
THE PRECONDITIONS OF THE GRAND STRATEGY IN LITHUANIA

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Abstract

The article examines the preconditions of the Grand Strategy in Lithuania. It is assumed that Lithuanian strategic documents, which have strived to acquire the status of the Grand Strategy, did not meet the requirements for such a strategy. A presumption is made that the political process in Lithuania lacks profound reflection on the past of the state and its current needs as well as the interface between these two elements. This reduces the capacities of public policy to acquire the Grand Strategy. The article observes that the absence of consensus on the strategic directions of the development of the country is related to the complicated formation of the Lithuanian nation and a complex blend of state history. The debate among Lithuanian historians and other experts about the need for a new program of Lithuanian historical identity mirrors the process of the state's "self-contemplation and reflection" and provides opportunities for conceptual definitions in the Lithuanian Grand Strategy. The necessary component for such definitions is the construction of national identity. As a result, analysis of the relevant historical and political realities on the national as well as the global levels is necessary in the design process of the Lithuanian Grand Strategy.

Introduction

In the Lithuanian academic discourse there are a number of discussions on the strategic directions of national development. These are accompanied by strategic documents organized and publicized widely by government institutions. Regardless of this fact, it would be difficult to name the nation's long-term development goals, which could be referred to as the nation's Grand Idea (Grand Strategy), which could be understood by Lithuanian society, and the realization of which would be attempted through strongly institutionalized means.

In this respect, one might raise the question - is this kind of strategy necessary for Lithuania? Could Lithuania, having NATO's safety guarantees and

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being a member of the EU, be naturally “doomed” by the growing welfare, the increasing quality of life and fruition of the vision of cohesion? Are globalization conditions able to independently project and organize Lithuania’s development? What is the essence of this strategy? Is it necessary?

All these questions are the object of the present article. Therefore, this article aims to examine preconditions for the Grand Strategy’s in Lithuania. The implementation of this goal formulates these tasks:

- to provide the definition of the Grand Strategy as used in the article;
- to introduce attempts to conceptualize the discourse of the Grand Strategy in Lithuania;
- to establish preconditions for Lithuania’s Grand Strategy;
- to name the most important problems of projecting Lithuania’s Grand Strategy.

1. The Conception of the Grand Strategy

There are many conceptions and definitions of the strategy, but in the most general sense, it is the whole of the solution defining the most important future goals of the nation, organization or individual as well as means to achieve these goals. The strategy helps to decrease and define the environment’s complexity while aiming at particular goals. Strategic management itself is the desired future’s modelling and the identification of the means to reach this future.¹ There are many kinds of strategies – their classification is based on the planning period (short-term, medium, long-term), content object (sectoral, horizontal, multi-sectoral, etc.), extent of dispersion (local, regional, global), and so on. A separate “niche” in the hierarchy and structure of the strategy is occupied by the Grand Strategy.

The origin of the Grand Strategy is to be found in the fields of military and a nation’s governing. As U.S. historian and diplomat G.F. Keenan notes, a nation’s government and military, even more so than any other collective human activity spheres, require calculation of relationships and links between

¹ G. A. Cole, *Strategic Management: Theory and Practice*. London and New York: Continuum, II ed., 1997, 3.

various means in a long-term perspective.² The Grand Strategy — is a long-term strategy, mostly implicating the global interests of a state as well as the state's intentions to take part in global political processes. It differs from other strategies in its form and content, and indeed it must include something “fundamental”. The Grand Strategy is mostly written and talked about in the context of the foreign policy of the so-called “Super powers”, i.e. big countries. The Grand Strategy is not a science in the classical sense; it is not a strategy either, in the traditional sense of the word. It encompasses much more than just strategic planning and management, rational and “right” political decision-making and the ability to demonstrate the effectiveness of the economy in the conditions of globalization. Due to this, the understanding of the Grand Strategy is sometimes mystified (this is done in Lithuania as well), making it part of the sphere of “power games”. Nevertheless, the Grand Strategy is an objective, rather clearly defined object of study. Here are a few definitions of the Grand Strategy:

- The Grand Strategy is a long-term national policy. It is a term of art coined by the academia and refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise a state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together in order to advance the national interest of this state. The Grand Strategy is the art of reconciling ends and means. It involves purposive action - what leaders think and want.³
- The Grand Strategy is a purposeful and single-minded use of all the available power and instruments of influence, aiming at the survival and safety of the state and it's people. The purpose of the Grand Strategy is to coordinate and set all the resources of a nation or the group of nations, aiming for long-term goals that are defined by fundamental political solutions.⁴
- The Grand Strategy is an interdisciplinary object of study. It is realized during times of war, conflict, peace, using military and non-military means, aggregating policies, activities, and tactics that complement one another.⁵

² George F. Kennan, “The Experience of Writing History,” in Stephen Vaughn, ed., *The Vital Past: Writings on the Uses of History*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985, 97.

³ Peter Feaver, “What is Grand Strategy and why do we need it?” 2009, April 8. [http://shadow.foreign-policy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it.]

⁴ Liddell Hart, B. H. *Strategy*. London: Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed. p. 322

⁵ Duke University's Program in American Grand Strategy [<http://www.duke.edu/web/agosp/>].

- The Grand Strategy outlines how the goal should be reached, staying on the action direction chosen by the nation. Other strategies can be applied additionally, detailing the means and methods for the achievement of the Grand goal.⁶
- The Grand Strategy includes resource management projecting between the various action sectors of a state, the hierarchization of strategic solutions in times of war and peace as well as the modelling of international alliances, most suitable for the nation's national interests.⁷
- The purpose of the Grand Strategy is to build a bridge between political theory and practice. The Grand Strategy may be born in debates at the highest levels of national power, but it lives or dies in the collaborative action of myriad junior officials.⁸
- The Grand Strategy is meant for planning, developing, and supporting the nation's military, moral, value and other systems, necessary in the global battle for power and survival. The projecting of the Grand Strategy in time is determined by the possibilities and perspectives of military conflict. The purpose of the Grand Strategy is to create an environment for long-term peace and stability, while considering the possibility of war.⁹

The Grand Strategy lends itself to vigorous interpretive academic debates, yet it is so realistic that practitioners can and must contribute for it to be properly understood.¹⁰ In other words, the Grand Strategy has to be adapted at many political levels and be easily recognizable by every citizen in the political every day, regardless of his or her education, individual interests, etc. The Grand Strategy blends the disciplines of history (what happened and why?), political science (what underlying patterns and causal mechanisms are at work?), public policy (how well did it work and how could it be done bet-

⁶ Centre for Applied NonViolent Action and Strategies [<http://www.canvasopedia.org/legacy/content/canvasopedia/dictionary.htm>].

⁷ Liddell Hart, B. H. *Strategy*. London: Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed. p. 322

⁸ P. Feaver, *What is Grand Strategy and why do we need it?* 2009, April 8. [http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it,]

⁹ Liddell Hart, B. H. *Strategy*. London: Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed., 322

¹⁰ Duke University's Program in American Grand Strategy [<http://www.duke.edu/web/agosp/>].

ter?), and economics (how are national resources produced and protected?).¹¹ The Grand Strategy is a calculated relationship between multiple measures, serving a higher goal. The Grand Strategy requires specific knowledge in certain fields, but, at the same time, it requires the ability to generalize, because without this ability there can be no understanding of how the whole system works, where its datum point is and where it is moving.¹²

The Grand Strategy is a natural evolutionary product of a nation, which it created at different points in history, utilizing various “ingredients” available at the time. The object of the present article is the modern, i.e. pertaining to the 20th and 21st centuries, Grand Strategy. According to Michael Howard, the Grand Strategy in the first part of the 21st century is the mobilization of the nation’s material, human, and industrial resources, and the projection of international alliances, aiming for goals of national policy.¹³ This conception was published in 2001, but as early as 1928, another author, Liddell Hart, presented a concept of the Grand Strategy that was not directly associated with conflict and war: “<...> although the concept of the Grand Strategy includes the eventual possibility of war, it must necessarily embrace the perspective of peace too.”¹⁴ Based on this understanding, war is fought in order to guarantee long-term peace in the future. It does not matter what strategy the war resorts to; what matters is that it brings long-term peace. It should be noted that the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu was guided by a similar understanding of the strategy. In his view, the ideal of warfare is victory without bloodshed. Battles where this principle was applied (e.g. Scipio Africanus in Spain, Napoleon at Ulmo, T.E. Lawrence’s desert campaigns during WWI, etc.) stand out in the history of wars as exceptional examples of an ideal strategy.¹⁵ Strategy in the modern world is a nation’s (or its coalitions’) art of controlling and using its resources (including armed forces) in order to protect and properly represent its interests, defending it from current, potential, and possible threats. In the

¹¹ P. Feaver, *What is Grand Strategy and why do we need it?* 2009, April 8. [http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it,]

¹² J. L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, 140, 251.

¹³ M. Howard, Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century, *Defence Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2001), 2.

¹⁴ B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy* (London: G. Bell 1929), 151.

¹⁵ Robert Greene, *33 War Strategies*. Vilnius: Algarvė, 2009, 18.

broadest sense, the projecting of the Grand Strategy is a process during which the country “searches for and establishes its place under the sun”; it is a reflection of the country’s unceasing history; therefore, a country’s creation and implementation of the Grand Strategy is the work of many generations.¹⁶

2. The Conception of the Grand Strategy and Attempts at Projecting it in Lithuania

In academic discourse and practice of Lithuania’s strategic management, we cannot find a clear answer to the question of what is the Grand Strategy. The term Grand Strategy cannot be detected in any public strategic documents. In the media, this word is ironically coloured: it is used as a synonym of a nation’s political inactivity, “playing with paperwork.” In the academic discourse, the concept of the Grand Strategy is used in the context of the foreign policy of great states (most often—USA, less often—Russia, United Kingdom, Germany, France, China and others)¹⁷. The academic literature of the discipline of strategic management reveals some information on the Grand Strategy, but it is very fragmented. For example, in the textbook intended to the students of the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, it is noted that in political science, the term “strategy” is used at different levels and in different contexts. The highest level is the Grand Strategy (also called

¹⁶ Liddell Hart, B. H. *Strategy*. London: Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed., 322

¹⁷ See, for example: V. Urbelis “The changes in USA Grand strategy and their implications for Lithuania“, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2002, ed. by Vitkus G., Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, 2003, p. 33-66.; V. Urbelis “Lithuania’s place in the Grand Strategy of the USA“. Vilnius, Lithuanian Military Academy, 2005; N. Statkus, E. Motieka “The changes of the global and Baltic states geopolitical situation“, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2003, ed. by Vitkus G., Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, 2004, p. 9-52; E. Motieka, N. Statkus, J. Daniliauskas “Developments of the global geopolitics and opportunities for Lithuanian foreign policy“, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, ed. by Vitkus G., Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, 2005, p. 39-80; G. Vitkus “The “triangle” of Russia-USA-EU and the smaller states in 2003-2004“ Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, ed. by Vitkus G., Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, 2005, p. 129-152; R. Lopata, N. Statkus “Empires, the world order and small states“, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, ed. by Vitkus G., Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, 2006, p. 27-84; E. Motieka, L. Kasčiūnas “Relations of Lithuania and Germany in the context of global geopolitical challenges in the start of XXI century“, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, ed. by Vitkus G., Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, 2006, p. 87-112; etc.

the total, highest, or national). This means the art of using the resources of the nation or several nations for achieving the goals of war and peace.¹⁸ We should note that the Grand Strategy can take various forms, and war is but one of them. In the legal acts the Grand Strategy is mostly defined as the long-term development strategy of a state.¹⁹

In Lithuania, there have been several attempts made to prepare and institutionalize the nation's long-term development strategy, i.e. a strategy that could be a candidate for the status of the nation's Grand Strategy. These are:

- **The state's long-term development strategy until 2015** (further—NLTDS), confirmed by the Seimas in 2002.²⁰ The purpose of the NLTDS is to formulate the state's long-term development strategy, which could evaluate the current situation in Lithuania, present the vision of the state, define its priorities and directions for the long-term development, according to the principles of EU Lisbon and Barcelona documents. The most important three long-term priorities presented in the NLTDS are as follows: knowledge society, safe society, competitive economy.
- **The strategy "Lithuania 2030."** Prepared by a special commission established by Lithuanian Government, the strategy "Lithuania 2030" presents a long-term vision of the country: Lithuania is a country of success, where one can live and work. The goal of the strategy is to awaken the society's creativity, to gather around ideas that, once implemented, could help Lithuania become modern, active, and open to the world.

It is important to name one more solid attempt to make sense of the discourse on the Grand Strategy in Lithuania. This is the scientific research "Lithuania's Grand (General) Strategy" prepared by the NGO "The Centre for Strategic Studies" in spring 2008 at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.²¹ The strategy is classified (only a sum-

¹⁸ B. Melnikas, R. Smaliukienė. Strategic management. General Jonas Žemaitis Military academy of Lithuania, Vilnius, 2007, 23-24.

¹⁹ Ibid, 23-24.

²⁰ The decision of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. "On the state's long-term development strategy until 2015", November 12, 2002 Nb. IX-1187

²¹ Lithuania's Grand (General) Strategy. Scientific analytical research. The Center for Strategic Studies, Vilnius, 2007.

mary is available to the public), but it is necessary to point out that it was prepared by an impressive group of 29 professionals, who are credited as the best experts in Lithuania in various fields.

In order to move forward with the analysis of the Lithuanian Grand strategy discourse, it is necessary to take a closer look into the conceptual and methodological differences and/or similarities of the previously mentioned Lithuanian long-term strategies. A few remarks can be made in this respect:

- *First*, the NLTDS and the strategy “Lithuania 2030” belong to different camps of the strategic planning technique. The NLTDS serves as a “roof” to numerous sectoral, inter-sectoral and horizontal strategies developed in Lithuania during the decade of independence. The “Lithuania 2030” seems to be a *vision*, rather than a strategy in the traditional sense of the word, and it strives to occupy a higher/symbolic *niche* in the national strategic discourse;
- *Second*, the NLTDS and the strategy “Lithuania 2030” belong to different camps of strategic planning culture. To be more precise, “Lithuania 2030” could be qualified as a *normative* strategy, while the NLTDS as a *practical* strategy. The NLTDS hardly implies any specific priorities or visions for the future of the Lithuanian nation. For the most part, it formally de-cites and presents opportunities which have been introduced to Lithuania in line with the membership in the EU and NATO and according to the principles of EU Lisbon and Barcelona documents as well as the core NATO strategic documents. There is nothing much *intrinsic* or *nationally unique* in the NLTDS. The strategy mostly generalises on the European and Transatlantic values, principles, widely accepted guidelines for future policies and settles all this information into the national strategic planning level. Contrarily, the strategy “Lithuania 2030” implies some specific *visions* for Lithuania. “Lithuania 2030” belongs to the domain of *creativity* strategies and therefore it prescribes some formula for Lithuanian self-identification, self-determination, self-motivation and a unique way of thinking in order to successfully develop in the globalised world. The vision provided in the strategy “Lithuania 2030” appeals to Lithuania as a unique country, which must use and extract its inner capabilities in order to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the global world. To sum up, the NLTDS only lists opportunities, while the “Lithuania 2030” tries to teach how to make use of them.

- *Third*, the NLTDS and the “Lithuania 2030” have been projected onto and presented in different geopolitical, political, economic and other international and national circumstances, bearing in mind the different approaches to these circumstances, too. The NLTDS draws the practical guidelines for the future of the state after the Lithuania’s accession to the EU and NATO. The “Lithuania 2030” does not adjust the state merely on the *status quo* of international environment; rather, it attempts to make use of this environment and marks a qualitatively brand new step in the Lithuanian strategic planning discourse. The “Lithuania 2030” reflects an effort to “visionise” the future – intrinsic and specific to the nation and at the same time compatible with the quickly changing global and local environments.

As it was mentioned in the previous section of the article, the Grand Strategy has to be the reflection of fundamental long-term political goals, which are agreed upon by the country’s elite and accepted by society. Besides (and this is particularly important in the context of analysis of Lithuania’s strategic management), in the literature of foreign authors, the concept of the Grand Strategy is often made an integral part of the projections of the country’s foreign policy.²² Keeping in mind that the Grand Strategy is traditionally perceived as part of a country’s national security definitions, the relationship between the NLTDS and the “Lithuania 2030” with Lithuania’s National Security strategy seems to be unclear. The National Security strategy is based exclusively on the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, National Security basics law, and North Atlantic and EU treaties; therefore, its role in the structure of strategic documents also becomes unclear. In great countries (for example, the USA, Great Britain, Germany), the National Security strategy is given the status of the Grand Strategy. Meanwhile, in Lithuania, this status belongs to the NLTDS (later it will belong to the “Lithuania 2030” strategy), where the basis for foreign policy and national security is not provided. Of course, it is important to pay attention to the fact that soon a renewed National Security strategy will be approved. Discussions on its place in the strategic planning system note that

²² See, for example M. Howard, *Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century*, Defence Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2001); P. Feaver, *What is Grand Strategy and why do we need it?* 2009, April 8. [[http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it,](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it)]

the National Security strategy is a document of political provisions and is not intended for planning; however, it has to be implemented through documents pertaining to the domain of strategic planning. This provision is embedded in the strategic planning methodology approved in the Government's 2010, August 25th, decision No. 1220. Therefore, as pointed out by one of the architects of Lithuania's National Security strategy—the Ministry of National Defence—the Lithuanian National Security strategy has been created in accordance with the experience of other countries, without applying strategic planning requirements for the document's structure and methodology.²³ Consequently, the Lithuanian National Security strategy remains an ordinary horizontal strategy without any substantial or exceptional role in the structure of Lithuanian strategic documents. Nor does it claim the status of the Grand strategy.

According to the Lithuanian government's 2010, August 25 decision on the Strategic planning methodology,²⁴ the NLTDS is still the most important strategic document in Lithuania, and other documents have to be coordinated with it to reflect the state's priorities as stated in the NLTDS. In other words, the NLTDS is supposed to take the role of the General (Grand) Strategy.²⁵ In reality, it does not correspond to this status. The NLTDS can be seen as an "outdated" strategy. The Grand Strategy in essence should not be the whole of sector strategies. These strategies usually do not aim at covering all fields of the activities of the state — rather, sector strategies or policies are intended for this purpose. It is only the most important, and not the executive or administrative, prioritized directions of activity that are indicated in the Grand Strategy, and it is argued that these fields are raised as national strategic priorities. The NLTDS is an antiquated document which has lost its relevance; it is worth having a closer look at the "Lithuania 2030."

As the illusion that Lithuania can quickly create a "knowledge society" has dissolved, academics and analysts speak more often about the fact that this

²³ Provision by the Ministry of Defence of Lithuania No. 12-01 "On The findings of the legal provisions of a working group, governing the Lithuanian National Security and Defence Policy, 2011 March 11.

²⁴ The decision of the Government of Lithuania "On the replacement of the decision of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania 2002 6 June No. 827 "On the approval of the Strategic Planning Methodology", 2010 August 25. No. 1220.

²⁵ Soon the "Lithuania 2030" strategy will be confirmed, wherein it will take over the Grand Strategy status from NLTDS.

concept is obsolete; therefore, the basis of the Grand Strategy should be the idea of a “creative” society. For example, political scientist Ainė Ramonaitė believes that in the digital age of easy access to all and any information, knowledge is not a virtue that can distinguish one from the rest. The most important resource of the 21st century is imagination. Ramonaitė offers the following vision of Lithuania: according to her, Lithuania would become a centre of world innovation, where concentrated firms or international community divisions could perform experiments, strategically plan, etc. It would be a country where a large part of its GDP would be intellectual production, and the majority of the population would be made up of the “creative class.” In order to become such a country, we have to become a social hotbed, where the best possible conditions would be provided to ensure creative improvement and dissemination. Ramonaitė believes that there are particular strategies, as applied in business and elsewhere, forcing people to “think outside the box”.²⁶ It is this type of “creative thinking” that set the context for preparing the long-term development strategy “Lithuania 2030.”


In the beginning of 2010, the government invited experts from many different fields to develop vision of the “Lithuania 2030” as well as to name Lithuania’s long-term priorities. The Strategy’s project presents the long-term vision of Lithuania: a nation of success, where one can live and work.²⁷ The goal of the Strategy is to awaken society’s creativity, to gather ideas that, once implemented, could help Lithuania become modern, thrusting, and open to the world, fostering its national identity. The Strategy notes that in seeking to implement the vision, we have to learn from the experience of other countries, orienting ourselves to the policies of the Northern-Baltic region countries. The purpose of the Strategy is to create an environment that forms and allows the development of the values that are important to the people. Three main fields of advancement are distinguished — society, economy, and government, which initiate changes that influence people’s value orientation.²⁸ The vision of “Lithuania 2030” is reflected in the figure below:

²⁶ A. Ramonaitė, “How could Lithuania become a leader of the world?” *Atgimimas*. 2007 May 25-31. Nr. 21 (942), [<http://www.atgimimas.lt/articles.php?id=1180002856>].

²⁷ The official website of the “Lithuania 2030” strategy [<http://www.lietuva2030.lt/vizijos-projektas>].

²⁸ *Ibid.*

Fig. 1. “Lithuania 2030”



Source: the official website of the “Lithuania 2030” strategy. [<http://www.lietuva2030.lt/vizijos-projektas>].

The Strategy still awaits confirmations; however, even now we can establish many positive elements which it has brought into the strategic management of the state:

- for the first time the country’s long-term strategy is formed not in the closed circles of politicians, managers, experts, but with the society — all citizens are invited to share their ideas and take part in the creation of the strategy;
- the strategy reflects tendencies and fashions of a post-modern society. At its heart stands a creative person, smart economy, and a government that is open and able to function in accordance with the web principle.
- concrete measures for the implementation of the strategy are presented. It is claimed that once the vision is realized in 2030, Lithuania will be among the top ten EU countries with respect to the following indicators: the life quality index (now Lithuania ranks 13-16th in the EU); the happiness index (now ranks 20th); the democracy index (now ranks 21st); the world competitiveness index (now ranks 19th); the globalization index (now ranks the 26th); the total innovation index (now ranks 25th).²⁹
- the strategy is “alive,” positive and invites people to take action. This manifests the ability of the state to become “successful”, while each citizen has to improve themselves and unite with others, aiming for the development of their nation. Hence, the Strategy hopes to unite the country with its citizens.

²⁹ The official website of the “Lithuania 2030” strategy. [<http://www.lietuva2030.lt/vizijos-projektas>].

At the same time, we can name several doubts and questions concerning the strategy of “Lithuania 2030”:

- most often the Grand Strategy is associated with the country’s national security and/or foreign policy projections. Considering the fact that the strategy “Lithuania 2030” does not deal with the foreign policy, does this mean that Lithuania has to choose the so-called “golden province” path and abandon the active foreign policy that was pursued not so long ago? The Strategy voices an opinion that there is no other choice, but to follow the successful Scandinavian model of organising the society. Why do we have no other choice?
- the nation’s development is projected on a rather narrow — advancement of creativity/science/innovation — foundation. Nevertheless, if the scenario of Lithuania’s development is written as the so-called “golden province” scenario, why is priority given to the search for innovative solutions at a global level, and not, say, to solving the nation’s internal problems (e.g. health insurance, corruption, emigration, apartment housing renovation and other fields)? These important issues are not to be found in the vision.
- The methods for the improvement of the government as presented in the strategy beg the question: will all these methods be realized? The strategy offers methods for the improvement/optimization of the public sector that are aimed at the liberalization of the public sector, bringing it closer to the needs of the market. For example, “in public management the widespread realization of the money-based initiative, optimizing the activities (coordinated with the centralization of general functions, better wealth management) and public service presentation in chosen directions (more services of a higher quality with the same resources or less resources for the same or even higher level of services).”³⁰ It is no secret that not in every country are the aforementioned methods justified. Thus the Scandinavian countries, which are indicated as a perfect example to follow, are as often as not sceptical about such “experiments” with the public sector, wherein the latter is “coordinated with the market’s needs.”
- The criteria evaluating the implementation of the Strategy (as with most criteria of this nature) are selective. As political scientist Tomas Janeliūnas points it out, for example, the “happiness index,” which is part of the

³⁰ The official website of the “Lithuania 2030” strategy. [<http://www.lietuva2030.lt/vizijos-projektas>].

strategy, is measured with various methods. Respectively, the results of such measurements are often different. Besides, the implementation of the strategy success index seems attractive only now. There is a big possibility that in 2030, the globalization index mentioned in the strategy will no longer exist or will mean something different from what it does now. According to Janeliūnas, it is a difficult task to forecast how the global environment will change and what indexes and values will be important 20 years from now. This requires forecasting, methods of which are not applied in the “Lithuania 2030” strategy. Forecasting is not the writing down of dreams on paper, it is a difficult process, which requires a large amount of data, difficult scientific methods and creative thinking.³¹

- Is it possible to become a “successful person” merely by reading the text of a particular document? The strategy orients itself towards traditional values of the political right (a strong family, harmony, etc.); however these do not necessarily have to match life visions of the modern youth, who may have very different perceptions of the concepts of country, national identity, and family. And what if the strategic vision does not convince all citizens? Will those unconvinced stay behind the “successful state’s” barrier? As Janeliūnas points out, documents themselves cannot inspire people. The vision itself cannot foresee that a political will be created for long-term goals, not short-term interests.³²
- According to economy expert Raimondas Kuodis, the government and other architects of the “Lithuania 2030” spend too much time considering discussions on how Lithuania should create a big auxiliary value economy, “creators’ society,” and “money-making machines” — Lithuanian iPhones and microssofts.³³ In Kuodis’ opinion, this is beside the purpose, since there is no clear relationship between the understood wilful actions now and the appearance of aforementioned products in the future. Let us say that the environment in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is very similar, while their

³¹ Tomas Janeliūnas, “The dreamland”, IQ.lt, March 8, 2011 [<http://iq.lt/rinktiniai-tekstai/svajoniusalis/>].

³² Tomas Janeliūnas, “The dreamland”, IQ.lt, March 8, 2011 [<http://iq.lt/rinktiniai-tekstai/svajoniusalis/>].

³³ R. Kuodis. “Different visions on the State’s progress”, 2010 June 11. [<http://www.bernardinai.lt/straipsnis/2010-06-11-raimondas-kuodis-skirtingos-valstybes-pazangos-vizijos/46123>].

individual successes fall are close to statistical bias. Therefore we cannot claim that “Skype” was made-up in Estonia because Estonia is different—it’s just that by accident “Skype” appeared just in Estonia while “GetJar” is in Lithuania. Because of this, some experts offer the solution of paying more attention to the country’s internal problems (such as apartment building complex renovation), and stop creating Grand Strategies which have misty perspectives of implementation.³⁴

Most of the definitions of the Grand Strategy note that the most important role and goal of the Grand Strategy is to guarantee the nation’s safety and survival. As political scientist Vaidotas Urbelis puts it, the strategy reflects the distribution of power, the intents of other countries and implementation methods of these intents.³⁵ Debates about the “Lithuania 2030” vs. NLTDS vs. The Lithuanian National security strategy concerning their role in the structure of strategic planning documents, their purpose, quality of content, perspectives of implementation etc., raise the following question: is the foreign policy an indispensable attribute to the Grand Strategy? And yes, “to what extent and by what means” should foreign policy be included in the strategic documents/doctrines or discourse in order for the latter to deserve the name of the Grand strategy? Or is the Grand Strategy at all possible without any foreign policy reflections?

There are two attempts to conceptualize the strategic discourse of Lithuanian foreign policy. These are membership in the EU and NATO strategy, and Lithuania’s, as the centre of the region, concept. The rightness of the membership in the EU and NATO strategy had not been doubted since their initiation until their practical implementation. They were firmly supported not only by the country’s elite, but also by the society in general. After Lithuania’s accession to the European Union and NATO, and with the emergence of a vacuum in the country’s further development visions, the idea of Lithuania as the centre of the region was created. Then the academics, politicians, diplomats as well as the media expressed their views on a hot topic: the

³⁴ “Lithuanians in the future: Potato growers or “Facebook” developers?”. *Technologijos.lt*, 2010 May 21. [<http://www.technologijos.lt/n/mtl/S-13088/straipsnis?name=S-13088&l=1&p=1>].

³⁵ V. Urbelis “Lithuania’s place in the Grand Strategy of the USA”. Vilnius, Lithuanian Military Academy, 2005, 28.

leader of which region should Lithuania aim to be? How should “this” be done? How much will it cost? Why is it necessary? The strategy “Lithuania 2030” points out that we have to aim to become an integral, successful, political and economically consolidated in the North and Baltic region, which includes five Northern countries and three Baltic countries.³⁶ We should pay attention to the fact that the scientific discourse does not include the “North-Baltic” region; there are only many different political formats functioning in this geographical space, which in long-term perspective can create preconditions for the formation of the “North-Baltic” region. It should be noted that even the “old-timers” of the so-called Nordic tradition deal with the concept of the “North-Baltic” region with many reservations. For example, giving his answer on whether we are able to create a common Nordic-Baltic block, one of the best all-time Norwegian diplomats and politicians, former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, UN Commissioner Thorvald Stoltenberg noted that “if this is not among the Nordic countries, then it will be impossible to speak about the Baltic countries involvement in such an entity. There is still much to be done among the most “northerners“, and only then talk about the coordination and cooperation of a larger number of states”.³⁷

The reality of our post-modern world allows us to presume that a country’s Grand Strategy (or a projection of such a strategy) is possible without foreign policy, just like the latter is understood in the traditional sense. This idea is confirmed by Estonia’s example of a successful concentration for national goals. Without any resources or instruments which could traditionally be considered as necessary for the Grand Strategy (a large territory, natural resources, advanced industry and military service, long-lasting diplomatic traditions etc.), Estonia, relative to other Baltic countries, has managed to break through in many parameters. In the field of foreign policy, Estonia has chosen the Northern direction, but it is doubtful that it would be possible to find a detailed global and regional Estonian foreign policy program. Estonia pays close attention to post-modern values, such as environmentalism, ecology, renewable energy, equal opportunities etc. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Estonia pays

³⁶ The official website of the “Lithuania 2030” strategy. [<http://www.lietuva2030.lt/vizijos-projektas>].

³⁷ “Confidence – a key priority.” IQ.lt February 23, 2011. [<http://iq.lt/rinkiniai-tekstai/pasitikejimas-%E2%80%93-svarbiausias-prioritetas/>].

little attention to foreign policy. In today's world, when information spreads at lightning speeds, countries operate in an environment where every phenomenon or event can gain international level. The control of these phenomena and events while placing them onto the level of national development is a big quiz which seems to be something that Estonia has solved. In other words, Estonia pays a lot attention to foreign policy, but in different, "non-traditional," methods. Such concepts as "active foreign policy," "golden province" (i.e. – "non-active" foreign policy) are increasingly losing their earlier meaning. In this sense, being a "golden province" and by means of active international lobbying, drawing foreign investors and national advertisement, Estonia can perform a more active foreign policy than Lithuania, which officially declares its active foreign policy. Activism in foreign policy is not an end in itself; it has to be directed towards the achievement of specific goals. For example, in the case of Estonia, these goals include, but are not limited to investment, capital drawing into the high value-added worth of IT and other industry sectors, advanced expansion of IT sector products into foreign markets, looking for specific niches that are suitable for capabilities of a small nation, creation of an attractive business environment, creation of a good image of the state abroad. The demonstrated success in accomplishing these goals pushes us to claim that Estonia has, if not a Grand Strategy, then at least a solid projection of the Grand Strategy. Economic diplomacy, active public sector service, creative business structures and, in general, active participation of citizens who familiarize themselves with the world and "reflect" a *niche* for their country and identity stands for real adaptation of the nation to the globalization conditions. This approach is no less a "foreign policy" than official visits from diplomats, speeches and consultations. Even when not formally stressing its foreign policy, Estonia thus does have a projection of the Grand Strategy.

If Grand Strategies are mainly the prerogative of superpowers, then the question arises: is the big size of a state a necessary precondition for an all inclusive effective foreign policy? The example of Estonia gives the negative answer. Though small, Estonia still successfully sails through global international seas, impressively using the opportunities for the development of the state. The same could be said putting into question the effectiveness of foreign policy of Israel, Singapore, Luxembourg and many other small countries. At the same time, for example, Mexico, which has a status of at least a middle-

size state, does not pursue any particular active foreign policy goals. This somehow suggests that active foreign policy and the (big) size of a state usually, but not always, go together. At the same time, this regularity suggests that more consideration be given to the content, forms and meaning of foreign policy nowadays. Is not a successful active foreign policy a function of successful domestic policies, coming up from a deep reflection about “who we are, what our country needs and how we are going to make it”? In this context, even the best foreign policy strategies, be they prepared as strategic documents or declared as political doctrines, do not make much sense if they are neither reflected, nor rooted in the societies and “heads” of states, nor backed by adequate resources alongside strong political will. Therefore, the precondition for the Grand Strategy is, first of all, the “self-reflection” of the state and productive construction of “itself”, (i.e. the state and its identity) throughout numerous functions of society: be it economy, politics (domestic or foreign), culture, international lobbying or effective consular service. Hardly are fundamental strategies and specific priorities of foreign policy the core preconditions for an affective “networking”, entrenchment and survival of a national state in the global environment.

The image of Estonia as a small state possessing the Grand Strategy without distinct foreign policy manifestations reflects a shift not in the content, but rather in the definition and particularly in the approach to the Grand Strategy. This means that the outlook on international relations is based on a rather different theoretical and methodological background. The perception of foreign policy as an intrinsic and indispensable element to the Grand Strategy is largely based on the theoretical background of *realism* (or any other theories from this camp, for example, the rational choice theory, neo-realism, the game theory etc.), which stresses the primacy of material factors (for example, the size of a state, military/industry resources etc.) in the logic of international relations. On the contrary, *post-modernism* (and all the other related theories, for example, constructivism, feminism, the critical theory, post-structuralism, etc.) gives priority to *non-material/idea-based/social* factors in explaining the international relations as well as the essence of the Grand Strategy. These factors are embodied in ideas, identities, languages, symbols, values and many others. It should be noted that there have been several prominent academic studies and articles with the post-modern outlook on the

Lithuanian foreign policy and national security issues.³⁸ The post-modern outlook on international relations gives a possibility to re-name the content, form, and the meaning of the Grand Strategy. It also opens up new horizons for the analysis of preconditions of the Lithuanian Grand Strategy.

Taking up the post-modern outlook on the agenda of international relations, the question could be formulated as follows: if active foreign policy is not a necessary component of the Grand Strategy (or its projections), and if Lithuania's politicians and strategists share this outlook, what is/could be Lithuania's Grand Strategy's "nail," i.e. assumptions and goals regarding Lithuania's long-term development? The latest Lithuanian long-term development strategy "Lithuania 2030" holds the high quality of life for Lithuanian citizens as the most important goal. Is this enough to allow the "Lithuania 2030" be a candidate for the Grand Strategy? Finally, the issue of foreign policy provokes one more substantial question: what role does history play in the organization policy of nation's development?³⁹ In other words, is the architecture of the Grand Strategy a philosophical issue, associated with the reflection of history, or is it a more technical/administrative occupation?

Historian and political scientist Raimundas Lopata believes that researchers of political history, while emphasizing that there are not any lessons in history, still accept the idea that in political action, when making decisions, the role of history—the teacher of life—is understood as the logic of decision-making power, which awakens memories of previous rules, and encourages their application to present and future cases.⁴⁰ Historians Česlovas Laurinavičius and

³⁸ See, for example, G. Miniotaite "Search for identity in modern foreign Policy of Lithuania: between the Northern and Eastern dimensions?", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004*, Vilnius: Lithuanian Military Academy, 2005, p.69-84; G. Miniotaite "The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity." in Charles Krupnick, ed., *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 261-296.; G. Miniotaite "Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A Decade of Transformation in the Baltic States", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 16, No 2, 2003, p.209-222; K. Paulauskas "The security studies: the status quo and the trends", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2006*, Vilnius: Lithuanian Military Academy, 2007, p.209-232; K. Paulauskas, *Who's Security? Which Identity? Critical security studies and Lithuanian Foreign Policy*, Vilnius: Vilnius university publishing office, 2010; etc.

³⁹ R. Lopata, *Recent Debate on Lithuania's Foreign Policy*, *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 22/2009, 169.

⁴⁰ R. Lopata, *History of policy and policy historization* (The review of the Alfonsas Eidintas book "The history of politics. Developments in survey". Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2008, 439 p.), *Politologija*, 2008/4 (52), 93.

Vladas Sirutavičius note that Lithuania experiences a situation of “not knowing where to go” (an alternative vacuum of strategic development) stipulated by the problems of the evolution of the Lithuanian nation, a sort of “identity cocktail”, which was mixed by the country’s complicated history: a conflict over the process of breaking away from union traditions, lack of consolidation in modern society, non-definition of “national” territories, the Soviet-type attribution to a national minority and parallel identification with nation’s historical backgrounds based on mid-war traditions and reminiscences on the heroic Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Historian Alfredas Bumblauskas notes that obviously Lithuania has matured for the need of a new historical identity program.⁴¹ And that would be one of the preconditions for the Grand Strategy of Lithuania. Lithuanian historians and other scientists discuss the need for a new historical identity program, which signifies the complexities of Lithuania’s self-reflection process. Meanwhile the latter grants the space and opportunities for new — conceptual, long-term — Grand Strategy definitions. The essential prerequisite for such definitions is the construction of the nation’s identity.⁴²

With the rapid rise of globalization, many nations which formed a national historical discourse in the 19th-20th centuries, are giving it up for ideological expressions of the country’s identity (These expressions are for the most part liberal and can be illustrated by the assignment to “democratic value nurturing family of nations”. The other type is represented by regional expressions, for example, Danube’s macro-region, the European Union as a unified geopolitical formation, and others). In this context, national historical memory of a country can gain a broader meaning; hence a new form of national identity develops under the conditions of globalization.⁴³

In the not so distant past, when the success of the implementation of the strategy by Lithuania, as a regional leader, was called into question, the issue of the country’s identity, again, ranked high on the agenda. Internationally, Lithuania is seen as part of Europe fostering democratic values and character-

⁴¹ A. Bumblauskas. “*The meetings of the Old and New Lithuania*”. Kultūros barai. 2007, nr. 6, p. 6-8.

⁴² The identity of a nation is a particularly complicated field of analysis. Due to space constraints, the problem of Lithuania’s identity is not analyzed in this article. Nevertheless, the author provides several notes on the topic of identity, since it is very important in the context of preconditions for the projection of the Grand Strategy.

⁴³ V. Berenis, *Lithuanian Identity: Between the Historical Experience of Central and Eastern Europe and the Heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania*, LIMES, 2008, Vol. 1, No. 1, 71.

ized by a liberal market, and respect for human rights. Some intellectuals believe that Lithuania's identity is actually *truly* European, and that Lithuania's political elite should not ignore this fact.⁴⁴ Therefore, Lithuania should try to become a "normal" EU country despite the fact that Lithuania's European policy is still reactive, mostly based on a "single question" pushing into the EU's agenda. This creates disaffection on the part of other EU countries.⁴⁵ The weakness of Lithuania's European identity is often attributed to excessive and unnecessary attention paid to the conception of the so-called regional leadership. In other words, the unmeasured and unconfirmed Lithuanian foreign policy hopes to actually slow down Lithuania's process of becoming a "normal" part of Europe in the region of Eastern and Central Europe. Still, the conception of Lithuania's regional leadership could also be also perceived as one more extra component of national identity. This means that integration into Western Europe and transatlantic structures was not the ultimate goal in the transformation process of Lithuania's identity. Using the advantages of the membership in the EU and NATO, Lithuania feels a natural, historically-based need to develop yet another — narrower — (sub)regional identity. The angular instrument of the development of this identity is Lithuania's active Eastern policy, pursued along with Poland and other Central-Eastern European countries. In addition, an alternative identity could be created through active participation in the construction of a new prosperous "Baltic-Nordic" region, which is given so much attention and high assessment in the strategy "Lithuania 2030".

It should be noted that the rapid construction of Lithuania's European identity aiming to "take on the EU's values," to "adapt to EU norms," and to "adapt the best EU practices," may also have negative results for Lithuania's smooth development and the possibilities of the Grand Strategy. For example, philosopher Vytautas Radžvilas believes that European integration could be perceived as an utterly technocratic project, where national loyalty is a negative feature.⁴⁶ Radžvilas says "we should not hurry to take on the "EU's best prac-

⁴⁴ N. Statkus, K. Paulauskas, "Foreign Policy of Lithuania: Linking Theory To Practice", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 17/2006, 61.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 61.

⁴⁶ V. Radžvilas, "The vision came true about the world of technocrats without visions and rounches without love", 2011 May 9. [<http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/vradzvilas-issipilde-zodziai-kad-pasaulyje-vyraus-technokratai-be-vizijos-ir-gaslunai-be-meiles.d?id=45230725>].

tices automatically,” but rather, we should reflect on our own history, aiming to “simply abandon the 19th century and feel free and equal to other nations.”⁴⁷ The philosopher notes that a nation’s vitality refers to its highest organizational level, based on international standards; however, and most importantly, it should still be able to reach for its own goals.⁴⁸ Radžvilas’ position is thought-provoking and deserves profound consideration in that it reveals the possible dangers that could come out of the lack of deep thinking on Lithuania’s future. In other words, the construction of an unambiguous EU identity for Lithuania in “trying to become a normal EU country” does not necessarily mean the versatile use of the country’s potential. Not having clear national goals and value orientation milestones, successive values (it does not matter how advanced they are at the global level) automatically do not create preconditions for the nation’s development.

Integration into the EU and NATO, as well as the expansion of the logic of a consumer society have determined that Lithuania’s identity is best described by the metaphor “conscience self-economization”. The national, regional, and local identities of the country are developing simultaneously. Modern sociologists agree that identities can be formed and reformed. Historical tradition and the modern social context have a special meaning for the success of this construction. The old forms of national identity do not have any dependent potential, while the new identity has not yet been formed.⁴⁹ This means that “...when making decisions, Lithuania’s politicians will increasingly have to follow post-modern rules, but, inevitably, remember geopolitics, too.”⁵⁰

Summing up, it is important to note that the political reality is both a material base and a social construct; therefore, nowadays particular importance is attached to the possibilities of constructing a political/strategic discourse.⁵¹

⁴⁷ V. Radžvilas, “*Show me a normal state, where a minority refuses to learn the state language*“, 2011 May 12. [<http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/vradzvilas-parodykite-normalia-valstybe-kur-mazuma-atsisakytu-mokytis-valstybines-kalbos.d?id=45360897>].

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ L. Jonavičius, “Geopolitical Projections of New Lithuanian Foreign Policy”, *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2006, 17, 70.

⁵⁰ N. Statkus, K. Paulauskas, “Foreign Policy of Lithuania: Linking Theory to Practice,” *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 17/2006, 42.

⁵¹ L. Jonavičius, “Geopolitical Projections of New Lithuanian Foreign Policy,” *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2006, 17, 36.

In other words, besides material factors, analysis of ideas about the historical/political reality at the national, regional, and global level is necessary as well. The intensive application of the intellectual and analytical potential of the state in the political discourse is a very important precondition for Lithuania's Grand Strategy. For now, discussions on Lithuania's national identity and its possible extrapolations in the country's strategic discourse take place in a closed circle of intellectuals, while the country's domestic and foreign policy is mostly fed by the instruments of interaction with the EU, NATO and other international organizations as well as the instruments of globalization *per se*. The political process lacks inner reflexes on the nation's past and its present needs; besides, the disembodiment of the two aforementioned elements is also obvious. This limits the abilities of the system of the strategic management of the state and becomes a hindrance in gaining features of a Grand Strategy.

3. The Subject of the Grand Strategy: the Well-being of the State vs. the Individual

The discourse of Lithuania's strategic management gains more and more popularity in a very particular understanding of the country's strategic development. Based on it, the essence of the strategic management of the country is projected into the people's well-being (primarily economic). In this case, any long-term program of the country's development foreseeing the country's economic growth could be treated as the Grand Strategy. For example, professor in economics Antanas Makštutis notes that one of the most important tasks of strategic planning in the world in general, and Lithuania in particular, is improving people's quality of life.⁵² According to him, the goal of strategic planning has to be the guarantee of national economy and market development, at the supply and demand level, fully satisfying the needs of Lithuania's society from the viewpoint of a person's life and the development

⁵² Antanas Makštutis, Strategic planning in the context of globalization. General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. The Publishing and Information Provision Service of the Ministry of Defence of Lithuania, Vilnius, 2006, 5.

of the family, while cultivating collective activities (represented by an organization). This guarantees the dissemination of democracy and advancement, as well as a harmonious evolution of the state in the international community.⁵³

It should be noted that manifestations of perceiving strategic management as based on economic objectives and societal well-being are also embedded in the strategy “Lithuania 2030.” This strategy has also reaped criticism for paying insufficient attention to the development of the nation or the state and excessive attention to the well-being and success of an individual.⁵⁴ The most important leitmotif of the “Lithuania 2030” is the expansion of the country’s economy and advancement of the well-being of the population. This is illustrated by indexes measuring the extent of the implementation of the Strategy. Three of the six aforementioned indicators are in essence associated with the increase of the economic well-being: the life quality index, the world competitiveness index, and the total innovation index. Two more indicators — the democracy index and the globalization index - reflect the evaluation of another “support/stanchion” of the Strategy - growth of the openness of the society. Finally, the sixth indicator, the happiness index, seems to summarize the implementation results of the other factors.⁵⁵ However, oriented mainly towards the expansion of material well-being, the concept of the Grand Strategy reduces its content:

- *First*, the object of the Grand Strategy is largely devoted to the state and its development. The world is made up of countries at different levels of economic development; however, this fact alone does not necessarily imply people’s gathering in the most economically strong regions. In other words, economic conditions are only one of the criteria, and not necessarily the most important, that play a role in choosing a country where it is “good to

⁵³ Antanas Makštutis, Strategic planning in the context of globalization. General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. The Publishing and Information Provision Service of the Ministry of Defence of Lithuania, Vilnius, 2006, 6.

⁵⁴ See, for example: Linas Eriksonas, “Homo economicus. The Man from the Strategy “Lithuania 2030“, Septynios meno dienos, February 18, 2011 [http://www.7md.lt/lt/laisvoji_tribuna/homo_economicus_zmogus_is_strategijos_lietuva_2030.html].

⁵⁵ The official website of the “Lithuania 2030” strategy. [<http://www.lietuva2030.lt/vizijos-projektas>].

live.” Let us consider, for instance, the United Arab Emirates or Qatar — they are wealthy countries, but because of many reasons it is doubtful that every Lithuanian would want to spend their entire life there;

- *Second*, although economic development is one of the most important elements of every Grand Strategy, such a strategy also has to include the moral level, i.e. the values of a specific country and the state as a value itself. The Grand Strategy is not just a function of material factors and economic processes. Rather, it is the opposite: a reflection of the history of a political community, fostered values and use of resources for further national development. Economic well-being is a means of achieving higher goals. The main goal the Grand Strategy is to achieve is that the people, who are dedicated the Grand Strategy (ideally, these people are also economically equipped), see themselves not only as *homo economicus*, but also as *homo politicus* of a specific political community (i.e. a country), which is exactly the subject of the Grand Strategy.

The discussion about the primacy of “the individual” vs. “the state” in the Grand Strategy raises the question of the destination, or the audience, of the Grand Strategy. Is the Grand Strategy dedicated to the people (*individuals*) or to the collective (*nation/state*) as a synergetic whole? The argument of this article presumes that the object of the Grand Strategy is a collective unit, be it a state, a nation-state, a political community, a tribe, an ethnic minority, etc. The reflection of “the self” as a collective unit is one of the preconditions for the Grand Strategy. To be more precise, the object of the Grand Strategy is mostly national/collective, rather than individual, security, well-being, growth, survival etc. The Grand Strategy implies the individual well-being as a function of the collective good. The latter is brought into being as a synergy of individual action which is constructed and regularly re-constructed by means of the Grand Strategy and tools of strategic management. Therefore, one of the preconditions for the Lithuanian Grand Strategy is a construction and reflection of the long-term strategic development guidelines aimed primarily at the collective, i.e. the nation/state/civic society, and not the individual, whose well-being though important, does not constitute the essence or the object of the Grand Strategy.

4. Strategic Management vs. Strategic Studies

Analyses of the system of strategic management in Lithuania's public sector often produce an impression that planners, policy makers and executers seem to confuse the concepts of strategic planning/management and strategic studies. Meanwhile strategic planning is associated with a managerial outlook on strategic planning, i.e. management of political processes in the framework of the traditional strategic planning cycle. The concept of strategic studies is associated with the outlook of political scientists on strategic management, which includes a much broader range of internal and external factors, i.e. projections on the position of the country in the international community and, accordingly, foreign policy visions.

Traditionally, the creation of the Grand Strategy begins from the so-called *strategic studies*, i.e. the country's self-reflection in the structure of the international community. Meanwhile, the role and the goals of Lithuania's government in the international system and projection processes of the internal development of a nation are understood as rather different, independent fields of activity. The concept of the development of an un-projected external society may determine that strategic alternatives of the internal development (knowledge society, boost of creativity and others) will be left without a firm foundation.

Processes of strategic management of Lithuania's foreign policy have an especially distinct divide between strategic planning of a formal/"institutional" foreign policy (in essence, it is reflected in the speeches of the president, the prime minister, the government's program and strategic action plans of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and conceptions of academic/analytical foreign policy. Although the latter are strongly anchored in the academic discourse, even the media, they are barely institutionalized in the foreign policy agenda.

The tradition of strategic thinking in Lithuania is associated mainly with academic activities, while the political discourse is largely valued as a function of administrative processes. Advanced intellectual ideas have a difficult time finding their way into the political agenda and, more often than not, they seem to be merely intrusive theoretical bodies on that agenda. Let us say that the concept of the Grand Strategy is very clearly defined in the scientific research report "Lithuania's Grand (General) Strategy." This report postulates

that the Grand Strategy is a long-term strategic document, which generates saturation of all resources of the nation in order to achieve national goals. The most important of the goals is the guarantee of the country's safety and survival.⁵⁶ The report points out that, in the traditional sense, the Grand Strategy is often associated with the National Security strategy. This is largely due to the fact that, in general, the survival of a country is the most important national interest. In the modern (and post-modern) sense, the Grand Strategy is understood as a grand idea of the nation, which unites the society with the government and encourages not only the fulfilment of the task of the nation's survival, but also advancement of its most effective competitive possibilities in the international environment. In other words, the Grand Strategy, first of all indicates, the nation's relationship with its external environment and other participants of the international system. This is why the nation's safety and abilities (power) are valued in the global context and are based on the logic of global development.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the ideas presented in the report remain only scientific notes. The same can be said about the Foreign Policy strategy and Lithuania's EU strategy,⁵⁸ which are prepared as scientific research papers, but which have not become the object of a political discussion and are barely used in the practices of state policies. There are many examples like this one, and they reflect the disembodiment of Lithuania's political processes from analytical thoughts. Lithuania's long-term development strategies – the "Lithuania 2030" and the NLTDS – are not based on a comprehensive scientific or at least analytic research; therefore, they do not pertain to the field of strategic studies. Ideas which gain productive forms among analysts, researchers and academics, have a hard time finding their way into the Lithuanian political agenda, which abounds in "strategic questions" at the administrative/technical level. The country lacks channels, such as, for instance, analytical structures and non-governmental organizations, which could transmit the views of the society on the nation's development and its possible alternatives. Still, the

⁵⁶ Lithuania's Grand (General) Strategy. Scientific analytical research. Public Institution "The Center for Strategic Studies", Vilnius, 2007.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Lithuania's foreign policy strategy. Scientific analytical research. Public Institution "The Center for Strategic Studies", 2006; Lithuania's European Union strategy. Scientific analytical research.. Public Institution "The Center for Strategic Studies", 2006.

biggest problem is the clear lack of a demand for such channels. Political will to institutionalize analytical information is weak and fragmented. To put it simply: vision making (*strategic studies*) and vision implementation (*strategic management*) processes – are two sides of the same coin. The creative application of these two sides of the “coin” is a precondition for the Grand Strategy in Lithuania.

Conclusions

- The role of the Grand Strategy is to coordinate and direct all resources of a country, nation or another collective unit while aiming for long-term goals, which are defined by fundamental political solutions. Throughout history, the greatest goal of the Grand Strategy has been the country’s survival and development.
- In Lithuania, the discourse on the Grand Strategy is not developed. The realities in the policies of the country as well as in the management of the public sector management reflect a rather chaotic combination of different strategic management theories and practice. It is true that Lithuania needs an all-encompassing national strategy — its status has been granted to the nation’s long-term development strategy until 2015 (NLTDS) and will soon be taken over by the new long-term strategic document, “Lithuania 2030”. However, the NLTDS and the “Lithuania 2030” strategy do not integrate the important components of the Grand Strategy, such as analysis of the international situation, forecasts, alternative projections of national development, clear value platforms, and others.
- Traditionally, the Grand Strategy constitutes part of the country’s definitions of national security. In Lithuania, the relationship of both NLTDS’s and the “Lithuania 2030” with the Lithuanian National Security strategy is unclear. The latter remains an ordinary horizontal strategy without an exceptional role in the structure of Lithuanian strategic documents.
- Lithuania’s discourse strategic management gains increasing popularity in a very particular understanding of the country strategic development. Based on it, the essence of the country’s strategic management is projected into the people’s individual well-being (which is estimated in predominantly economic terms). It raises the question on the primacy of the individual

vs the state in the Grand Strategy discourse. The Grand Strategy is not a function of economic processes. On the contrary, it is a reflection of human history, fostered values and resources belonging to a specific political community. The object of the Grand Strategy is, therefore, a collective unit. One of the preconditions for the Lithuanian Grand Strategy is a construction and reflection of the long-term guidelines of strategic development of the collective, i.e. - nation/state/civic society, but not the individual, whose well-being, although important, does not constitute the essence of the Grand Strategy.

- Traditionally, foreign policy has been a very important part of the Grand Strategy. Nevertheless, the reality of the post-modern world allows us to presume that a country's Grand Strategy might not have foreign policy, the latter understood in the traditional sense. The assumption of a foreign policy, as an intrinsic and indispensable element to the Grand Strategy, is based on the theoretical background of *realism*, which stresses the primacy of material factors in the logic of international relations. On the contrary, in explaining international relations as well as the substance of the Grand strategy, *post-modernism* gives the priority to *non-material/idea-based/social* factors. The post-modern outlook on international relations gives a possibility to re-name the meaning of the Grand Strategy. In this sense, a successful active foreign policy is a function of successful domestic policies, stemming from a deep reflection about "who we are, what our country needs, and how we are going to make it". The precondition for the Grand Strategy is the "self-reflection" of the state and a productive construction of "itself" throughout numerous functions of the society: be it economy, politics (domestic or foreign), culture, international lobbying, effective consular service, etc.
- Lithuania experiences a "not knowing where to go" situation (due to the lack of consensus on the nation's directions for development) associated with the problems of the formation of the Lithuanian nation; it is a nation's identity cocktail mixed by the complicated history. Old forms of the Lithuanian national identity do not have any dependent potential, while the new identity has not been constructed. Lithuanian historians discuss the need for a new program of the Lithuanian historical identity, which reflects the nation's complicated "self-contemplation" process, which creates opportuni-

ties for conceptual definitions of Lithuania's Grand Strategy. A construction of the nation's identity is a necessary precondition for these definitions. In addition to the analysis of the material factor, an analysis of ideas concerning the historical/political reality is necessary at the national, regional and global level.

- One of the preconditions for Lithuania's Grand Strategy is a merge of *strategic management* and *strategic studies*, as analysis units, into a single strategic process. The country still has very few instruments relating the academic/analytical thought to the practice of the policy/strategy and bureaucratic mechanisms. The lack of the need for such instruments in the political process is also very clear. Due to the fact that Lithuania's long-term development strategies – the “Lithuania 2030” and the NLTDS – are not based on comprehensive scientific or analytic research, they do not step into the field of strategic studies. Vision making (*strategic studies*) and vision implementation (*strategic management*) processes – are two sides of the Grand Strategy “coin”. The creative application of these two sides of the “coin” is a prerequisite for the Grand Strategy in Lithuania.