1. National security concept of Estonia**

According to the Estonian National Development Plan of the Energy Sector 2020, energy independence is defined as the largest portion of imported energy resources in the overall energy balance. In accordance with this definition, Estonia is characterised as one of the most independent European states. However, the question of Estonia's energy dependence has still been raised in its National Security Concept.

The energy sector is not prioritised over other security sectors such as cyber security, transport infrastructure, security of the financial system and the environment. Energy security is quite an "ordinary" sector, with specific objectives, and only one crucial threat is mentioned – the dependence on local oil shale resources.<sup>15</sup> In order to secure its energy needs and diversify energy sources, the strategy stresses the importance of Estonia's interconnection with the EU electricity and gas system and the implementation of EU energy policy objectives such as efficient energy consumption. That means the rational use of oil shale and the extensive introduction of renewable energy technologies. Besides, additional connections with the Baltic states, Nordic countries and Poland will diversify the country's sources of energy and reduce its dependence on Russia as the dominant energy supplier.

To conclude:

1. The energy sector is defined as one of the national security sectors. However, being relatively independent regarding energy imports due to significant local energy sources, Estonia has not prioritised the energy sector over others.

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<sup>13</sup> Naaber, M., Overview of Estonian Energy Policy. Research Paper. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011. Available at <[http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_29589-1522-2-30.pdf?11120117265](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29589-1522-2-30.pdf?11120117265)> [3 12 2012].

<sup>14</sup> National Development Plan of the Energy Sector until 2020 (2009) of Estonia, adopted by *Riigikogu* on 9 March 2009.

<sup>15</sup> National Security Concept of Estonia, adopted by *Riigikogu* on 12 May 2012. Available at <[http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National\\_Security\\_Concept\\_of\\_Estonia.pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf)> [3 12 2010]

2. Energy threats have not been prioritised either. The crucial one is Estonia's dependence on oil shale – the dominant local energy source. In order to diversify energy consumption, Estonia could increase its share of imported energy sources, strengthening its energy dependence on external suppliers. However, the risk of growing energy dependence is scarcely probable in the short term; thus, Estonia securitizes the potential internal energy problem, which may threaten its energy sector in the future.
3. Estonia's measures to strengthen energy security are supported by implementing EU energy policies and integrating with the EU energy market.

### **3.2. The development plan for Estonia's energy sector up to 2020**

Estonia's energy strategy, adopted by *Riigikogu* in 2009, is a complex document that is implemented through the development plans of different sub-sectors, such as the Development Plan of Estonian Electricity Sector up to 2018, the National Development Plan for the Use of Oil Shale for 2008-2015, the Development Plan for Enhancing the Use of Biomass and Bioenergy for 2007-2013 and the Energy Conservation Programme for Estonia for 2007-2013. Hence, concerning Estonian energy security measures, the whole legislative basis of energy politics shall be taken into account.

According to Estonian energy strategy, the objectives of the energy sector are as follows:

1. Continuous energy supply. Measures and activities planned for the achievement of this objective are described below.
  - a) Diversification of energy supply through the distribution of energy sources in the energy balance. In 2010, oil shale formed 80% of Estonia's internal energy balance. As stated in the energy strategy, such a large share of one fossil fuel in the total energy production is not practical due to energy security and climate considerations.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, diversification of the energy portfolio is needed. In order to reach a target of 30% of oil shale in the energy balance by 2020, the implementation of long-term national energy projects related to the development of renewable energy sources and wind farms is planned. Additionally, a new power-plant project has recently been begun by the Estonian government. The power plant, located in Narva, will be fuelled by local oil shale and supplied with

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<sup>16</sup> National Development Plan of the Energy Sector until 2020 (2009) of Estonia.

two 300 MW units for a fossil-fuel power plant based on Circulating Fluidised Bed (CFB) boiler technology. Although it won't be a new project, it will be based on fairly new efficiency-oriented technology. Besides, when the project is implemented, it will be definitely one of the most expensive.<sup>17</sup>

- b) Development of new electricity and natural gas connections. This measure refers to new and previously implemented regional and long-term projects such as an electricity connection between Estonia and Finland, 'Estlink 2', as well as the implementation of the Baltic Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) in cooperation with other EU member states, particularly the Baltic states.

2. Sustainable supply and energy consumption is the second priority. In order to meet this objective, the efficiency of the use of oil shale is to be improved. As stated in the strategy, the use of oil shale for electricity production will be continued in the interests of Estonia's energy security, but this should be carried out in a more environmentally friendly way. This objective shall be met by investing in new technologies and the infrastructure of power plants such as Narva and Kiisa.

Three out of four energy projects that Estonia has recently implemented are not new, national and short- or medium-term (Table 1). These are Estlink 2, the prototype of the first undersea electricity cable, completed in 2006; the modernisation of existing power plants such as Kiisa and Narva; and development of wind farms. Taking into account the price of these projects, they may be described as ordinary measures. Although the total cost of 'Estlink 2' is 320 million euros, it is not the largest investment for the Estonian energy sector.<sup>18</sup> The cost of modernising the existing energy infrastructure (power plants) is just 17.3 million euros. Finally, the development of two new wind farms will cost 92 million euros.

To sum up, as a country with low dependency on energy from outside sources, Estonia is not keen on securitizing its energy sector. The securitization intensity is rather low and extraordinary measures do not prevail in the implementation of energy policy. This indicates that Estonia implements a rather comprehensive and rational energy policy – non-securitization of the energy sector leads to quite "ordinary" political measures to strengthen Estonia's energy security. This example shows that energy problems may be solved successfully without their securitization.

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<sup>17</sup> According to Eesti Energia, the contract for the new power plant reaches 950 million euros. Available at <<http://www.alstom.com/press-centre/2011/1/press-releases-power-plant-estonia/>>

<sup>18</sup> European Commission endorses Estlink 2 investment. Estonia.eu 2 July, 2012. Available at <<http://estonia.eu/news/150-european-commission-endorses-estlink-2-investment.html>>.

**Table 1.** Estonia's energy projects

PROJECT	CRITERIA FOR EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES				<i>Extraordinary /typical</i>
	New	Cost of project	Regional	Long-term	
Estlink 2	-	+	+	-	Typical
New power plant in Narva	+	-/+ (new power plant technology)	-	-/+ (medium-term)	(extra)ordinary
Modernisation of Narva/Kiisa power plants	-	-	-	-	Typical
Wind farms	-	+	-	-	Typical

#### 4. Securitisation of energy in Lithuanian strategic documents

After the shutdown of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, Lithuania's energy system became highly dependent on imports of electricity and fossil fuels. Lithuania does not have sufficient fossil fuel in-ground resources to fully satisfy its energy needs and is forced to import more than 80% of its energy from Russia. The level of energy dependence has been growing for several years. There was a high increase in the level of Lithuanian dependence on imported liquid fuels, from 48.8% in 2009 to 79.4% in 2010.<sup>19</sup> Consumption of renewable energy sources has also been growing; in 2010 this constituted 15.2% of the total energy balance. However, this is still not sufficient to decrease Lithuania's dependence on imported fossil fuels. Another feature of Lithuania's energy sector is its isolation from the EU energy system. There are no electricity connections with continental Europe. As part of the Eastern BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) interconnection ring, Lithuania feels more vulnerable to interruptions to its energy supply or large price fluctuations than countries with diversified and self-sufficient energy systems.

<sup>19</sup> Department of Lithuanian Statistics (Vilnius), Energy statistics of 2010. Report of Department of Lithuania's statistics, 15 June, 2011.

#### 4.1. Lithuania's national security strategy

The importance of energy security is strengthened in the latest National Security Strategy of Lithuania (henceforth, “the strategy”), adopted in 2012. Firstly, energy security is identified as one of the country's vital interests. Ensuring a stable and reliable energy supply from diversified sources, and Lithuania's integration into the EU energy system, are targets of the national security policy. Secondly, the significance of energy problems is underlined in the description of risks and threats to national security. Economic and energy dependence is the first security risk mentioned in the strategy. In this sense, the challenges within Lithuania's energy sector are prioritised, among other risks and threats to national security. Unlike Estonia, Lithuania mostly securitizes actual problems and challenges to the energy sector. These are: the dominance of a single external energy supplier; and the isolation of Lithuania from the EU energy system, making it an ‘energy island’ without internal energy resources, etc.<sup>20</sup> To sum up:

1. The vulnerability of Lithuania's national security depends on the reliability of the energy sector. The more challenges Lithuania faces in the energy sector, the more vulnerable its national security is. The importance of energy determines that the energy sector is thought to be an independent and vital sector of national security.
2. Risks and threats to the energy sector are the most important.
3. Energy problems are securitized because of Lithuania's complicated energy situation – the scarcity of internal energy resources and, as a result, the dependence on a single external supplier. Thus, *de facto* existing and external problems of the energy sector, particularly energy dependence on Russia, have been securitized in the strategy.

#### 4.2. National Energy (Energy Independence) Strategy

In order to ensure energy independence before 2020, the most ambitious measures are to be implemented. These are initiatives in the electricity, heating, gas and oil sectors, as well as renewable resources and energy efficiency.

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<sup>20</sup> National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania (2012), adopted by Seimas on 26 June 2012. Available at <[http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc\\_l?p\\_id=428241&p\\_query=&cp\\_tr2=2](http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=428241&p_query=&cp_tr2=2)> [3 07 2012].

1. Electricity is one of the most important sectors for energy security. The focus is on strategic projects, which have a crucial impact on ensuring the country's energy independence.

- a) In order to reach full integration into the European energy system by synchronising with the European Continental Network, power links with Poland (LitPol Link) and Sweden (NordBalt) are to be completed. These are brand new projects that will be crucial for the whole Baltic region, connecting it with the EU energy system. According to the Lithuanian electricity transmission system operator, Litgrid, the cost of the LitPol Link may reach 371 million euros, more than 174 million of which will be invested by Lithuania.<sup>21</sup> Meanwhile, the total price of the NordBalt project is planned to be 550 million euros, with 232 million euros of Lithuania's investment.<sup>22</sup> Two electricity lines will be built before 2020, so these are long-term projects. Taking into consideration the price and the project term of the two links, these measures should be described as having features of 'extraordinariness'.
- b) A new nuclear power plant (Visaginas NPP) is Lithuania's main strategic project. However, it is not a new strategy, as the Ignalina nuclear power plant was commissioned in 1983. Although Ignalina NPP was shut down in 2010, Lithuania has never given up its ambitious to remain a nuclear state. In this regard, the Visaginas NPP project does not satisfy the first criterion of extraordinary energy measures. Despite this, the project is definitely untypical for Lithuania. Firstly, the preliminary cost of the plant will fluctuate from 3.5 to 5 billion euros, an unprecedented level of investment for Lithuania. Secondly, this is a regional project, ensuring additional – but vital – electricity capacities for Lithuanian co-partners Latvia and Estonia. Finally, the new nuclear power plant is scheduled to be commissioned in 2020, so this is a long-term project. In this regard, Visaginas NPP meets three out of four criteria and may be described as an extraordinary measure<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> Poderys, V., "Jungtis su Lenkija ir Švedija ir Lietuvos perdavimo tinklo naujos struktūros vieta Europos vieningame tinkle (supertinkle)" ["Electricity links with Poland and Sweden and the place of Lithuania's new-structured powergrid in the single (super) powergrid of the EU"]. Report. Available at <[http://www.lsta.lt/files/seminarai/2011\\_0926\\_LM\\_konferencija/19\\_Litgrid%20Virgilijus%20Poderys.pdf](http://www.lsta.lt/files/seminarai/2011_0926_LM_konferencija/19_Litgrid%20Virgilijus%20Poderys.pdf)> [11 05 2011].

<sup>22</sup> National Energy (Energy Independence) Strategy (2012), adopted by Seimas on 26 June 2012. Available at <<http://www.lrv.lt/EP/strategija-EN.pdf>> [1 08 2012].

<sup>23</sup> On 14 October 2012 an advisory referendum on the construction of a new nuclear power station was

2. The most progressive initiative in the gas sector is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal, which should diversify the supply of natural gas. This is another completely new energy project recently implemented by Lithuania. Taking into consideration the costs, the LNG terminal is one of the most expensive projects of recent years,<sup>24</sup> and is planned to be built and launched by 2014. Although the LNG terminal is a national and short-term project, it is thought to be an untypical one.

3. The Lithuania–Poland gas pipeline is a prospective future project which would be untypical for Lithuania. According to preliminary project assessment, investment may reach 47 million euros. Besides, its regional significance is stressed in Lithuania’s energy strategy. It is stated that the gas pipeline between Lithuania and Poland is strategically important on a regional level, allowing the connection of the Baltic states’ and Polish and Western European gas networks.<sup>25</sup> The project is planned to be finished by 2016, so it may be identified as untypical.

**Table 2.** Lithuania’s energy projects

PROJECT	CRITERIA FOR EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES				<i>Extraordinary /typical</i>
	New	Cost of project	Regional	Long-term	
Visaginas NPP	+	+	+	+	Extraordinary
LitPol Link NordBalt	+	+	+	-/+ (medium-term)	Extraordinary
LNG Terminal	+	+	-	+	Extraordinary
Lithuania– Poland gas pipeline	+	+	+	+	Extraordinary

Most of Lithuania’s energy projects described above can be evaluated as extraordinary measures, determined to assure energy independence (Table 2).

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held in Lithuania and the proposal was rejected. However, the new government of Lithuania is still undecided as to whether to continue with this project.

<sup>24</sup> According to Klaipėdos nafta, which is implementing the LNG terminal project and will pay for Norway’s Høegh LNG company, that covers a 10-year lease of a maritime platform for importing liquefied gas, along with regasification devices, at 520 million euros. The ship, which functions as a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit, will cost 250 million euros.

<sup>25</sup> National Energy (Energy Independence) Strategy (2012).

Although none of the projects have been implemented yet, there is a strong political will to implement them, despite the controversy they have already caused. As the most dependent on external energy supply, Lithuania is the country that securitizes her energy sector in the most intensive way, and most of the measures which Lithuania has recently implemented are extraordinary, i.e., they are new, expensive, regional and medium- to long-term. If these projects were implemented, the securitization of Lithuania's energy sector could be treated as reasonable political tool in order to legitimise energy projects and ensure energy security.

## **5. Securitisation of energy in Polish strategic documents**

Poland is challenged by the same problem as Lithuania – energy dependence on a dominant external energy supplier. The country imports nearly 90% of its crude oil and 66% of its natural gas. What is more, 95% of imported crude oil and 80% of gas comes from Russia. However, as the largest producer of hard coal in the EU, Poland has balanced its energy consumption with local coal resources. Hence, coal constitutes 58% of the overall structure of energy sources, and imported oil and natural gas constitute 28% and 13% respectively. Although Poland's hard coal reserves are key strategic fuel for power generation, making energy by burning coal produces twice as much CO<sub>2</sub> emissions as burning natural gas, and Poland will have to change its energy balance in order to meet EU environmental standards. According to Poland's national energy strategy, the country's energy mix is going to change over the next two decades due to a rise in the use of renewables, natural gas and nuclear energy.<sup>26</sup> Poland's energy profile is therefore shaped both by vast domestic coal reserves and a heavy reliance on imported fuels, of which gas is of particular political and economic importance.

### **5.1. Poland's national security strategy**

In contrast to Lithuania and Estonia, Poland does not specify the energy sector as independent in its national security strategy. Energy is an integrated sector of the economy, and is one of the most significant. Measures of energy security are identified in the section on economic policy. As stated in the strategy,

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<sup>26</sup> Sprawozdanie z wyników monitorowania bezpieczeństwa dostaw energii elektrycznej (2011) [Report of Poland's Ministry of Economy] Ministerstwo Gospodarki. Warszawa 2011.

the main targets of economic policy are the development of energy infrastructure, the modernisation of the national electricity system, and implementation of new electricity grids, etc.<sup>27</sup>

The main energy challenge is stated to be Poland's dependence on external energy suppliers. In this context, one more risk is mentioned – the use of energy resources for political ends by some countries, particularly Russia. Thus, the main source of threats is thought to be other states that Poland is dependent on and which may use this dependence in order to reduce Poland's energy (and economic) security. On the other hand, in securitizing its energy dependence on Russia as the dominant energy supplier, Poland ignores its internal energy problems, such as the ineffectiveness of the energy sector because of coal overuse. Such selective securitization of energy problems is thought to be unreasonable.

To sum up:

1. The energy sector is one of the prioritised sectors of the economy but is not an independent sector of national security.
2. Energy threats are important, but are not vital. The main source of threats is external in nature, coming from other states, particularly Russia.
3. Poland does not identify its energy sector problems with national threats. Internal energy problems are not mentioned in the strategy and are not securitized.

## **5.2. Poland's energy policy to 2030**

Poland's energy strategy has been systematically reviewed and amended every four years since the late 1990s. The latest version of the document was prepared in 2009 by the Polish government and provides a comprehensive vision of the energy sector, its drawbacks and perspectives. The strategy provides a coherent list of urgent problems in the national energy sector, which – in contrast to those in the National Security Strategy of Poland – are much more relevant. The improvement of energy efficiency is the first basic target mentioned in the strategy. Of course, energy efficiency is only one step toward the overall goal of energy security; this also refers to other priorities in Polish energy policy, such as improvements in overall energy security, the wider use of renewables, the development of competitive energy and electricity markets, and so on. However, after comparison of the contents

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<sup>27</sup> National Security Strategy of Poland, adopted by the Council of Ministers. Available at <[http://www.bbn.gov.pl/portal/pl/475/1144/Strategia\\_Bezpieczenstwa\\_Narodowego\\_RP.html](http://www.bbn.gov.pl/portal/pl/475/1144/Strategia_Bezpieczenstwa_Narodowego_RP.html)> [3 04 2012].

of the two above-mentioned strategic documents, the change in the problems of energy sector that have been securitized has been noted. In the national security strategy, priority is given to Polish reliance on external supplies of energy resources; meanwhile, in the energy strategy, the main object of securitization is the energy sector's internal problems, mainly energy efficiency. Actions that influence all of the targets set in the energy strategy can be distinguished by the following concrete actions: power diversification through the construction of nuclear power plants; development of an LNG terminal; and increased investment in energy-efficiency measures at a residential level.

1. Development of nuclear energy: although the debate on building a nuclear power plant in Poland had continued for more than four decades, the concept of adding nuclear power to the Polish energy mix was revived in 2005 and was subsequently included in the nation's overall energy policy strategy. More recently, in the newest energy strategy, the development of nuclear energy was stated to be a vital direction for energy policy. A project for two planned nuclear plants, which has already satisfied all of the regulatory procedures (environmental impact assessment, investment, nuclear waste management and a public communication/outreach programme), marked the beginning of the nuclear era of Polish history. In this context, the project should be treated as an extraordinary measure. The cost of the project confirms the uniqueness of this measure. According to Poland's state-owned, largest power group, PGE, the preliminary cost will fluctuate from 15 to 18 billion euros between 2012 and 2035. The project is planned to be implemented by 2030. Although it is not a regional but a national project, it satisfies three out of four criteria and may be described as an extraordinary measure.

2. Construction of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście is the Polish answer to the question of its heavy reliance on Russia as a single supplier of natural gas. As in Lithuania, Polish LNG is also a completely new project, the implementation of which was accelerated after 2008 when the Polish government declared it a project of strategic significance. The terminal should start operating by 2014. Like the nuclear power plant project, the LNG terminal is untypical due to its costs, which may reach 600 million euros. The terminal has also garnered the interest of the European Union (EU), which perceives it not only as an important tool for increasing Polish energy security but also as representing a possibility for the Baltic states to diversify their gas supply through the Polish terminal. As a result, the EU decided to co-finance this investment by granting roughly 8 million euros from the European Energy Plan for Recovery Fund.<sup>28</sup> Although Poland has already stressed

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<sup>28</sup> Nyga-Łukaszewska H., Poland's Energy Security Strategy, 2011. Report.

the regional significance of the project, other Baltic states haven't shared this view. To sum up, the Polish LNG terminal, with some reservations, may be described as an extraordinary measure.

3. Renewables and alternative energy sources play a part in the diversification of the energy mix.

- a) In order to support energy generation from renewable energy sources, a particular support system has been introduced. This system is based on the possibility of obtaining certificates of origin, known as 'green certificates'.<sup>29</sup> This initiative is quite new; it was introduced in 2005, but started operating in 2010. In order to create a market for the certificates, in which generating electricity from renewables would be supported, investments reaching 180 million euros for the 10-year period between 2010 and 2020 have been provided. Although this is a new kind of measure for Poland, which has just started promoting its 'green policy', no other criteria for extraordinariness would apply.
- b) One more alternative in order to meet EU targets on reducing greenhouse gas emissions is shale gas. It is also believed that tapping Poland's own gas deposits could assure strategic energy independence from Russia. Although Poland is thought to have the largest deposits of shale gas in Europe, drilling the shale gas is still an alternative, but not a real energy security measure. Besides, this new policy direction would be extremely expensive for Poland, but would have regional significance in spreading the shale gas revolution in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, shale gas should be treated as a future direction for Polish energy policy.

In conclusion, Poland is keen on securitizing its dependence on external energy suppliers, but its energy policy is a coherent plan for addressing multiple challenges – external energy threats together with the internal problems of the Polish energy sector, which are not securitized with the same intensity. Poland's plans to build nuclear facilities and an LNG terminal, as well as exploring shale gas, are types of extraordinary measures. Meanwhile, some of the energy projects have been successfully started in an "ordinary" way, without them being proclaimed as a response to security issues. For example, in order to meet EU renewables and emission standards, Poland has taken RES and nuclear development initiatives.

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<sup>29</sup> Energy generated from renewable sources supported by the project includes electricity generated in particular by: a) hydro-plants and wind farms, b) biomass and biogas-based sources, c) solar photovoltaic cells and thermal collectors, d) geothermal sources, and e) energy recovered from the incineration of municipal waste.

Although these measures could be described as extraordinary, they have been implemented without any securitization. Poland's energy policy is reasonable and comprehensive – only sensitive issues such as energy dependence on Russia are securitized and solved with extraordinary measures; other challenges are tackled without official securitization. This would support the hypothesis that securitization is not always necessary to tackle energy issues.

**Table 3.** Poland's energy projects

PROJECT	CRITERIA FOR EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES				<i>Extraordinary /typical</i>
	New	Cost of project	Regional	Long-term	
LNG terminal	+	+	-	-/+ (medium-term)	Extraordinary
NPP	+	+	-	+	Extraordinary
RES	+	+	-	+	Extraordinary
<i>Shale gas</i>	+	+	-	+	Possibly Extraordinary

## 6. Securitisation of energy in Ukrainian strategic documents

Owing to its Soviet-inherited energy infrastructure, Ukraine's primary advantage in the energy field is the transit of oil and gas to Europe. Possessing the largest system of gas and oil pipelines in Europe, spread over 37,500 km, Ukraine is capable of delivering around 56 million tonnes of oil and 180 million cubic metres of natural gas per year.<sup>30</sup> What is more, Ukraine has large reserves of oil, natural gas and coal. These advantages of Ukraine's energy sector, however, are not enough to ensure Ukraine's energy security, and the country faces some significant risks. First, partly due to the lack of modernisation of its Soviet-era energy infrastructure,

<sup>30</sup> Kapitonenko M., "Ukrainian energy security: Between mortgage and profit. On wider Europe". In *Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program*, 2012. Sirijos Gira V., Ukrainos gamtinių dujų transportavimo sistemos modernizacija: Ukrainos kaip „energetinio įkaito“ sindromas. [The modernization of Ukraine's natural gas transportation system: an "energy hostage" syndrome of Ukraine.] In *Rytų pulsas* 5(33), pp. 1-10, 2010.

Ukraine's economy consumes too much energy. It requires about two times more energy per GDP unit than the world average. Ukraine's own production covers only about 25% of its consumption, while the remaining 75% is imported, mainly from Russia and Turkmenistan. Not only the gas transportation system, but the whole Ukrainian energy sector, needs appropriate investment for modernisation.

### **6.1. Ukraine's national security strategy**

The latest version of the strategy was approved in 2012. Energy security is given top priority in an overview of security threats and risk assessment. As stated in the strategy, exhaustion of traditional energy resources and increased competition for access to them and control over their transportation routes are the main global trends that are extremely important to Ukraine.<sup>31</sup> Some internal energy problems are mentioned in the strategy, too: Ukraine's heavy reliance on imported energy sources; its ineffective use of national energy potential and local energy sources; and a too-slow integration process with the EU Energy Community. The risk assessment shows that energy is thought to be an independent and significant sector of national security, and the target of ensuring energy security is a vital national interest. It should be mentioned that in a previous version of the strategy, from 2007, such a formal separation of the energy sector did not exist and energy was claimed to be a branch of the economic sector.

The main targets of the energy sector are diversification of energy supply sources; increased use of new energy sources and the protection of existing ones; modernisation of the energy transportation system to ensure uninterrupted energy supplies for the internal and external markets, etc.<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile, the main tool for solving these problems is expected to be Ukraine's cooperation with the EU, based on financial support from the EU to modernise the Ukrainian energy system.

Energy plays a pivotal role in Ukraine's national security strategy and Ukraine realises the seriousness of the energy challenges the country has recently addressed. Being a matter of great concern, energy is securitized in the strategy:

1. The energy sector is placed as equal to other sectors and is even one of the most significant.
2. Energy threats are treated as seriously as other threats.

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<sup>31</sup> National Security Strategy of Ukraine (Ukraine in the Changing World), 2010. Available at <[http://www.dsaua.org/images/docs/2011.02.08%20nss\\_ukraine\\_project.pdf](http://www.dsaua.org/images/docs/2011.02.08%20nss_ukraine_project.pdf)> [23 05 2012]

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

3. Problems of the energy sector that are securitized in the strategy are not only external, but also internal in their nature – from Ukraine’s reliance on imported energy sources and its dependence on Russia in particular, to inefficiency in its own energy sector and large energy consumption.

## **6.2. Ukraine’s energy strategy for the period up to 2030**

The energy strategy was approved in 2006 as a manifest of legal instruments that shape the energy sector’s regulatory environment and other instruments more international in character. The main objectives of the strategy are: increased Ukrainian GDP through efficient development of the fuel and energy infrastructure; creation of the necessary environment to ensure that the demand for energy products can always be met; improvement of Ukrainian energy security; improvement in energy efficiency, etc.<sup>33</sup> Energy (inter)dependence on Russia and other previously mentioned problems in the energy sector have been considered in most of the newest strategic draft documents, which have not been adopted yet. However, Ukraine has no reliable legislative basis regulating the process of decreasing its energy dependence on Russia. Without a strong legal basis, the energy strategy cannot become an efficient document in fighting the challenges Ukraine has recently faced. Despite some of the drawbacks of this document, tools and measures to reach the targets of the energy policy are as follows:

1. Problems referring to the oil supply could be solved by the extension of the Ukrainian–Polish Odessa–Brody pipeline to Poland’s port of Gdansk and refinery in Plock. The pipeline is designed to pump oil from the Caspian Sea to Europe, bypassing Russia. The project is the first and only initiative in the oil sector directed at decreasing Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia. Its costs may reach 3.6 to 14.4 billion euros and that would be the main argument for calling this project an extraordinary one. Despite the potential of the project, it hasn’t progressed for several years and may not be brought back to life. Ukraine is not the only partner showing little interest in continuing the initiative, but there are some internal factors forcing Ukraine to delay the expansion of the pipeline, such

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<sup>33</sup> Energy strategy of Ukraine for the period up to 2030, 2006. Available at <[http://www.google.com/#hl=en&tbo=d&q=energy+strategy+of+ukraine+till+2030&revid=850947698&sa=X&psj=1&ei=5ve8UKmWD8SLswbjloHYBw&ved=0CGUQ1QIoAA&bav=on.2,or.r\\_gc.r\\_pw.r\\_qf.&fp=a97ff67a64e84980&cbpcl=39314241&biw=1366&bih=615](http://www.google.com/#hl=en&tbo=d&q=energy+strategy+of+ukraine+till+2030&revid=850947698&sa=X&psj=1&ei=5ve8UKmWD8SLswbjloHYBw&ved=0CGUQ1QIoAA&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.&fp=a97ff67a64e84980&cbpcl=39314241&biw=1366&bih=615)> [12 03 2012].

as its old and unreliable energy infrastructure as well as Ukraine's vulnerability to Russian lobbying and pressure to delay the project.

2. The development of nuclear energy is not a new direction for Ukraine's energy policy, because the country is heavily dependent on nuclear energy – it has 15 reactors generating about half of its electricity. In mid-2011 the Ukrainian energy strategy to 2030 was updated, and the role of nuclear power in the electricity sector was emphasised. In mid-2012 the policy was again updated, and 5000 to 7000 MWe of new nuclear capacity was proposed by 2030, costing some 18 billion euros. It should be mentioned that those extra capacities would be achieved by completing and modernising existing nuclear plants. Although Ukraine's projects for developing nuclear energy are not new and cannot be treated as extraordinary measures, according to the cost criterion they may be described as untypical, with some reservations. Thus, the preliminary costs of the modernisation process may reach between 1.4 and 3.7 billion euros. In June 2010 an intergovernmental agreement was signed, under which Russia will largely finance the project. Some 85% is to be financed through a Russian loan, with 15% of the funding coming from Ukraine. It seems that part of Ukraine's investments will not be as high as may have been expected. In this regard, the modernisation of previously commissioned nuclear plants is not treated as an extraordinary measure ensuring Ukraine's energy security.

3. One of the most innovative energy projects could be the LNG terminal. Plans for the construction of an LNG terminal to weaken dependence on Russian gas were first announced on the state level by the Ministry for Fuel and Energy in 2005. However, in contrast with Poland and Lithuania, Ukraine has taken no practical steps to implement the project. Ukraine's LNG terminal could be an untypical measure due to the 'novelty' criterion. There are some difficulties in evaluating the costs of the LNG terminal. According to preliminary estimates, construction of an LNG terminal may require 816 to 1443 million euros of investment.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, the scope of investments may be clarified after the feasibility study and development of the project's business plan. However, the implementation process has already stalled several times and the date when it should be finished is unknown.

Ukraine is a very specific case when comparing its proclamations on energy security and measures (especially the implementation process) to deal with energy

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<sup>34</sup> Razumkov Centre, "Diversification of Sources of Natural Gas Supply in Eurasia (2009)", In National Security and Defense. Available at [http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category\\_journal/NSD110\\_eng.pdf](http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD110_eng.pdf) [12 04 2012].

threats. Ukraine securitizes its energy dependence on Russia in quite an intense form, but takes no rational steps to solve these problems. Furthermore, it should be admitted that some actors on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides have an interest in maintaining the *status quo* between the states. In this context, securitization has not been used as a problem-solving technique, or as the basis for the legitimisation of extraordinary measures. This could lead to an assumption that Ukraine considers securitization only as a political trend or proclamation, without any rational usage in practical measures dealing with security issues.

**Table 4.** Ukraine's energy projects

PROJECT	CRITERIA FOR EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES				Cost of project
	New	Cost of project		New	
Odessa–Brody pipeline	-	+/-	+	+	Typical
Development of nuclear energy	-	-	-	+	Typical
<i>LNG terminal</i>	+	+	-	-	<i>Possibly Extraordinary</i>

## Conclusions

All the countries analysed – Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine – are securitizing energy issues; moreover, the securitization act is formalised comprehensively in strategic documents and the energy security sector has become, in most cases, a methodologically separate sector of national security, treated equally with “traditional” security sectors, like military, economic, political, social, etc. The formal inclusion of energy issues in national security agendas and more elaborate sector-level strategies (i.e., energy security strategies) could be named as cases of “successful securitization” processes.

The research extends Floyd's argument about the need to have a source of moral legitimacy for securitization and a positive outcome of security practices. In this study, the premise was that the dependence ratio on an external source of energy supply could serve as a legitimate reason to securitize energy issues. Moreover, this actual dependence on an external supply could be related to the

extent of securitization efforts (securitization intensity) and the selected security practice, i.e., what extraordinary measures are taken.

In the cases of Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, this rationale for securitization processes is confirmed: a higher energy-dependence ratio leads to more intense formal securitization and to more extraordinary measures (or energy projects that are untypical for certain countries). However, the Ukrainian case provides some interesting reservations. Although Ukraine is very dependent on supplies from Russia, and this situation serves as the main reason for the high securitization intensity of its energy sector, it does not lead to the sort of security practices considered likely. As the analysis of Ukrainian strategic documents exposes, Ukraine still tries to solve its energy problems in fairly typical ways; that is to say, with “business as usual” methods. Such a situation begs the question: why does Ukraine securitize the energy sector in a very intense manner when it does not need to attract support for extraordinary measures?

**Table 5.** The relationship of reasons, security intensity and extraordinary measures

	<b>Energy dependence ratio (share of imported energy sources, %)</b>	<b>Securitisation intensity (based on six criteria)</b>	<b>Number of extraordinary measures/projects</b>
Estonia	13	Low	1
Lithuania	82	High	3–4
Poland	32	Medium	2–3
Ukraine	69	High	1–2

The Ukrainian case should lead to the conclusion that a securitizing actor (the Ukrainian government) reacts inertly to the persistent problem of energy dependence and follows a general trend in the region to securitize the energy sector, but does not seek consistently to solve issues. Of course, there could be a lot of other obstacles to completing the securitization process successfully, but the investigation of such obstacles would be out of the sphere of securitization studies. The complete securitization process should involve not only the legitimisation for extraordinary measures but also the implementation of such measures in order to solve issues that would otherwise persist. An unfinished securitization process could mean that a securitizing actor does not always understand the rational purpose of securitization.

The Polish case is very helpful to explain whether securitization efforts are always needed to solve energy issues. This case shows that the securitization of some energy issues is likely, but not necessarily when implementing unusual energy projects or extraordinary measures. Poland is securitizing the issue of dependence on external supply to some extent, but only some extraordinary measures are included in this securitized agenda of energy policy. Some energy projects, which could be described as untypical for Poland, are not securitized and fall away from the security agenda. This could support the argument that implementation of untypical projects or extraordinary measures does not always provoke securitization efforts. In other words, the choice to securitize or not securitize some specific issues and measures still remains a freely selected instrument by the government (or other securitizing actor).