U.S. STRATEGY TOWARDS LITHUANIA: A REGIONAL APPROACH

Vaidotas Urbelis

The last century will be remembered in the history of international relations as a century of American hegemony and dominance. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11 challenged this view. For the first time since World War II the United States was attacked on its own territory, adding a new dimension to the American threat perception. Therefore, U.S. strategic concepts had to change accordingly.

This transformation has had a direct impact on Lithuanian-American relations. On one hand, in U.S. security strategy, Europe is no longer perceived as a potential area of instability. New threats to U.S. security largely come from the other parts of the world, and the focus of Washington's policies is shifting towards these regions. On the other hand, the robust development of Central and Eastern Europe, along with certain political and economic strengths in Russia, raises U.S. economic and trade interest in countries like Lithuania.

Changes in U.S. security strategy raise new questions or decision makers and the academic society. They are asking whether the U.S. is further determined to remain in Europe, what role Lithuania and other countries of the region can play in the U.S. strategy, and what measures they should take to maintain American presence in the region.

This article aims to discern the regional dimension of U.S. foreign policy towards Lithuania and its neighbours. In geostrategic terms, Lithuania belongs to two regions. First, it is part of the Northern European region which encompasses the Nordic and Baltic nations. At the same time, together with the other new members of NATO, also known as the Vilnius-10, it is bound by the same desire to maintain NATO's presence in Europe. The term Central and Eastern Europe is frequently used to define these countries.

For the time being, Lithuania's policy towards the U.S. is in many ways similar to that of both Northern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. A perspective of Lithuania as a country belonging to both regions allows us to better define U.S. interests in the country and fit Lithuania into U.S. global security strategy. As still the most effective tool in promoting U.S. interests in Europe, NATO will be the focal point of the analysis.

CENTRAL, EASTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE IN U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY

In U.S. security strategy, Europe plays the most important role. The National Security Strategy approved in September 2002 clearly states that "there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most able international institutions in the world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening world trade."¹ Europe is perceived as the birthplace of democratic values and a major partner in spreading them across the globe.

On the other hand, the U.S. expects a cooperative rather than a competitive or counterbalancing approach from Europe. Specifically, U.S. policy in Europe pursues four major goals:

• to get support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism and engage European countries in crises response operations;

• to encourage democratic developments in Eurasia, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, and the Balkans;
• to maintain economic ties with the EU, to guarantee flows of investment, to expand the market for defence industry production;
• to sustain strategic balance in Europe, mainly through strengthening the transatlantic link, preventing militarisation of the EU, and fixing the borders of Russia.

U.S. policy towards Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe is constructed along these lines. Although Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe are different in their economic, social and cultural characteristics, their policy towards the U.S. is largely similar. The main factor that unites these two regions is their pro-American orientation. In terms of security, both Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe feel dependent on the U.S., and they do not envisage European security architecture without American involvement.

This dependency is determined by the geographic location and the historical experiences of the two regions. This is especially true in Central and Eastern Europe which historically used to serve as a battlefield between Germany and Russia. As one prominent analyst has put it, "Pechenegs, Tatars, Turks, Muscovites and Soviets all merge [for Central and Eastern Europeans] into one continuum where they mingle with Teutonic knights, Prussians and Hitlerites." Lithuanian history is no exception with its centuries-old history of foreign occupations.

The second important feature of the U.S. relationship with Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe is the asymmetry of power between them. The U.S. speaks to the region from the position of the strong. Central and Eastern Europeans and the Nordics possess almost no strategic capacity to threaten U.S. strategic interests. Their participation in the U.S.-led campaigns is good for America, but their incapacity or unwillingness to participate would do no harm. Therefore, the region is vitally interested in developing certain specific capabilities that would be of consequence to the U.S. Such capabilities could be intelligence information, specialised military units, hi-tech equipment or the experience of working with certain countries such as Russia and Ukraine.

WAR ON TERRORISM AND MILITARY COOPERATION

The terrorist attacks of September 11 changed the whole context in which NATO enlargement was viewed by the United States. American security expert F. Larrabbe notes that "the main U.S. strategic priority became the war on terrorism. For this the United States needed as broad a coalition of allies as possible." The ability to contribute to the war on terrorism has become one of the key requirements for developing relations with the U.S.

Interestingly, the role of Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe in the global antiterrorism campaign is not at all marginal. The countries of the region have provided their military units to U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The contributions of new members alone reached 4,000 troops in 2002. This constitutes more than 7 per cent of all allied troops in Afghanistan.

In the future, these numbers are likely to increase due to ongoing modernisation of the new NATO member armies (see Table 1). For example, Lithuania plans to increase its participation in international operations by 10 times in 2009 - from a 100 strong company-size unit to a 1,000 strong battalion-size task group. On a regional scale, this growth will be even more substantial.

---

Table 1. Enlargement effects on NATO Alliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATO 19</th>
<th>NATO 26</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
<th>Long-term Forecast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of population (mln.)</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Armed forces (thousands of troops)</td>
<td>3,448</td>
<td>3,986</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (bln. USD)</td>
<td>18074</td>
<td>18446</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Defence Budget (bln. USD)</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of NATO Troops deployed (thousands)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Increase substantially</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


U.S. economic and military assistance is another important element of U.S. cooperation with Central and Eastern European nations. The new members of NATO need to modernise their armies and improve their military capacities. By providing assistance to these countries the U.S. administration can also promote the interests of American military industry in the region. Over the past decade, Central and Eastern Europe has been a major recipient of U.S. economic and military assistance, and this trend could be sustained in the future.


Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2001).

There are two reasons to believe that military cooperation between the U.S. and the new NATO members will increase. One is the widening technological gap between America and Europe, which makes the transfer of technologies critical to NATO effectiveness. The second reason is the rapidly growing defence budgets of the new NATO members, which is related to defence reform. In 2002, defence spending reached 9 billion dollars (see Table 2) and is likely to grow as Central and Eastern European nations seek to acquire modern weaponry compatible with that of NATO.

Table 2. Defence expenditures of NATO's new members (mln. USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>1.132</td>
<td>1.155</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>1084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3.073</td>
<td>3.356</td>
<td>3.222</td>
<td>3.000</td>
<td>3.400</td>
<td>3.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6957</td>
<td>7521</td>
<td>7022</td>
<td>7004</td>
<td>7721</td>
<td>8977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over the last few years competition between American and European military manufacturers has constantly increased. Both the U.S. and certain European countries seek to influence strategic decisions made in the capitals of new NATO members. For example, in 2002 Poland decided to purchase 46 American F16 fighters, thus becoming, in the words of U.S. President George W. Bush, "one of the best friends of the United States in Europe." In 2003, the Czech and Hungarian governments opted for European Gripen aircrafts, which caused a fierce diplomatic reaction from the U.S. administration.

In comparative terms, Lithuania is one of the leading Central and Eastern European nations in acquiring U.S. technological products. Its contracts with U.S. military manufacturers include: the acquisition of tactical radios from Harris Corp., Javelin antitank systems from Lockheed Martin and Reytheon Corp., and Stinger antiaircraft systems from "Hughes Missile System Company" and "General Dynamics / Raytheon Corp." Thus, despite its small size Lithuania has managed to establish itself in U.S. strategic thinking.

The changing U.S. attitude towards Lithuanian armed forces supports the argument that the U.S. increasingly considers Lithuania as a reliable partner. This shift is reflected in strategic recommendations drafted by U.S. experts upon request of the Lithuanian Government. In 1997-1998, a group of experts led by Major General Kievenaar carried out a Lithuanian Defence Assessment study, and a similar study was conducted in 2001. The first study clearly advocated the principle of territorial defence for Lithuania and was rather sceptical about Lithuania's capabilities of contributing to support peace or NATO Article 5 operations. Lithuania's capacities to provide Host Nation Support facilities were not even considered. U.S. experts advocated the view that in the instance of an aggression Lithuania would have to rely primarily on its own armed forces.

However, the study carried out in 2001 presents Lithuanian armed forces in a completely different light. Enormous attention is paid to C3I (command, control, communications, intelligence) capacities and their interoperability with NATO. The study stresses the importance of English language skills and Host Nation Support preparedness. A strategic role is given to the Klaipeda sea port and the Šiauliai airbase. The study says nothing about the model of territorial defence, but instead it urges the Lithuanian government to develop mobile armed forces interoperable with those of NATO. This view is fully consistent with the growing U.S. need for mobile deployable units and infrastructure support to combat terrorism.

**PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC VALUES**

The American perception of globalisation builds on two key assumptions. One is that democratic states that share similar values do not fight against each other. The other stipulates that free trade leads to prosperity for all nations. J. Kurth in his article "The next NATO: Building an American Commonwealth of Nations" notes that the American view of the world has not changed much over the last few decades. The U.S. strategic focus is still limited to the few regions which together constitute less than half the area of the globe and less than half its population. "These regions include almost all of Europe, much of Latin America, some of the countries on the periphery of East Asia and of course Australia and New Zealand. As it happens, these four regions

---

7 BNS [Lithuanian Armed Forces will be armed with Stinger systems] Lietuvos kariuomenė bus apginkluota "Stinger" raketomis, 2002 10 11.
largely correspond to the U.S. system of alliances as it existed fifty years ago (NATO, the OAS, a series of bilateral treaties with Asian countries, the ANZUS). The extent of "globalisation" in 2001 is not that different from the extent of the "Free World" in 1951.\textsuperscript{10}

In this context, Central and Eastern Europe represents a significant challenge. Central and Eastern European nations have successfully liberated themselves from the communist yoke and now seek to return to the democratic mainstream. "The Baltics [in particular] have been extraordinarily successful in establishing and embodying the American values of liberal democracy, the free market and the rule of law."\textsuperscript{11} These dramatic changes have rocked the grounds of the U.S. global perception, hence the enlargement of the European Union and NATO.

Now the U.S. administration seeks to expand democratic values further to the East, and countries like Lithuania can play an important role in this strategic move. Their specific knowledge and expertise of eastern nations helps to address the needs of emerging democracies in a more targeted way. Lithuania already consults its European and American allies on developments in Belarus and Kaliningrad. Lithuania has also demonstrated motivated attempts to participate in securing democracy in Ukraine and South Caucasus. Central and Eastern Europe is rich in cooperation formats that could be applied across EU and NATO borders.

The Nordic countries have also gathered enough experience to participate in EU and U.S. Eastern initiatives. In the early 90s, the Nordic countries devoted huge resources to assist Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian democratic reforms. Their active policy and support helped the Baltic nations to integrate more quickly into the European Union and NATO. By joining their assets and expertise the Nordic and Central and Eastern European nations can now contribute to U.S. strategic goals to strengthen security and democracy in Eastern Europe.

\section*{ECONOMIC COOPERATION}

Economic cooperation between the United States and the Central, Eastern and Northern European markets is relatively small. Northern Europe accounts for slightly less than 2 per cent, and Central and Eastern Europe - for 0.42 per cent of the overall U.S. foreign trade (see Table 3). However, the numbers have been constantly growing during the last decade. For example, the U.S.-Baltic trade turnover quadrupled in 1993-2000. The U.S. is also a major investor in Central and Eastern European markets.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcccccccc}
\hline
\hline
Nordic 5 & 1.60 & 1.53 & 1.59 & 1.68 & 1.69 & 1.54 & 1.63 & 1.63 \\
Baltic 3 & 0.02 & 0.03 & 0.03 & 0.03 & 0.04 & 0.04 & 0.05 & 0.08 \\
Central and Eastern Europe (Vilnius10) & 0.25 & 0.27 & 0.26 & 0.26 & 0.30 & 0.34 & 0.37 & 0.42 \\
Nordic Baltic 8 & 1.62 & 1.55 & 1.62 & 1.72 & 1.73 & 1.58 & 1.68 & 1.71 \\
Nordic 5 + Central and Eastern Europe (Vilnius10) & 1.85 & 1.80 & 1.85 & 1.94 & 1.99 & 1.88 & 2.00 & 2.05 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{U.S. Foreign trade with Central and Northern European countries}
\end{table}

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2001)


The strategic location of Central and Eastern Europe on the major oil and gas transportation routes only increases the region's importance to U.S. strategic interests. However, U.S. involvement in this area has been limited and is further decreasing. Statistics shows that the U.S. share in foreign investment in Central and Eastern Europe has shrunk since the first wave of

\textsuperscript{10} Kurth J. “The Next NATO: Building an American Commonwealth of Nations” \textit{The National Interest}, Fall 2001, \url{http://www.expandnato.org/kurthnato.html}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibidem.
NATO enlargement, and the decrease is particularly visible in the so-called strategic sectors. At the same time, Russian investment in these sectors has increased dramatically. This situation has even fuelled speculations about a "strategic deal" between the U.S. and Russia on Central and Eastern Europe.

**GEOSTRATEGIC BALANCE IN EUROPE**

The U.S. strategic goal in Europe is to influence the processes taking place on the old continent. Naturally, the most important European partners of the U.S. are the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, but inside the EU, small states are also important. A country succeeding in EU decision-making may be a valuable partner to the U.S. Thus Lithuania must be active and innovative in the European Union in order to increase its transatlantic importance.

The U.S. administration understands that the EU countries bordering Russia and Belarus are concerned about their security. The EU is still in the process of developing its common security and defence policies, thus it does not yet possess real capabilities to provide "hard" security guarantees. On the other hand, the EU's Nordic nations have for years pursued a policy of neutrality and they now resist rapid militarisation of the EU. U.S. diplomacy can use these affairs to expand its participation in European domestic affairs.

The U.S.-based Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) in their study, Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region, indicates that "Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could constitute part of a core of Eastern and Central European states that serve as "new Atlanticists," states who have a compelling interest in keeping the United States involved in European security." This opinion is echoed in U.S. Senator J. Kyl's statement during the NATO Expansion Treaty debate, namely that "the expansion of NATO is more than just a rearward-looking act of humanity. It is also a forward-looking act of statesmanship that will serve U.S. interests well in the future." K. Waltz sticks to this view by noting that "NATO enlargement will obviously allow the U.S. to keep its finger in European security and defence policy."

This new role of Lithuania and the other new NATO members was revealed during the crisis in Iraq early in 2003. The American decision to start military action against Saddam divided the European nations. France and Germany were against the war, while eight other countries, including Italy, Poland and Spain, supported the U.S. policy. The statement of the Vilnius 10 nations in favour of the military action was critical in this debate. The Economist noted that Franco-Germany policy has become a minority policy in the enlarging EU.

Lithuania's pro-American posture was already visible before the Iraqi crisis. Voting practices in the United Nations and EU institutions reveal the attempt of Central, Eastern and Northern European nations to balance between strategic U.S. and EU interests (see Table 4). Lithuania and the other democracies in the region tend to support the European position on global issues but they stick with the U.S. in transatlantic matters.

---


13 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region, 2002, p.1


Table 4. Voting practices in UN and EU institutions (2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Germany, France</th>
<th>Poland, Denmark, Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transatlantic issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO out-of-area operations</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU defence dimension</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-NATO duplication</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian autonomy</td>
<td>Pro-Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>Not ratified</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Criminal Court</td>
<td>Wants exemptions</td>
<td></td>
<td>No exemptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions against Cuba</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrogation of Antibaltic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Treaty</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After enlargement both Central and Eastern European and Northern European countries will strengthen their positions at the EU level. They will not only form an integrated and dynamic economic region, but will also collect enough votes to veto the EU Council's decisions. According to the Treaty of Nice, the Nordics and Baltics should have 39 votes at the Council, and the Central and Eastern European nations will get 77 votes. Provided Romania and Bulgaria join the EU in 2007, the region's voting power will increase to 101 votes. This is more than enough to form a blocking minority which presently requires 85 votes.

LITHUANIA'S REGIONAL ROLE IN U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY

From the U.S. global perspective, Lithuania and other countries of the region are not pivotal areas in Europe. Their contribution to the global war on terrorism is limited, their possessions of strategic resources (oil, gas, nickel etc.) are small and in addition they create only a minimal share in U.S. foreign trade.

Lithuania and the other countries of the region must find their niches in U.S. global strategy to become key players. There are two major areas in which countries like Lithuania can make difference to the U.S.:
1. They can add value by joining U.S. efforts to promote democracy and combat terrorism.
2. As EU members, they can influence EU decisions in favour of transatlantic interests.

To achieve these goals, Central and Eastern European and Northern European countries have to expand their regional cooperation. Many formats already exist, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Visegrad 4, Baltic 3, Nordic 5, Baltic-Nordic 8, Vilnius 10 and the recently launched E-PINE. Participation in broader formats increases Lithuania's power to actively engage in other regions (see Table 5).

Table 5. Multiplication of Power through Participation in Regional Formats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russia, Kaliningrad</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Anti-Asia</th>
<th>terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic states</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vilnius 10</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania alone</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>small</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Larrabbee and Asmus (2002).18

17 Table was constructed according to voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. U.S. Department of State.
In developing new regional initiatives two aspects should be considered. Firstly, these new initiatives must not lead to regionalisation of security. Secondly, these new initiatives must not contradict U.S. foreign policy objectives. Therefore, Lithuania and the other countries of the region should follow several principles to make their policy proposals attractive to the U.S.:

- New policy initiatives should lead to the creation of real capabilities;
- They must include Russia, Ukraine, and perhaps in the future, Belarus;
- Financial costs of possible U.S. participation should be low;
- New initiatives should aim at fighting terrorism or spreading democracy to other regions.

Lithuania will have to combine these principles with national priorities. The U.S., as the world's dominant power, and Lithuania, as a small state, naturally have different priorities in the world and Europe. Lithuania will give its attention largely to regional problems; intra-European issues will gain more importance, whereas global issues such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD and global stability will dominate the U.S. agenda.

**Table 6. Overlapping U.S. and Lithuanian foreign policy agendas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Lithuania's role in U.S. strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Maintain hegemony; war against terrorism, fight against proliferation of WMD</td>
<td>Has no independent agenda, low priority</td>
<td>Lithuania as U.S. force multiplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>Fix Russian borders, strengthen NATO, maintain balance of power, non-militarised EU</td>
<td>Similar to the U.S. but more emphasis on intra-EU issues</td>
<td>Huge opportunities for cooperation in constructing policy towards Russia and coordinating positions on intra-EU issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Not high priority, mainly concerning common principles such as democratic values</td>
<td>Democracy in Belarus, demilitarisation and economic development of Russia</td>
<td>Lithuania is interested in involving the U.S. in regional matters in exchange for its support on global policy issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis concluded in a similar way by saying that "the United States has exerted a fair amount of political capital to make Baltic membership in NATO a reality. It is now the Baltic States' turn to repay the favour and prove that they are, in fact, members of the Euro-Atlantic family, ready and willing to continue to contribute their resources and personnel to the defence of common interests."\(^{19}\) According to the IFPA, the Baltic States can do this in three ways.

First, they must continue the serious work of preparing and improving their militaries for operations with the Alliance. Expediting and expanding plans and facilities for Host Nation Support should be a priority in this regard, as should the development of effective capabilities for operating in crisis response scenarios.

Second, the Baltic States must enhance their efforts to reach out to Russia. The confidence that NATO's security guarantee provides should make it easier for them to engage their larger neighbour. Lithuania could serve as a bridge between Russia and the Alliance.

Finally, the Baltic States must recognize that as full NATO members, they will have a meaningful voice in the debates and discussions on key matters of the Alliance's business. They

\(^{19}\) Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p.5.
must use this voice to support the transformation of the Alliance so that it would remain a viable defence organisation.

In this respect, areas that involve Russian or Ukrainian participation are especially promising. Examples of such cooperation might be common projects in the Kaliningrad district covering different themes - science, environmental protection or crisis management. In the future, they can be extended to cover even military projects or initiatives. From a global perspective, Lithuania should enhance its cooperation with U.S. allies in geographically more distant parts of the world. Defence and security related cooperation with South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), Middle Eastern countries (Israel, Jordan, and Egypt) or South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan) could have a positive impact on Lithuania's security cooperation with the U.S.