

# A BALTIC CHALLENGE

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One of the responsibilities Albright and Talbott entrusted me with when I joined the State Department was the Baltic states. They both had a special interest in the issue. If NATO enlargement was about creating a Europe whole and free and undoing historical injustice, then there was no doubt in Albright's mind that the Baltics qualified on both counts. One of her favorite sayings about Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was that one did not have to be located in Central Europe to have Central Europe in one's heart. Along with the subjugation of her native Czechoslovakia in 1938, Albright considered the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the illegal annexation of these three states by the USSR among the great injustices of the 20th century.

Albright saw the Baltic issue as a litmus test of NATO enlargement. If enlargement was part of an integrationist strategy to remove Russia's imperial temptation and alter old patterns of zero-sum thinking, nowhere was this antidote more needed than in the Baltic states. One day shortly after I joined the State Department, Albright told me of her dismay that so many people were trying to simply ignore the Baltic issue. "We can't ignore this problem" she said. "It is a test of whether we can succeed in changing the way people think about the politics of post-Cold War Europe. We shouldn't run away from it," she continued. "I want to try to tackle it. I want to make it the litmus test of our whole strategy." And she was looking to Talbott and me to help her come up with that strategy.

During a trip to Vilnius to meet with the three Baltic Presidents after the Madrid summit, Albright would say in public what she had told me earlier in private: "Perhaps no part of Europe has suffered more from the old pattern of European politics than the Baltic states. You lost your security, your freedom, your independence, your prosperity—everything but your spirit and your spine." No one would benefit more, she argued, if we could create "a new pattern of politics in Europe." The United States, she made clear, supported Baltic aspirations to join NATO and would not discriminate against them. "We will not punish you in the future because you were subjugated in the past."

But Albright did not just want to reassure the Balts about our commitment to their Western integration. She wanted to use the carrot of eventual NATO membership to help them transform and Westernize their own societies. This included encouraging countries like Estonia and Latvia to integrate their Russian-speaking minorities and become multi-ethnic democracies. Albright was willing to stand up and defend the Baltics against Moscow's pressure. But she also wanted them to change their own zero-sum thinking and reach out to Russia as they became part of the West. "The quest for security is not a zero-sum game in which Central Europe must lose if Russia gains and Russia must lose if Central Europe gains" she stated in a major speech in Vilnius. The process of NATO enlargement "is not about escaping West, it is about gaining the confidence to look East in a spirit of cooperation."<sup>2</sup>

Talbott, too, had a deep interest and commitment to the Baltic states dating back to his days as a journalist covering the former Soviet Union. He often told the story of how he had sat with Lennart Meri, then still a quixotic filmmaker, dissident, and chronicler of the native peoples of the Soviet far North, on a steamer between Tallinn and Helsinki debating the future of the Baltic states. Talbott was one of the strongest advocates of an open door policy that protected the Baltic states—and left open the possibility that countries further to the east might one day join NATO as well. At a Deputies Committee meeting in spring 1997 Talbott passionately made the case for SIBROD because of the need to protect the Baltic states. Several colleagues around the table in

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<sup>1</sup> Extract from the "Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era". New York: Columbia University Press, 2002

<sup>2</sup> See the Memorandum from Acting S/NIS John Herbst to Secretary Christopher entitled "Scope Paper—Your Trip to Moscow," March 18, 1996.

the White House Situation Room looked stunned. Finally, Undersecretary of Defense Walt Slocombe broke the silence and said: “Strobe, you are supposed to be against all of this stuff.” Everyone laughed. But it was another example of the contrast between the public caricature of Talbott’s thinking and what he advocated in reality.

No one knew better than Talbott how deeply rooted Russia’s neuralgia on the Baltic issue was and how hard it would be to change that mindset. It was one reason why he was so adamant that the U.S. position on NATO’s open door be clear and consistent. His view was that Western strategy needed to be clear in saying that the Baltic states would one day join NATO. But he also believed the West, including the Baltic states, had to simultaneously reach out to Russia, cooperate with it, and address its sensitivities where they were legitimate. Just as the West needed to offer Moscow a vision of a new cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, Talbott believed that Washington needed a vision of how Baltic membership in NATO was part of a broader, cooperative framework around the Baltic Sea in which Russia, too, would have its place.

Derek Shearer, the U.S. Ambassador in Helsinki, Eric Edelman, Talbott’s Executive Assistant, and I resurrected the idea of the Hanseatic League as an image or metaphor for what we had in mind. By reaching into the region’s past, we hoped to show that it had once been possible for these countries to have the kind of normal, alternative future we were striving for in which Russia, as a Baltic littoral country, was connected to these countries by commerce and travel. Talbott liked it so much he asked us to read up on the history of the Hanseatic League and to look for modern-day parallels. When I brought back a book on the Hansa from the Hanseatic Museum in Bergen, Norway, he had the CIA blow up one of its maps into a chart which he kept in his office and would bring out to engage visitors on Baltic-Russian relations.

At a conference at Stanford University in the fall of 1997, Talbott spoke about how the U.S. needed to manage the dilemma of supporting the legitimate Baltic aspirations to reintegrate into the West and join NATO with Russia’s fear and loathing that they might succeed in doing so. “Quite bluntly,” Talbott told his audience,

Russians need to get over their neuralgia on this subject; they need to stop looking at the Baltic region as a pathway for foreign armies or as a buffer zone, not just because such old think offends and menaces the Balts but because it doesn’t make sense, since there are no would-be aggressors to be rebuffed.

In the final analysis, Russia will have to make that adjustment herself, by its own light and for its own reasons. But we and our European partners can help. One way is to make the idea of commercial, political and environmental and other forms of collaboration among the states along the littoral of the Baltic Sea a centerpiece of our own activity there — and an important part of our dialogue with Russia as an important regional power.

Our message to Moscow is this: if you Russians insist on looking at the 13th century for models applicable to the 21st, then you should dwell less on the image of Aleksandr Nevsky defeating the Swedish knights on the ice and think instead in what might be called “Hanseatic” terms—that is think about the Baltics not as an invasion route inward, but as a gateway outward.<sup>3</sup>

The Clinton Administration’s Baltic commitment took many people by surprise. And not everyone was happy. Primakov hated it and repeatedly warned us against taking steps to bring the Baltic states closer to NATO. It was unpopular with some of our key European allies as well. The exception was our Nordic allies who were, if anything, even more supportive in word and deed than the U.S. We looked to them for advice and ideas on how to craft our strategy. They knew the region better than we did and understood the importance of getting the U.S. more involved—and often lobbied for more U.S. involvement vis-a-vis more skeptical Europeans. The convergence of U.S.-Nordic thinking on the Baltic issue led to a kind of implicit strategic alliance and cooperation in the region that would, in turn, play a key role at the NATO Madrid summit.

The Clinton Administration was often accused of pursuing a strong Baltic policy for domestic political reasons. The reality was that we were being criticized at home from both the right and the left. I would sometimes amuse my Nordic and Baltic counterparts by explaining the U.S. political lineup on this issue with four wine glasses at dinner. My staff soon dubbed it the “Asmus Four Glass Theory on the Politics of Baltic NATO Membership.” As I described it to Talbott in a

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<sup>3</sup> Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 336. 399.

memo, “Right-wing Republicans want to bring them in now, Bush Republicans and Democratic defense hawks say never; Democratic internationalists such as you and me say yes in principle but not now; and liberal Democratic arms controllers say it is not worth risking the arms control agenda with Moscow because of the Baltic issue.”<sup>4</sup> Fashioning the two-thirds majority required for Senate ratification required a good strategy and enough time.

This was why the United States had proposed a U.S.-Baltic Charter. We needed a strategy to create the conditions that would make it possible to one day bring the Baltic states into NATO—not as a precipitous, isolated act that would sour relations with Moscow but as part of an overall strategy for building security and stability in the region. But for that strategy to work, we first needed to agree with leaders of the Baltic states on what we were trying to achieve, embrace a common strategy on how to achieve it, and create the mechanisms to follow up with practical steps.

The Baltic states did not trust us either, at least not initially. Although we were in many ways their strongest supporters, the fear of betrayal by the West ran deep. Our Baltic interlocutors were uncomfortable with the slow, deliberate course we had charted on enlargement and they considered our approach to addressing Russian concerns naive. Like Lech Walesa in Poland, they believed that the best approach was to simply enlarge NATO and create facts on the ground—the sooner, the better. Moscow’s attitude, they believed, would change only once they were in NATO, not beforehand.

As a Democratic political appointee, I took some refuge in the fact that this distrust was bipartisan. The people of the Baltics had never forgiven Roosevelt for Yalta; and many of them still considered Democrats almost congenitally naive about Russia. But they did not trust the Republicans either. One could hardly spend an evening in a pub in Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius without someone bringing up the fact that President George Bush had hesitated in recognizing Baltic independence in 1991 for fear of undercutting Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. At the time, President Bush had stated that: “When history is written, nobody will remember that we took forty-eight hours more than Iceland or whoever it is” that recognized them first.<sup>5</sup> But they did. I was constantly reminded that the U.S. was number 34 in the list of countries recognizing the regaining of Baltic independence.

Vytautas Landsbergis, the first post-independence Lithuanian head of state, in many ways epitomized Baltic distrust of the U.S. He was a Lithuanian hero—the man who had led his nation to independence and rallied the nation to stand up to Moscow in 1991, when the Soviets had started to intervene and killed a number of Lithuanians in front of the parliament. An ethnomusicologist by training, Landsbergis was stubborn and proud. He had pursued Lithuania’s independence, which would help catalyze the collapse of the Soviet Union, over the advice and objections of many Western governments and friends who had urged him to adopt a more moderate course. He, and Lithuania, had won as a result.

I met Landsbergis while working at RAND in the mid-1990s and developed a candid relationship with him even though we did not see eye-to-eye on many issues. When I once tried to explain the reasons why the U.S. could not bring the Baltics into NATO right away, he brushed my comments aside as irrelevant. Landsbergis thought the U.S. was a naive but powerful country that sometimes had to be forced to do the right thing. It was the lesson he had drawn from dealing with the Bush Administration. Landsbergis’s view was simple. U.S. policy should be to enlarge NATO as fast as possible to remove any lingering Russian imperial temptations. Like the Nike commercial, his motto was: “Just do it.” Landsbergis wanted a security guarantee and he wanted it now—from the United States. All other issues regarding Lithuania’s qualifications could be sorted out later.

To varying degrees, this view was shared throughout the three Baltic states. These countries looked to Washington because we were a superpower and because they believed the U.S. policy

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<sup>4</sup> See Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “A Democratic and Undivided Europe in Our Time”, Cernin Palace Prague, Czech Republic March 20 1996, <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1996/96o3/96o32odossec2.html>>

<sup>5</sup> See “Secretary’s Lunch with Central European Foreign Ministers, March 20 1996, Prague,” State 059734, March 27, 1996.

had more of a moral component to it than the *Realpolitik* practiced by many Europeans. At the same time, they also thought that Americans in general, and the Clinton Administration in particular, were not hard headed enough when it came to dealing with the Russians and their security. While respecting American power, they were determined to do whatever it took to get a security guarantee for their countries. If need be, that included pushing and even humiliating the U.S. into doing the right thing.

In the spring of 1997, Baltic anxiety was at an all-time high. The Baltic press was full of speculation about a possible sellout of the Baltic states as the price for Russian acquiescence to enlargement in the context of negotiations over the Founding Act. To make matters worse, Yeltsin had stated to the Russian press that he reserved the right to revise the Founding Act if any former Soviet republics were ever admitted to NATO. As Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs had put it: “NATO says the door is open, but the Russian dog is sitting in the entrance barking at us not to go in.”<sup>6</sup> Knowing that Baltic anxieties were on the rise, Talbott invited the Presidents of all three Baltic states to a meeting to reassure them that no deals had been cut at their expense.

The meeting took place in The Hague on May 28, 1997 where President Clinton was commemorating the fiftieth Anniversary of the 1947 Marshall Plan. While welcoming the signing of the NATO-Russia agreement in Paris the day before, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis and Estonian President Lennart Meri had expressed their fears that their nations’ security was being sacrificed in the attempt to accommodate Moscow. Ulmanis told Talbott that he was “no longer sure” where his country fit in the U.S. vision of Europe’s future.

President Meri was more dramatic. He started by telling Talbott that the last week had been one of the most difficult in recent memory for the Estonian nation.

The combination of the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act along with several U.S. policy moves had sent “the wrong signals to our immediate neighbors.” He had “expected more” from the United States and was disappointed. There were “illusions” in Moscow about the Baltic states that needed to be dispelled and only Washington could do that. He was concerned for the fate of the Estonian people. He compared himself to an Estonian Moses who had been chosen, “in a biblical sense,” to lead his people back out of bondage to freedom and to Europe. And he felt personally betrayed—including by us.

Talbott looked at Edelman and me for help. But at first we did not know what Meri was talking about. Then it clicked. He was referring to a U.S.-led military exercise named “Baltic Challenge.” As part of our effort to reassure the Baltic states, we had agreed to a series of military exercises in these countries over a three-year timeframe. In mid-April we had moved the dates of the exercise and scaled it back in size after someone realized it was going to take place *during* the Madrid summit. We did not think that 2,500 U.S. Marines landing on Baltic beaches was an ideal backdrop for the summit. All the participants, including the Estonians, had agreed to these changes. But somehow the story had become twisted that the rescheduling was in response to Russian pressure. The second complaint was that a U.S. spokesperson had mistakenly referred to the U.S.-Baltic Charter as a “cultural agreement.” It was an honest mistake by someone not up to speed on what we were doing. But it was taken as evidence that the U.S. was about to sell these countries out.

Talbott’s temper flared. Looking at Meri, he told him that they had known each other for many years and had always spoken openly and honestly to one another. If it were not for the U.S. commitment and this President, NATO enlargement would not have happened. Similarly, if it were not for Washington’s leadership, enlargement would surely have been capped after a single round and the Baltics would have been excluded. The President had defended the right of the Baltic states to join NATO with Yeltsin at Helsinki and there was nothing in the Founding Act “in large print, fine print or between the lines” that in any way discriminated against the Baltic states or closed the door to their entry into NATO. Estonian accusations on the Baltic Challenge were “just plain wrong.”

The Baltics did not have a better friend in the West than the United States and the Clinton Administration, Talbott continued. The distrust of American intentions Meri had shown would be a great disappointment to President Clinton and Secretary Albright. The Deputy Secretary

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<sup>6</sup> See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 401.

challenged Presidents Meri and Ulmanis to name a single instance where the U.S. had failed to do what it had promised. Moses, he pointed out, also had a little bit of help. While making no claims to divinity, he told the Baltic Presidents that the U.S. was just as committed to leading the Baltic states back to Europe as they were.<sup>7</sup>

His outburst was met by silence. It was the low point in our relations with the Baltics. After the meeting broke up, Edelman put his hand on Talbott's shoulder and said, "Remember what he and those people have been through. Besides, Moses was probably a pain in the ass too after forty years in the wilderness." But the meeting proved to be cathartic. The distrust and anger on both sides had been vented and the air cleared of the former acrimony. We moved quickly to make a new start. At Sintra, Estonian Foreign Minister lives and Defense Minister Luik visited me in my hotel, looking slightly chagrined. Talbott dropped by and we started to patch things up over drinks.

Over the next two years, our dialogue with all three Baltic states would grow extremely close. As they started to believe that we were indeed committed to using American influence to guarantee them the perspective of eventual NATO membership, they started to relax and focused on doing their homework to get ready. Lithuania took the lead in trying to improve relations with Moscow and working regionally with Kaliningrad. Talbott and I would grow close to the leaders of all three countries, but especially to Meri and the Estonians. In the summer of 1999, Talbott and I spent a day as Meri's guest at the Estonian President's retreat on the Baltic coast—taking a sauna, swimming in the Baltic Sea, and talking politics into the dark hours of the morning. In the helicopter on the way back, Talbott said to me: "You know we talk more openly to these guys than even some of our current allies." It was a dramatic shift from the scene in that Dutch hotel room in May 1997.

Back in Washington, I had assembled a small team to draft a U.S.-Baltic Charter. A lot of good legwork had been done, especially by our Ambassador in Riga, Larry Napper. But the bigger questions about what we were trying to achieve had not yet been answered. With a mandate from Albright and Talbott, I took over the process. My basic idea was simple. The Charter would convey in clear terms that we had a common vision of Europe, that they were part of that vision, that NATO enlargement was part of a broader strategy of building this unified Europe, and that our goal was to integrate them into the institutions of this new Europe, including NATO. Politically, we were not willing to agree to any language that implied a surrogate U.S. security guarantee in lieu of NATO. But we were willing to underscore our enduring interest in their independence and sovereignty and the fact that we would not consider our vision complete unless and until we had brought them in.

At the same time, the Charter was not just about NATO. We wanted to use it to encourage the Baltic states to accelerate their internal reforms as well as to embrace policies that would contribute to our broader vision for the region—including an improved relationship with Russia. We therefore insisted on strong language on the need to build multi-ethnic democracies and the integration of Russian-language speakers, as well as support for regional cooperation with Moscow. It was far easier for these countries to make such pledges in a document with the U.S. than in any other context. We also wanted to back up these pledges with concrete tools to implement them. We proposed creating a Partnership Commission that would meet once a year. It would have two working groups on economic and military issues that would report to the Commission. It would be chaired by Talbott and the Baltic Foreign Ministers, respectively.

The goal was to use the commitment of the U.S. government to identify and resolve problems that would, in turn, accelerate the integration of these countries into Western institutions, including NATO. Our philosophy was captured in a metaphor I used with my Baltic interlocutors. I told them that they would have to complete the marathon to get into NATO, but that we saw ourselves as their coach. While they would have to run the race themselves, we would use America's influence to guarantee that there was a level playing field and that they were not handicapped because of geography or history. We would also be on the sidelines, offering practical advice and be cheering them on until they crossed the finish line.

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<sup>7</sup> See "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Russian FM Primakov, March 21 1996," April 3, 1996.

The next step in clarifying our Baltic policy came in mid-June on the day we announced the President's decision in favor of inviting three countries to join NATO at Madrid. Several days earlier, Edelman and I had joined Talbott for a quick visit to a Starbucks. Talbott was practically addicted to cappuccinos and enjoyed sneaking out of the office for a quick caffeine fix. His secretary would call to say that the Deputy Secretary needed me to join him immediately for a meeting. I would drop what I was doing and run up the stairs to his office only to discover it was time to sneak out for a caramel macchiato. The drive on the way over was often used to plot strategy and think out loud about future policy.

It was during one of these covert trips to Starbucks in early June that Talbott asked Edelman and me how we envisioned actually bringing the Baltic states into the Alliance. We ran through various scenarios on how the Baltics might actually join NATO and debated the pros and cons of the countries coming in individually, as a group, or in conjunction with other Nordic countries. We concluded that the day when any of this would be feasible was probably still a long way off. But we agreed it was important that the Baltics understood our goal was to eventually bring them in, and that the strategy we were proposing was designed to make that possible.

Several days later on June 12, I joined Talbott in his office as we prepared to inform the three Baltic Ambassadors about Clinton's decision to invite three countries to join NATO at Madrid. As we went through his talking points, Talbott hinted that he had decided to clarify our long-term intentions on the Baltic issue. During the subsequent conversation with the three Ambassadors he stated: "We will not regard the process of NATO enlargement as finished or successful unless or until the aspirations of the Baltic states are fulfilled. We are aware of the implications of that, in the near term, the middle term and the long term." No U.S. official had previously made such a statement. It had not been in his talking points either. As we walked out of his office I turned to the Department's Baltic desk officer, Trevor Evans, who had been the notetaker, and said: "I want that sentence inscribed in that memcon. It is now U.S. policy."<sup>8</sup>

By mid June, Talbott and I had worked through several versions of a draft Charter to our satisfaction. We had promised the Baits we would start negotiations on the Charter before Madrid so that they had a clear sense of what we wanted to achieve. Getting the entire U.S. government to close ranks around the philosophy and strategy we had developed was not easy, however. I often had to invoke both Albright and Talbott to overcome the ingrained skepticism and reluctance of various parts of the U.S. government to take on any new obligations, especially on a sensitive issue like this one.

Finally, we were down to one last clearance—the White House. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and his Deputy, Jim Steinberg, were uncomfortable with a couple of key sentences in the draft. Although much of the language was a repackaging of things we had previously said in other contexts, we had deliberately put it together in a way that sent a clear and powerful message. That was the idea. But Berger and Steinberg were nervous that the Baits might over-interpret the language and suggested that we had given them a quasi security guarantee. I appealed, arguing that not to repeat language previously used would be seen as a step back and that I could get assurances from these countries that they would not over-interpret such language. I was in a cab on my way to the airport to fly to the region when Talbott reached me from Denver on my cell phone, where he was attending the G-8 summit. He gave me my final negotiating instructions. I had nearly all the language I had requested.<sup>9</sup>

On June 23, 1997, I arrived in Tallinn for the start of a negotiating tour through all three Baltic capitals. I insisted that we ensure strict confidentiality of our talks. I had no intention of negotiating the content of this document with the Baltic press or, even worse, the Baltic-American community and press looking over our shoulders and judging who had made what compromise. It was also important that we send a clear and common message to our respective publics on what the purpose of this exercise was. We believed it was not a negotiation over a security guarantee or a precommitment to NATO membership. We saw it as a discussion among friends on how we

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<sup>8</sup> See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 399.

<sup>9</sup> See "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin, March 22, 1996", State 068798, April 3, 1996.

could build our common vision of Europe, the principles underlying that vision and how the U.S. and the three Baltic countries could work together to achieve our common goals.

In Tallinn, I paid a courtesy visit to Meri. By this time I had developed my own personal relationship with the man I had come to view as a kind of Havel of the north. He was known for playing practical jokes on his staff and friends. As I shook his hand, he looked at me with a twinkle in his eyes, reached up and touched the lapel on my suit and asked: "Ron, have you brought the security guarantee?" It was his way of reminding me that he was determined to use every ounce of his political capital and energy to make sure his country would be safely anchored in the West.

The Estonians were pleasantly surprised by our draft which, they admitted, was much better than they had expected. The Latvians were supportive as well, and especially grateful that we were proposing mechanisms to turn the rhetoric of the Charter into practical steps on the ground. The Lithuanians were more skeptical. Not only did they want a separate document, they also wanted more clarity on NATO membership than our draft offered. In essence, they wanted an implicit security guarantee. I detected the guiding hand of Landsbergis as the *eminence grise* behind the scenes as I negotiated with my Lithuanian counterparts.<sup>10</sup>

I explained the limits of our policy and warned them not to overplay their hand and run the risk of destroying the goodwill Washington was offering. The U.S. would not be pushed into offering them a security commitment through a back door that it was not prepared to offer through NATO's front door. It had to evolve through the building of trust, cooperation, and performance. The Charter was the first step in that process. I knew my counterparts understood the message. But I also knew that they were under instructions to get more. They were not going to get it. One of the Lithuanian negotiators was suffering from a bad back. I saw a dark sweat stain spreading across his shirt. I told him I hoped it was because of his back and not my message. He smiled weakly and said he had to go back to the parliament and brief Landsbergis on our talks. I encouraged my Lithuanian counterpart at our press conference, Albinas Januška, to say that the Charter would not contain a security guarantee and that Vilnius had not asked for one.

Upon returning to Washington, I sent Talbott a memo on the week's results: "I believe that we have finally succeeded in moving the Baltics, including the Lithuanians, beyond the point where they somehow view NATO membership as an "entitlement" or something we owe them. Instead, they increasingly acknowledge that this will be a long haul and that we are one of their closest friends and strongest supporters." We had come a long way, I wrote, since our disastrous meeting in The Hague one month earlier.

The challenge we now faced was the risk that it would have to compromise our open door policy at Madrid by agreeing to a package on Romania and Slovenia to accommodate the French that discriminated against the Baltic states. "At each stop I was repeatedly questioned about how committed the U.S. was to these measures and whether we wouldn't agree to compromises with the allies that would, in turn, compromise Baltic security as well. I assured them we would not. I hope I'm right."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> See the memo to the President from Warren Christopher and Strobe Talbott entitled "Your Meeting with Yeltsin", April 18, 1996.

<sup>11</sup> See the "Memcon of Conversation Between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin", April 21, 1996.