

Graeme P. Herd, Donald N. MacIver

1. Introduction

The principles, direction and major concerns of Lithuanian foreign and security policy have remained relatively constant since independence but the context of policy development and decision making has changed considerably and is likely to continue to do so.¹ With the disintegration of the Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the breakup of the Soviet Union the cold war political order disappeared unexpectedly quickly between 1989 and 1991. Then some CEE states expected to be in the EU within a decade. In the year 2000, however, it is clear that both the strategic environment and our conception of the nature of security have been transformed. If 'fear and hope' was the dominant leitmotif of the cold war era, it has been largely replaced by one of 'hope and fear'. Although policy makers in CEE still work in the shadow of the Soviet legacy, the experience of the last ten years has provided considerable grounds for hope that their efforts will bear fruit particularly in respect of convergence and integration with Western Europe. However, over the next ten years there may be a need for greater clarity and realism both to maintain the high levels of commitment to this project and to overcome the new obstacles that seem to be emerging.

The Kosovo campaign in 1999, more than any other factor, was instrumental in reshaping the conception of international security for the new century. Issues of humanitarian intervention and human rights have clashed with older ideas of state sovereignty and the primacy of internal, domestic jurisdiction and fixed territorial borders. The post-Cold War tension between rights of self-determination and the obligations of states to uphold their territorial integrity was a major feature of this conflict. It has provided a marker for those seeking to analyze the evolution of international security and is playing a key role in the reshaping of a new European security order.² The Kosovo campaign has brought into sharp focus a series of internal institutional challenges to the EU and NATO that will impact on the creation of an Euro-Atlantic security order.

The Kosovo campaign has also questioned the ability of prospective aspirant EU and NATO states to integrate by refocusing attention on democratic security-building in CEE. Transition policies, their effectiveness, direction and prospects for democratic consolidation or otherwise have all received greater coverage in the minds of policy-makers and publics. The role of regional hegemon to the East and the question of their integration or isolation from the emergent European security order will dominate the European security agenda in this century. These issues are of paramount importance to the effectiveness of CEE foreign and security policy strategies and an exploration of them and the challenges they pose is particularly timely in the month the post war unification of Europe is discussed in Nice.

2. The West and Internal Challenges to the European Security Order

¹ A version of this paper was first delivered by Graeme P. Herd at The Fifteenth Nordic and Third Baltic Sea, Peace Research Conference, *Northern Europe: Transformation, Integration, Conflicts*, December 8-9, 2000, University of Latvia, Riga

² James Gow, 'A Revolution in International Affairs', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2000, 293-306,

Throughout the 1990s both the EU and NATO have made new efforts to respond to the challenges of a changing security environment. NATO is no longer the 'cemetery for elephants' which some considered it to be at the beginning of the last decade, an evaluation which the Rome 1991 Strategic Concept (SC) did little to dispel. The 1997 NATO Madrid Summit addressed the issue of enlargement, agreeing to the admission of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. Mainly because of the objections from certain NATO members (especially the UK and US) admission of the remaining CEE states was delayed. This was particularly difficult for Lithuania, which had been perceived as a front runner, at least amongst the Baltic States. However, the expansion of NATO forged stronger links with CEE states and represented a triumph over internal organizational and external Russian resistance. The prospects of further enlargement were again affirmed at the NATO Washington Summit of April 1999. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) created an 'open door policy' to enlargement, buttressed by feedback mechanisms and a review process. The new SC, enabling the Alliance to engage in out-of-area activity, was also unveiled in Washington. During the Kosovo campaign it appeared that NATO policy was being created in a pragmatic and ad hoc manner, often through transatlantic UK-US phone calls. Although smaller NATO member states (which would include Lithuania if it were to accede) were left out of the decision-making loop, the informal and less structured mode of decision-making now in place may advance the cause of enlargement.

In the late 1990s the EU responded rapidly, at least by its previous standards, to the evolving security environment. The Franco-British St. Malo declaration (December 1998) has great significance for the further development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At St. Malo what was formally referred to as a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was upgraded to become a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).³ The announcement in the December 1999 Helsinki Summit of a series of EU defense initiatives focused attention on the EU's determination to create a crisis management capability: a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men on 12 month missions capable of deployment at 60 days notice. This force is to be created in order to carry out humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace making duties 'in and around Europe'. This will allow the EU a full role in security matters in Europe, as it will possess a 'capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces and the means to do so. The EU could thus become a 'one-stop shop', offering a wide range of policy options (economic, social, political and military) for the prevention or management of complex emergencies.

The EU has built upon the 1992 Petersburg tasks of 'search and rescue', conflict prevention and crisis management and peacekeeping, to integrate peacemaking into its functions. The Yugoslav conflict provided an impetus for institutional and mission adaptation. A realization that EU militaries lack command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) gathering capability, the deep trauma of Bosnia and the Serb-Croatian war (especially NATO's arming of the Croatian Grand Offensive against Serbia), have all contributed to the EU's predisposition to be proactive and decisive in democratic security-building. Although EU states currently provide 75percent of ground forces in Kosovo, at critical periods in the mid 1990s 'in the heart of Europe' it was only the United States that could provide any realistic possibility of a *pax Europa*. This humiliation has acted as a spur to the 'militarization' of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Although the 'pledging process' that has taken place at the Brussels

³ The EU has condoned the confiscation of the word Europe in its use of acronyms, ironically mirroring the image which Milan Kundera's essay *A Kidnapped West: The Tragedy of Central Europe* evoked, of a kidnapped Central Europe in bondage to the East during the Cold War. See: Iver B. Neumann, 'European Identity, EU Expansion and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus', *Alternatives*, Vol. 23, 1998, 379-416.

20 November EU Summit will boost the Rapid Reaction Force; it will not be until 2003 that the EU carries out its first full-scale military exercise. It is only then that the projected force ceases to be paper tiger and analysts and aspirant states will take the idea seriously.⁴

Despite these widespread and deep-seated changes within the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the challenges that loom ahead are perhaps even more serious than those of the previous ten years. These new challenges to dual enlargement emerge from EU and NATO states; they are generated by 'internal' issues' partly connected to concern about a diminished US role in European security. The US welcomed further development of ESDP, with the proviso that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's unacceptable 3D's ('decoupling', duplication and discrimination) had first been addressed.⁵ Moreover, Russia is no longer perceived as a global threat to US interests, lower now on its global security agenda than the Middle East or South East Asia.⁶ To understand the new security environment, the origin and nature of these internal challenges must be understood.

The first is whether the publics of EU and NATO states can be persuaded that further enlargement is worth the costs. These costs are economic, political and strategic. The economic cost can be measured in terms of increased euro-dollar tax bills. It is envisaged that Euro-Atlantic security community defense bills currently at around 1.5 percent to 2 percent of GDP will have to be raised to between 3 percent to 4 percent to finance enlargement.⁷ This is where the political cost is crucial. Ten years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the peace dividend has still to be delivered to increasingly disheartened taxpayers and it is questionable whether elites have the courage and political will to increase defense spending. It is uncertain how long they can continue to expend resources (energy, talent and expertise) on enlargement before the 'fatigue factor' makes a significant impact. Then there is the strategic cost, whether western elites are prepared to accept the implications of enlargement for their relations with Russia and the East, a critical part of the vision of European security in the twenty-first century.

The second issue is the nature of an enlarged European security community and the problem of managing expansion while maintaining effective decision-making within an enlarged Union. This question is of secondary importance to NATO with its newly acquired more informal decision-making culture. But it is critical to all EU enlargement debates. The parameters of the debate are blurred by splits within the EU over the intergovernmental ('a Europe of nation states') and federal visions of the EU and its entanglement with the question of whether deeper policy integration or a wider enlargement of the EU should have the first priority. As foreign and defense policy represents the *raison d'être* of the classical nation state, the battlegrounds over CEDP may in the future become deeply entrenched. Inter-governmentalists could press for the maintenance of unanimous voting on military cooperation and other policies including the widening of the EU and federalists for Qualified Majority Voting and policy

⁴ Alison J.K. Bailes, 'The EU's Future Role in Defense: Issues for the Baltic Region', *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2000/1 (5), 17-28.

⁵ Peter van Ham, 'Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia', *The Marshall Center Papers*, No. 1, 2000, 1-40. For an alternative voice, see: Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Living with a New Europe', *The National Interest*, no. 60, Summer 2000, 17-32.

⁶ Condoleezza Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1, January/February 2000, as George W. Bush's likely national security adviser, only addressed the issue of 'Europe' in one short paragraph.

⁷ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Director, Aspen Institute Berlin, Germany. Unpublished presentation at the Concluding Conference of the *Program on European Security*, Center for European Security Studies (CESS), The Netherlands, 7-10 November 2000.

deepening.⁸ The adoption of the CEDP implies consensus over the development of new political and institutional structures and decision-making processes. However these internal EU debates are resolved or managed, it is inevitable that they will contribute towards a slippage in the EU enlargement timetable. Aspirant states such as Lithuania can do little to speed this process and may well slow it down by indicating support one way or another on these complex and overlapping issues.

The third question is whether the European security order can deal with the conceptual difficulties centered on the contested nature of 'security' itself? Although it appears that there has been a closing of the security culture gap in the West in the 1990s (with Austria and Sweden debating joining NATO, Ireland PfP), EU and NATO states have had to redefine the meaning of security as the concept of security drifted apart at the strategic and operational level. The conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kosovo have challenged accepted Cold War notions of the causes of insecurity and conflict and highlighted the new sources of insecurity that are likely to dominate the 21st century. They have expanded the civilian non-military impact into security and sharpened debates in national security structures over the necessity of force projection capability as opposed to territorial defense.

However, at the strategic (nuclear) level, conceptually we find ourselves back in the 'graveyard for Cold War elephants', stuck with outdated ideas of offensive and defensive trade-offs (with the associated concepts of deterrence, flexible response and graduated escalation) between superpower blocs and their alliance systems within a Cold War paradigm. It is generally agreed that over the next ten years twelve new nuclear states will emerge. This in itself demands a reassessment of how the European security system is to develop. Here the geo-strategic range attributed to the EU's crisis management capability (4000 km) is puzzling – it is not clear why the EU should possess a rapid reaction response that takes troops to the Gulf, the Baltic States, Sierra Leone and Chad, but not Kinshasa, the Caspian or Central Asia. What is clear for aspirant states like Lithuania is that they are likely to have little or no influence over the nature and direction these debates take in the EU and NATO states.

3.The Challenges of Dual Enlargement in an Era of Transition

Lithuania's claim to lie at the cross roads of Europe has been given greater substance by the geo-strategic, economic and political shift of Europe's center of gravity eastwards, exemplified by the movement of Germany's capital from Bonn to Berlin and the integration of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO. Nevertheless, states on the eastern periphery of Europe, like Lithuania, are still in the process of transition and systemic change while also grappling with the challenges of dual accession to NATO and the EU. This creates demands that could overwhelm their complex transition projects. The quality of democratic transition is mainly determined by the length and character of communist dictatorship (70 years in Ukraine, 40 years in Lithuania), the nature of the political system before the communist take-over and the pace of development since then. Prospects for integration into the European security and economic order are thus heavily dependent on the ability of states to advance and consolidate their democratization projects.

Although the Iberian peninsula was integrated into the EU eleven years after the fall of Franco, eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall not one former communist state

⁸ For a lively and informed discussion of this issue, see: Jolyon Howorth, 'European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge?' *Chaillot Papers*, 43 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, November 2000), Chapter Three: 'Where is the CESDP leading us?' 83-87. The issue of small states and their security needs is generally recognized as under theorized.

has yet been integrated. The impact of 70 years of Sovietization presents unique challenges to integration and has dramatically lengthened the negotiation process for all Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members. Their legal, financial systems and labor legislation were artificially harmonized in the Soviet period. As a result of 'deep' Sovietization, these states face additional steep barriers to integration into the EU. This of course affects the Baltic states more than other CEE countries as they still have considerable transit trade with the former Soviet Union. All them suffered from the effects of the Russian economic collapse of 1998 and have not yet gained from the recovery that began earlier this year.

Moreover, although the EU is attempting to erode barriers and create an extremely secure internal community, it also aims for deeper integration of its members through the institutionalization of intensive multilateralism and the development of sub-national and European-level governance.⁹ As a result, the real danger arises that the former Soviet border could evolve into the economic and bureaucratic equivalent of a new Berlin wall, rather than Vladimir Putin's preferred 'gates into a democratic country'.¹⁰ Moreover, the spillover threats of deep Western recession (an economic earthquake or tsunami?) over the next ten years would have an immediate and detrimental impact on the economic and political stability of eastern Europe. Poland, for example, with 70 percent of her foreign trade now oriented westwards is particularly vulnerable to the combination of economic recession, declining Western economic interest in CEE and the dangers of protectionism. Whether CEE remains a source of cheap labor and a market for secondary products or a fully integrated part of the EU will all depend on border regimes – their location and their nature.

The Schengen agreement, for example, has important consequences for the EU's relationship with the East. Polish-Ukrainian relations are a case in point as 2 million people (shuttle-traders) travel across this border every month. If the Ukrainian economy is strengthened, the role of organized crime diminishes, and unemployment is reduced, then it is highly likely that a semi-transparent border will emerge. However, if prostitution, drug transit and other criminal activity prevail and predominate, then the EU's eastern frontiers will be 'hard' and impermeable. The flow of illegal Chinese migrants to the Russian Federation is estimated to exceed 2 million in 2000 according to the Federal Migration Service - 50,000 of which are calculated to travel on to Europe. Reportedly, there are currently 150,000 illegal migrants in Belarus from Central, South, and South East Asia, waiting to slip westwards.¹¹ Russia's human rights commissioner, Oleg Mironov, reports of a catastrophic rise in the export and trade of Russian citizens in the West, with over 500,000 women, children and young men from the FSU living illegally in Western Europe. They are subjected to sexual abuse and contribute to the trade in human organs, rendering Russia 'a reception, transit and dispatch country for the export of human commodities.'¹² Illegal migration and criminality will have a profound impact on both the ability of former Soviet territories to integrate into 'Fortress Europe' and on the perception in western capitals and public opinion over the desirability of further enlargement.

⁹ William Wallace, 'Europe after the Cold War: interstate order or post-sovereign regional system?' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, December 1999, 201-223.

¹⁰ *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 29 November 2000. Some analysts warn of the emergence of de facto 'silver' or 'paper curtain' or a cultural divide (where modernity is differently perceived). Such a barrier could also be characterized as the 'digital divide'; the adoption of e-commerce, Internet and mobile phone access linked to third generation (3G) technology is generally slower in the east due to outdated telecommunication infrastructures and financial systems.

¹¹ *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 27 July 2000.

¹² *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 21 July 2000.

The exclusion of Austria from the EU during 2000 resulted in a consequent rise of Euro-skepticism and presents a real danger for Lithuania. In Bulgaria the agricultural and industrial sector has already collapsed in order to meet EU entry requirements whilst Bulgarian borders have been opened to EU states, despite the maintenance of an EU visa regime.¹³ Romania's second round presidential elections run-off (10 December 2000) will be fought between the two extremes of the political spectrum. The electorate chose not to elect the extreme-nationalist neo-authoritarian demagogue, Corneliu Vadim Tudor of the Greater Romanian Party (GRM), who has promised to 'rule the country with a machine gun' and extract 'stadium justice'. They chose instead an ex-president 'reformed communist' populist, Ion Iliescu of the Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) who instigated the 1989 'palace coup' and then undermined systemic change in the 1990s.¹⁴ Vaclav Havel has warned that delayed integration would play into the hands of 'xenophobes, chauvinists and nationalists' and so threaten the regions stability, whilst moving westwards across the Schengen border, right wing populists warn of the perils of an eastern 'immigrant invasion.' Although delayed accession would not necessarily derail democratization projects in CEE, historical experience suggests that the international environment must be generally favorable for the consolidation of transition democratization phases. The Cold War 'threat from the East' could, in this worst case scenario, be replaced by a 'threat from the West' with the failure to 'bridge false fault lines'.

Any delay in enlargement will have a profound impact on the Baltic region, which started the integration process from a position of relative advantage to both the CEE states of SE Europe and the CIS countries. All Baltic states have undergone a dramatic economic strategic reorientation westwards, notably in their increased trade with the EU, which is also their biggest source of investment and new technology. Their combination of low cost labor with a skilled and versatile work force is likely to ensure that this continues and develops. In addition there are some significant regional factors favoring enlargement, including the expectation of extensive synergies with the Scandinavian countries who are also the principal cheerleaders of Baltic accession to the EU.¹⁵ Amongst the Baltic states Estonia is still considered the most prepared for EU membership, but it is still not certain that it will join in the first wave. Moreover, Lithuania and Latvia are catching up. In December 1999 the EU invited them to join the enlargement negotiations and the process of harmonizing legislation and institutional arrangements with the EU has been accelerated. Lithuania has forged new sub-regional relationships of its own, particularly with Denmark, which could provide similar economic benefits to those derived by Estonia from its close relationship with Finland.¹⁶ However, whilst the economic generators of integration are important, Lithuania, like the other Baltic states views the EU even more as a guarantee of security and independence of Russia: 'it is easier talking to the Russians from within the EU than

¹³ As a consequence, the Socialist Party opposition are planning to exploit voter dissatisfaction with the negative impact of reforms in the summer 2001 election by building their campaign around the slogan 'Enough is Enough!' With 17 percent unemployment, average monthly salaries at \$110 and widespread poverty amongst women and minorities, this is likely to prove an effective political platform. Margarita Asenova, 'The Schengen List impacts on Bulgarian elections', *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 4, No. 227, Part III, 22 November 2000.

¹⁴ V.G. Baleanu, 'Romania's November Elections: A Future Return to the Past?' *Conflict Studies Research Center Occasional Brief*, 17 November 2000, No. 80, 1-18.

¹⁵ Klaudijus Maniokas, 'Methodology of the EU enlargement: A Critical Appraisal', *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2000/1 (5), 35-60.

¹⁶ Russia was the most important source of Lithuania's imports (28 percent), but only the fourth-largest export partner (6.5 percent share) after Latvia, Germany, and Great Britain. *RFE/RL Baltic States Report* Vol. 1, No. 37, 5 December 2000.

from outside it.’¹⁷ Lithuania itself may not have much influence on the progress of enlargement but it will not miss any opportunity to advance it. The political elites are fully committed to the process and the final goal. They must ensure that this commitment and enthusiasm is sustained amongst their own electorate, which has recently shown signs of emulating its Danish counterpart.

Elites may feel confident that the logic of enlargement is widely accepted across Europe but, the longer its implementation is delayed, the more likely is enthusiasm for it to diminish. In the capital cities, like Vilnius, some citizens may enjoy lifestyles approximate to those in Western Europe, but this is accompanied by growing inequalities between rich and poor, skilled and unskilled, young and old, urban and rural, which could become seriously destabilizing in certain economic conditions. As it is, Poland apart, there is not a single case where a CEE government (or even coalition) has been returned to office. Finally, although there exists a myriad of regional organizations (BSCC, BSEC, CEFTA) they have proved largely cosmetic rather than effective training agents or ‘umbrellas of European security.’ As CEE states have competed for accession to Western institutions, they have turned their backs on each other and regional cooperation has withered as a result, increasing both the pressure to integrate and the exposure of those states that fail.

Notions of market-democratic transition frame the new post-communist security paradigm – successful transition is the key contemporary litmus test of ‘Europeanness’ Thus, CEE states have to overcome many challenges in order to accomplish the transformation from Soviet to post-Soviet society. This conception (transition = security) is reinforced by another – the idea that modernity is based on market-democratic development and represents post-Soviet security and stability, and that conversely ‘Soviet’ was indicative of failed modernization projects and instability. This dichotomy between past and present, instability and stability is proving to be a false one. The transition from communism to capitalism is producing some very mixed results. The ‘transition trap’ and the growth of hybrid models of development – such as ‘oligarchic capitalism’, ‘kleptocracies’, ‘nomenklatura capitalism’ and ‘illiberal democracies’ (characterized by ‘privatized parties’) - inevitably complicates regional attitudes to the new European security order and perceptions within the region. Attempts to reform the welfare state may lead to the emergence of ‘farewell’ or failed states within the region – that is states within which elementary protective functions are beyond the capacity of the state. The underlying cultural norms and constraints embedded within the social fabric of these states may well prove to be ‘capital’ of the wrong kind. These alternative models negate Fukuyama’s contention that ‘liberal democracy and market-orientated economic models are the only viable options for modern societies’.¹⁸

4.The East: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus?

The early 1990s belief that ‘democratic peace’ would spread quickly eastwards has proved optimistic. Ten years into transition, it is clear that other factors are also critical to the quality of democratic security within the region. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, Lithuania’s largest neighbors to the East, share the Soviet inheritance of distorted priorities, inept resource management and excessive militarisation of the industrial base. They also share the experience of a troubled transition. The EBRD’s *Transition Report*

¹⁷ Vijai Maheshwari, ‘Elites favor EU but voters worry’, *Financial Times*, 24 October 2000, quoting Raimundas Lopata, Director, *Institute of International Relations and Political Science*, Vilnius University.

¹⁸ ‘Survey: The New Geopolitics’, *The Economist*, July 31 1999, p. 4.

2000, the bank's latest annual survey of economic transition in the former eastern bloc, notes that the CIS (and in particular Central Asia) will need at least a decade of high growth to recover from the economic decline experienced since 1989.¹⁹ Transition has placed a profound stress on their economies and societies, evidenced by a 50percent+ GDP decline during the 1990s and high levels of international indebtedness leading to either a 'humiliating subordination' to the west or the possibility of a 'credit blockade'. For the post-Soviet Slavic Republics, the contemporary specter of 'coercion' through conditionality and 'intimidation' through structural reform ironically mirrors that of CEE dependency on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet, despite their shared past and present, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have different perspectives on future paths to integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

At the end of the first decade of post-communist governance, the consolidation of Russia's relationship with an enlarging European security order will prove central to stability in the post-Soviet world. Vladimir Putin has argued that: 'The fundamental principles which unite Europe are also the basis of policy of the Russian Federation. Russia has always been, is and will continue to be a European country in terms of its location, culture and level of economic integration.'²⁰ However, beneath the rhetoric, Russian perceptions of NATO are entirely negative and it remains to be seen whether Russia and the EU will develop a constructive or antagonistic relationship. The EU and the question of EU enlargement has yet to be 'politicized' or 'securitized' within the Russian Federation, but the preconditions are now emergent. Is there an identifiable broad spectrum of long term-shared interests between the EU and Russian Federation underpinned by a high degree of mutual confidence and understanding? Are these prerequisites for cooperation emerging, or will the EU lose Russia to diverging conceptions of European security, allowing the 'strategic partnership' to consist of limited foreign policy co-ordination outside of energy and raw material exports?

Why is it that, ten year after the end of the Cold War, so much uncertainty and so many unanswered questions still dominate the Russian foreign and security policy-making landscape? The answer lies in the inter-linked ambiguity and ambivalence associated with Russia's strategic orientation and the nature of power distribution within the Russian Federation. With Russia straddling the strategic axis from Kaliningrad in the West to Vladivostok in the Far East, a basic tension between the 'European' and 'Eurasian' identity of Russia dominated the formulation and evolution of her political culture. Three quarters of her population and one quarter of her territory lay in 'European Russia', her populations were Christian and the Russian elite adopted European-style court systems and became a European 'Great Power' in the 18th century. As Aleksey Arbatov, Deputy Head of the Duma Defense Committee, stated when asked which US presidential candidate was preferable to Russia: 'The picture is not all straightforward, and not only because there is no black and white answer, who is better and who is worse for us, but also because it is not entirely clear what our priorities are: is it Europe or Asia?'²¹ Perhaps Vladimir Putin has best expressed the ambiguity at the heart of Russia's relationship with Europe: 'Russia's position is unique. It is a Eurasian country but actually, it is more of a European state.'²²

The process of integrating Russia into a new European security order – a project for the 21st century – will largely stand and fall on a number of inter-linked issues that are

¹⁹ Ron Synovitz, 'EBDR Report sees big disparities between CIS and Central Europe', *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 4, No. 222, Part I, 15 November 2000. Ukraine's GDP is 37 percent of 1990 levels and according to the latest World Bank figures is 143 out of 160 (below Syria and Sri Lanka) in its development levels.

²⁰ *Russian Public TV*, Moscow, 29 May 2000.

²¹ *TV6*, Moscow, 8 November 2000.

²² *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 11 March 2000.

generated by the process of enlargement. Putin appears to be pragmatic and sincere, willing to build a partnership with the EU based on energy exports, consumer goods imports, industrial cooperation and combating international terrorism and organized crime. However, what will be the position of a Russian diaspora should the EU integrate post-Soviet Black and Baltic Sea states? What will be the impact of EU Schengen borders on the broader access of Russian exports (particularly agricultural goods and energy) to EU markets? How will Moscow and Brussels manage the status of Kaliningrad - Putin's so-called 'pilot project' or litmus test of Russian-EU co-operative capacity? Or, at the start of the 'revolution in international affairs', can Moscow and Brussels reach a consensus on the meaning of sovereignty and interdependence? What will be the nature and scope of Russia's participation within Europe's crisis management capability and the other regional defense projects following the EU Helsinki 1999 summit? Will Putin's Russia undertake structural reform, generate an improved investment environment and more effectively fulfill adopted decisions? The threat of large-scale EU sanctions against Russia over its conduct in Chechnya provides one dynamic capable of increasing anti-EU perceptions amongst the elite - only 2 per cent of 1,500 Russian citizens polled in April 2000 'totally trust the European Union'.²³ In the context of Russia's expulsion from the Council of Europe and high levels of anti-NATO attitudes after Kosovo, could general anti-Westernism and a growing isolationism spillover into an anti-EU sentiment?

For post-Yeltsin's Russia, key internal questions remain to be answered, all of them revolving round the central question - how stable is the Russian Federation? At the end of Arbatov's interview, he added a second variable that will influence Russia's relations with the US: 'What are we going to do in our own country? Depending on our own conduct, we will fare better with one candidate or another'.²⁴ The raft of reforms which Putin has proposed since his inauguration and rammed through the *Duma* and Federation Council have highlighted key questions that have yet to receive definitive answers eight years after the adoption of a Federal Treaty. Would Russia 'backslide from democracy to totalitarianism?' Would the federal district representatives usurp powers and interfere in the activities of regional governors? Would the weakening of the regions necessarily make the center stronger? Does such fundamental reform, particularly to the Federation Council, necessitate constitutional change? Or will the reform process stagnate, falling prey to over-lapping competing jurisdictions and so serve as a crude mechanism for checks-and-balances between competing institutions? Will the concentration of federal functions into seven centers lead to the emergence of de facto 'inter-regional capital cities', the inequitable distribution of federal resources, the division of regional leaders into first and second class? Would this in turn lead, ultimately, to the disintegration of the Russian Federation through the creation of powerful, economically and politically integrated inter-regional associations ('quasi-states' or 'quasi-republics'), and so result in the formation of a confederation? Or would the change prove more rhetorical than real, providing a cloak for Putin's efforts to broaden his personal power base and so secure his regime?

Ukraine could argue that it is a net contributor to European security as it has the capability to project security outside its borders. It has rescinded all territorial claims, was a founding member of the BSEC and strategic partnerships with Poland, the US, and has formulated triangular partnerships with Poland and the US, Poland and Canada. It shares economic ties with Romania and Moldova and contributes alongside Hungary, Slovenia and Romania towards an engineering battalion under the SE Stability Pact.

²³ *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 13 April 2000.

²⁴ *TV6*, Moscow, 8 November 2000.

Although Ukraine is not a key player in the Balkans and Caucasus, its willingness to participate within the European security order – the underlying principle of integration – is not in doubt.²⁵

However, Ukraine's security landscape is littered with paradoxes and dilemmas. Ukraine seeks to balance a special NATO partnership (rather than full integration) with CIS membership. As President Kuchma stated: 'I would like to single out one such principally important axiom for Ukraine's international policy: our European future is indivisible from a strategic partnership with Russia.'²⁶ To square this particular circle, Ukraine must both implement an effective internal reform program to satisfy the EU and NATO and remain dependent upon the quality of Russia's 'Ukrainian policy' (a policy over which Ukraine has little leverage) and which Russia is determined to shape. As Aleksandr Avdeev, Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister noted: 'According to our estimates, the scope of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO is double that of military cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. Last year Kiev did not protest against NATO's aggression in the Balkans. It did not freeze cooperation with the Alliance, following our example. Moreover a program of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO for 2000 and 2001 was officially adopted.'²⁷ The strengthening of a strategic partnership with Russia and closer relations with NATO are harder to combine post-Kosovo.

Former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, imbued with the spirit of post-Cold War *realpolitik*, has stated: 'it cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.'²⁸ The further Russia distances itself from the process of integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures, the more Ukraine's chances of strategic reorientation are diminished. The realization that as an isolated Russia is dangerous for European stability and that the inclusion of Ukraine in the European security order but exclusion of Russia would create huge instabilities decreases Ukraine's ability to integrate. However, there exists no other security strategy open to Ukraine than that of expressing a continued commitment to integrate with the West. If Ukraine leaves the CIS (as a founding and participating member) then this will also create instability, as Ukraine is the only state large enough to diminish Russia's influence in this organization, a factor complicated by the fact that its own stability is partially dependent on continued economic cooperation with Russia and access to Russian markets.²⁹ Indeed, arguably even if Ukraine was to be integrated, NATO could not defend Ukraine from an aggressive Russia, despite deep cuts in Russia's armed forces and Russia's acknowledgement that it is incapable of waging a large-scale conventional war until 2010.³⁰

These constraints leave Ukraine in a state of security paralysis. It remains a buffer state caught in a security dilemma: it is unable to push or pull Russia towards greater EU and NATO cooperation and unable itself to integrate into the European security order

²⁵ Borys Tarasyuk, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine. Unpublished presentations and discussion at the Concluding Conference of the *Program on European Security*, Center for European Security Studies (CESS), The Netherlands, 7-10 November 2000. See also: James Sherr, 'The Dismissal of Borys Tarasyuk', *Conflict Studies Research Center Occasional Brief*, 6 October 2000, No. 79, 1-6.

²⁶ *Kuryer, U*, Kiev, 22 January 2000, p. 3.

²⁷ *Russia TV Channel*, Moscow, 21 May 2000.

²⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'The Premature Partnership', *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 1994, vol. 72, no. 2, p. 80.

²⁹ Alexander Rahr, German Association for Foreign Affairs. Unpublished presentations and discussion at the Concluding Conference of the *Program on European Security*, Center for European Security Studies (CESS), The Netherlands, 7-10 November 2000.

³⁰ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Moscow, 22 November 2000.

without Russia. At the same time it is open to pressure from both the West and Russia. The EU and NATO have throughout the last decade demanded that Ukraine give up nuclear weapons, radicalize its market reforms and close down Chernobyl despite the costs to Ukraine. Yevhen Marchuk, secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, has argued, for example, that the closure of Chernobyl on 15 December 2000 and the consequent loss of 1,000 MW output to Ukraine's grid (7percent of its energy production) may cause a serious energy crisis.³¹ These frustrations are exacerbated by attempts by Russia to divert gas pipelines through Ukraine to Belarus and then onto Poland in order to strengthen Ukraine's dependence on Russia. Here collusion between Russia's Gazprom influenced as it is by strategic imperatives and western energy companies, such as Ruhr Gas that respond to commercial considerations, are only opposed by Poland's insistence that the pipeline runs through Ukraine onto Poland. Thus Ukraine's two-vector policy – a constant maneuvering between Russia and the EU - is and will remain Ukraine's only security 'option'.

Belarus as the most Soviet of the former Soviet republics has yet to begin the transition process (all the more striking following the Belgrade Uprising of October 2000), and represents a destabilizing factor in regional security. President Lukashenka, in his opening address to the first session of the new parliament, stated: 'The country's foreign policy priorities coincide objectively with such dynamically developing states as the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, and the Republic of Cuba, Vietnam, Libya and many others'.³² It is not clear the extent to which this is compatible with Russia's new Foreign Policy Doctrine, and the enlargement of the European security order renders Belarus' continued existence in isolation and confrontation from mainstream European developments untenable. Three likely scenarios emerge: regime collapse followed by systemic change and democratization (the Serbia variant)³³ or 'rogue state status' (the Libyan option) maintained by the export of arms to 'grey markets' abroad coupled to ever-increasing domestic repression. A last option remains – but unification with Putin's Russia remains highly problematic and it appears driven more by a reaction to dual enlargement rather than Russian revanchism. NATO enlargement provides the military strategic rationale for integration; the EU various possible models of integration – confederal, federal, and intergovernmental.³⁴ Moreover, as Russia's security agenda is dominated by conventional military degradation, cash-starvation led unilateral nuclear disarmament, a demographic crisis, the fragility of hydrocarbon GDP dependency,³⁵ and the growth of organized crime – to what extent do these factors allow Russia-Belarus to remain a stable partner within the European security order?

5.Security Paradoxes and Possibilities for the New Century?

³¹ *Den*, Kiev, 11 November 2000, pp. 1-4.

³² *Belarussian Radio First Program*, Minsk, 21 November 2000.

³³ President Lukashenka told the chiefs of the State Security Committee (KGB): 'certain forces in the west' seek to 'apply the Yugoslav scenario to Belarus.' *Belapan news agency*, Minsk, 29 November 2000.

³⁴ Or would Vladimir Putin's preferred model of unification look to Russian based administrative template; Belarus as the de facto eighth Federal District, with Lukashenka as the Presidential Representative?

³⁵ Russian Presidential Adviser Andrey Illarinov noted a 7 percent Russian GDP rise over the last year, but has argued that such economic growth is attributed to external economic factors and is not sustainable. He notes in particular the 38 percent (on average) increase in the price of oil and other raw materials and 14 percent drop in import prices that leaves Russia vulnerable to an economic crisis (projected for August/September 2001). *Kommersant*, Moscow, 30 November 2000.

The prospect of NATO and EU enlargement to integrate CEE states, including the Baltic states, is a process that began immediately after the Cold War ended and developed at an increasingly rapid pace during the 1990s. It represented a strong desire on both sides of the old divide to make Europe whole again. Today the pace has slowed down but the goal remains a priority of statesmen in both east and west Europe. Only if geopolitical factors should delay the process of integration long enough to create a backlash amongst populations on either side can it be seriously threatened. At the start of the new century delayed integration is a real possibility and political leaders can not therefore afford to take too long to resolve the new challenges which have recently emerged.

The question for many Western policy-makers appears to be: 'how to enlarge without enlarging'? For NATO the answer to this revolves round the question of how to soften the concept of Article V. For the EU, the enlargement issue is entangled in the question of governance. EU governance presents a fast evolving mixed system of political governance that may promote new sorts of linkages, mechanisms, and processes to replace enlargement along classical lines. The blurring of the edges and softening of the corners at where ever the border lies implies the creation of a system of 'parallel security partnerships' between allies and non-allies - some form of 'multi-level security governance.' These linkages have yet to be articulated, but present a clear opportunity for small states in the accession process to make their voice heard.

A key litmus test of the viability and integrity of the EU's crisis management capability will be the extent of Russia's involvement. The EU's holistic approach to military and non-military aspects of security – with military and economic sticks and carrots – will stand or fall on the level of Russian participation. Could we see a paradox whereby Russian involvement in EU civil crisis management operations takes place – so consolidating Russia into the European security order - but only when that force is deployed outside of Europe? The possibility of the UN requesting that the EU intervene in Sub-Saharan Africa or Asia is not excluded. Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov has stated that 'there should be a jointly operated mechanism of taking each other's interests into account, in particular on matters concerning Russia's possible contribution to carrying out EU operations in controlling crises.' As a cosponsor of the peace process in the Middle East, Ivanov noted: 'The very nearness in approaches to this issue on the part of Moscow and Brussels allows us to act more in unison and, if required, collectively on this track.'³⁶

The context within which Lithuanian foreign and security policy is being formulated has become more complex. Will a greater clarity and realism both to maintain the high levels of commitment to this project and to overcome the new obstacles that are emerging stand as the central leitmotif for security in the next decade or rather will a circularity of thinking and paralysis of action? Delayed integration may paradoxically enable Lithuania to maintain its ability to further consolidate its democratization project and so increase its capacity to remain buoyant amidst the rip-tides of EU policy implementation and competitive power politics. It appears that Lithuania is at a crossroads with two visions of future development apparent. By 2010 Lithuania is firmly embedded within EU and NATO structures, a motor of having successfully enacted its own 'Szeged Process' (Hungary's financial and administrative support for opposition forces which helped trigger regime change in Serbia) with Belarus. However, the clear and present danger for Lithuania in the new century is to remain on the park-bench beside Ukraine, like one of Beckett's tramps awaiting their eponymous mentor/master/guru, stuck in a meaningless dialogue with no conclusion.

³⁶ Interfax news agency, Moscow, 25 November 2000.