SECURITY CULTURE OF LITHUANIA

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Abstract

Employing the concept of security culture the article aims to define key features of Lithuanian security policy and to explain the rationale of its main security directions. In the first section of the article the model of analysis is described and four key variables are identified. Later on the narrative evolves around two allegories of Hobbesian and Kantian cultures which are juxtaposed and reflected in all subsequent sections of the article: fundamental premises of the nature of the international system, the nature of threats, a strategy and instruments to fight threats, and main partners (in the field of security) in the international affairs. The main argument of the article is that Lithuanian security policy, in particular its part directed towards Russia, is strongly influenced by the Hobbesian side of Lithuanian security culture, developed throughout the tumultuous history and triggered by the size and geographical position of the country.

Introduction

For years size, geographical location and historical experience have been the major factors shaping security culture of Lithuania and defining main features of Lithuania’s current security policy. Although at first sight neither the main goals of Lithuanian security policy, namely, preservation of the state sovereignty, peace and welfare, nor the means employed to attain these goals - cooperating with international community, especially NATO and the European Union, - differ from those of many other European states. On the other hand, due to constant prioritization of Russia-related security issues in different international forums, Lithuania is often referred to as “one issue state”, while because of its close, even subservient, relations with the USA it is received with a certain degree of suspicion by the pro-European members of the EU. The aim of this article is to reveal the main features of Lithuanian security culture and to explain the causes of certain aspects of Lithuanian security policy.

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1. Model of Analysis

The concept of security culture is novel in the academic debates. It is mostly related to the changing security agenda and alternative perspectives on national security,\(^2\) when arguing that cultural elements of the global or domestic environment of the states are decisive in explaining the latter’s national security interests, politics and behaviour.\(^3\) Though it is complicated to define what these elements are, they may vary from one state to the other. Most commonly they are related to historical experiences in security field, especially the most dramatic ones, attitudes towards certain domestic or international practices, norms and values. Harald Müller defines security culture as a “set of values, norms, rules and practices with regard to security that gives thinking and acting in security field of a specific state a particular, sometimes singular pattern”.\(^4\) Following the lines of constructivism tradition it might be argued that security culture defines security identity and therefore shapes certain security preferences of a state, group or even individual. Though there could be more than one security culture in one state, for example, the first one directly influencing the official security discourse of the state and the second possessed by the society in general or by a specific group of the society, usually one security culture prevails and guides the official security discourse and behaviour of a state.

Can security culture change or be changed? Cultural factors are usually the most persistent through time; nevertheless, they still can change either in an incremental way, which takes years, or suddenly, as a response to an external shock. For example, conflicting security discourses of NATO members and some of the former Warsaw Pact countries transformed into common security discourse after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The concept of security culture presents the researchers with many challenging and novel opportunities for interesting research; however, most of the debates in the field so far have been carried on a rather conceptual and theoretical level. One of the reasons could be the fact that cultural variables are not easy to define and to


measure. More applied research within the field is conducted using the concept of strategic culture. Strategic culture has been analysed as a civilisation phenomenon – the Western Way of Warfare\(^5\); as international institutions and norms\(^6\); as the strategic culture of certain states\(^7\); and, most recently, as the strategic culture of international organizations\(^8\). Though strategic culture is more related to the use of military force, the latest research on strategic culture does not limit itself to the analysis of military factors, and tends to investigate how cultural environment affects behaviour of the states in general.

One of the most popular definitions of strategic culture presented by Alistair Ian Johnston postulates that strategic culture is a system of symbols composed of two parts. The first part involves fundamental premises about the order of strategic environment (e.g., the role of war in inter-state relations), the nature of the enemy and the threats it poses, the effectiveness of the use of military force and the conditions under which military force is employed. The second part is of an operational character and is related to the most effective choices for fighting threats.\(^9\) In this article Johnston’s definition is employed as the basis for research strategy; therefore, it is argued that national security culture consists of: 1) a system of symbols related to and views on the nature of the international system; 2) perception of threats, their prioritization and attitudes towards the most effective ways to prevent and to fight threats. As through identity security culture shapes security policy and international behaviour of a state, it also has an impact on national foreign policy. Moreover, security culture, security cultures of the small states in particular, cannot be analysed without taking into consideration other players of international politics. Membership in alliances, international organizations, and partnership with other states in the field of security has an important effect on the development of the national security culture.

2. Fundamental Premises on the Nature of the International System

Security culture involves a set of rather fundamental symbols and values related to the general understanding of the character of the international system (which has been shaped, re-shaped and preserved throughout history), the nature of states and their role in international relations. Alexander Wendt puts forward three dominant visions of world order and international relations grounded on different value systems and calls them “cultures of international relations”. Although the Hobbesian culture was dominating the agenda of international relations throughout modern history, emergence of international institutions and other players of international relations reinforced the Kantian culture. It is worth arguing that mixture of values could be observed in the security policies of contemporary states, nevertheless domination of Kant vs. Hobbes and vice versa under certain circumstances may reveal particularities of security cultures in various states and help to explain their international behaviour patterns.

How Lithuania sees and estimates international system is very much interlinked with its historical experience. This experience is twofold: one part bears successful international experience of an independent statehood (its climax dating back to the 15th century, when the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania spread from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea) which was based on European values; while the other one is characterized by several periods of occupation and disillusionment in the peaceful and just international relations, suspiciousness towards European states and European politics. The last occupation of Lithuania alienated Lithuanian understanding on how international system is constructed and what values are guiding it from many Western European states.

By the end of the Second World War, Western European states understood that wars and power politics were evil, which should be eliminated as a rightful mode of international relations. Ever since the security cultures of those countries have developed in the spirit of cooperation, good will and the principle of respect towards each other’s fundamental rights. Growing economies and security shield of NATO advanced further development of European security culture, which

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10 Alexander Wendt argues that three dominant visions of international relations are grounded on three philosophical traditions: Hobbesian, Locke’an, and Kantian.

eventually started to resemble the famous „Perpetual Peace“ of Immanuel Kant, making European countries declare that „peace is the natural component of state policy“. However at the end of the Second World War those left on the other side of the Iron Curtain learned a different lesson: the politics of reconciliation, pacification, and inability to have a strong say leads to disastrous consequences for the national survival and therefore should be avoided. For them international relations remained to be “ruled” by the Hobbesian logic and this understanding affected their security cultures for a long time.

Although during the Soviet occupation period Lithuania did not have its independent foreign or security policy, it might be assumed that it did not have its independent security culture either, since the latter was suppressed by the USSR. To understand current security culture of Lithuania at least two sets of factors should be taken into consideration. First of all, Soviet communism, although resented by Lithuanians, throughout the period of occupation managed to change a set of values and perceptions within Lithuanian society (attitudes towards human rights, the role of the state, fundamental freedoms etc.). On the other hand, narratives on glorious past of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, “historical injustice” and heroic post-war resistance were reinforcing antagonism towards the Soviet Union (Russia) creating positive alliance with those who opposed it.

These factors became vital for the formation of not only Lithuanian security culture; they also affected Lithuanian identity in general after Lithuania had regained its independence in 1990. For several years after declaring its independence, Lithuania was still considered by many European countries as „the grey zone“of Europe. Lithuania was afraid to be left once again on the “wrong side of the curtain”. In 1991 Lithuanian political elite was considering several options of security policy: neutrality, security alliance of small states, and membership in military alliance. However, considering the historical experience of Lithuania itself and having strong suspicion towards Russia, the last two options did not find sufficient support either within the political elite, or within the society of Lithuania. Therefore after Russian troops had left Lithuania in 1993, the President of the Republic of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas wrote a letter for the Secretary

General of NATO expressing Lithuania’s intent to join the organization. It is worth mentioning that, although in the official discourse of Lithuania the strife for membership in NATO was defined as the aim to “come back to Europe”, “gain a rightful place in the international community” etc., in reality it meant gaining security guarantees from the USA.

Throughout the Soviet regime, the USA never recognized the legitimacy of Soviet occupation of Lithuania and was the only state in the world not hesitating to officially bring up the issue of the occupation of the Baltic States. After Lithuania had regained its independence, not only was the USA a strong advocate of Lithuania’s efforts to join NATO, but also had a rather harsh rhetoric against Russia’s attempts, speaking in geopolitical terms, to push Lithuania back to the „grey zone of Europe“. Therefore, while Russia has become part of Lithuanian national identity as „they“, the major threat for the national survival, - the USA has definitely gained the status of „we“, the best ally and protector. The famous statement by George W. Bush made during his visit to Vilnius in 2002 for the citizens of Lithuania at the City Hall square that “anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy would also become the enemy of the USA” embodied exactly what Lithuanians had sought for years. The phrase was engraved in the table hung at the entrance to the City Hall of Vilnius. These factors gain a special importance when one is taking into consideration the fact that Lithuania tends to see the world politics as rather bellicose, driven by the “zero sum game” logic. On many occasions this logic has prompted a particular suspicion of closer cooperation between Russia and NATO or Russia and the EU.

Different argumentation was supporting Lithuania’s membership in the EU. By joining the EU Lithuania sought to „come back to the European family“, “ensure economic welfare”, “gain from the EU financial aid” and “strengthen democracy in Lithuania”. Before Lithuania became a member of the EU, the Union had never been considered as a security organisation. Moreover, EU ambitions to create a common security and defence policy were received as a potential challenge for Lithuanian security threatening to undermine NATO. Those fears were reinforced by the support for the ESDP from Moscow as they were related to Primakov’s doctrine aimed at balancing US hegemony by creating an alternative security system in Europe.  

Membership in the EU forced Lithuania to face strengthening of the ESDP and, now being part of the EU, to formulate its position on the issues related to

the European security. Kantian values - democracy, respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law,\textsuperscript{14} became inherent in the Lithuanian institutional framework. However, as cultural elements tend to be very change-resistant, certain discrepancies between the official security discourse and the real attitudes of the society and international behaviour of the state started to emerge.

First of all, the heritage of Soviet ideology, which definitely was in contradiction to the Kantian value system, has ingrained a certain impact on the Lithuanian value system in general. For example, a very significant feature of Lithuania, as well as of the other post-Soviet states is a rather indolent participation of the society in the affairs related to the security and foreign policy of the state.\textsuperscript{15} By taking the security option of the country’s membership in NATO, Lithuania has chosen the direction of the foreign and security policy corresponding to the expectations of the society\textsuperscript{16}. The society has thereafter transferred the responsibility for the national security to the state. Unlike many other European states, the Lithuanian society does not see much of its own role in deciding national security issues, and considers the state to be the main guarantor of national security.\textsuperscript{17} There is an observable separation between internal and external security issues, and although the society has moderate knowledge and opinion about the former, the latter is considered as the exclusive domain of ‘high politics’ rather than an “issue for society”.

News on international politics and international security are only very briefly mentioned in the national media. Those that eventually do appear in national newspapers or internet portals are merely translations from international news agencies. There are no public discussions in Lithuania on key international security issues. Security decisions of the state are simply accepted as a constant. The reaction of the society towards one or another security issue thereby largely

\textsuperscript{14} Article 6, Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 1992, \url{http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html}

\textsuperscript{15} It was demonstrated by the public opinion and security elite opinion survey on security related issues. \textit{Lietuvos gyventojų, nevyriausybių organizacijų ir politinių partijų požiūrio į saugumą ir gynybą analizė}, [Anglysis of the Attitudes of Lithuanian Society, Non-governmental Organizations and Political Parties towards Security and Defence], Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademijos Strateginių tyrimų centras ir Strateginių studijų centras, Vilnius, 2007.

\textsuperscript{16} Miniotaitė, (note 12) p.178.

This in part could explain relatively high interest of the society in everything related to Russia. This fact also became obvious during Lithuania’s application for NATO and the EU process: professional and purposive public relations campaigns increased the number of those in favour of both organizations within a very short time. The expertise on security issues is also lacking within the political parties of Lithuania. Therefore the security agenda of Lithuania is mostly affected by a small security community, consisting of political leaders, diplomats, certain bureaucrats, experts and the most influential academics and journalists. Yet even within this close security community circle there is an observable lack of self-reflection on international affairs, international security issues, as well as on the reasons why Lithuania makes one or another security policy decision. For a long time the main debates over security issues in Lithuania have stemmed directly from geopolitical considerations, which could also be attributed to the Soviet legacy and rationalization of international politics inside contemporary Russia.

The lack of self-reflection on foreign policy decisions could be demonstrated by Lithuania’s determination to go to Afghanistan. Although Lithuania has contributed its troops to the military operations in Iraq and has led a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan since 2005, there has never been a major public or expert level discussion evaluating the status quo or lessons learned either before or after Lithuania’s involvement in those countries. Although it could be argued that the lack of interest in international affairs or external security issues is characteristic of small states, which lack a global perception of the world, it is also related to the Soviet cultural heritage.

Secondly, though Kantian values are considered to be the guiding principles of the Lithuanian security policy (they are reflected in all the national security documents), Lithuania’s external behaviour often reflects the features of the Hobbesian culture. One of the examples is the war in Iraq. Without questioning the legitimacy of the operation Lithuania supported it, later even contributing its armed forces, and was not sensitive to the use of military force without the UN mandate. First of all, the fact that Russia is a member in the UN Security Council and has a veto power, which it has used not once throughout the history of dealing with general

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19 Ibid.
mistrust towards Russia in Lithuania, undermines the image of the UN as the most effective security organization in the eyes of Lithuanians. Secondly, historical experience of totalitarian rule influenced Lithuanian interpretation of the war in Iraq, which viewed it as liberation from oppression rather than aggression. The struggle between the Kantian and Hobbesian attitudes towards the international system, lack of self-reflection and interest of the society in international affairs makes Lithuanian foreign and security policy rather situational and inconsistent, where interpretation of certain principles of international relations is made and decisions pertaining to foreign policy and security are taken ad hoc, and are often based on “enemy” - “friend” conceptions.

3. Nature of Threats

The Hobbesian culture is naturally associated with the modern threats, which in most cases result from the struggle for power between the states, while the Kantian culture recognizes the importance of the post-modern threats and tends to explain the causes of modern threats as a result of bad education and wrong environment. Gražina Miniotaitė argues that the concept of security in Lithuania is very close to the one defined by Barry Buzan and combines both realism and constructivism. Lithuanian official security discourse includes modern and post-modern, internal and external threats. The majority of the threats indicated in the official security documents of Lithuania reflect NATO’s strategic concept and are similar to the threats mentioned in the security documents of other European states. The Lithuanian National Security strategy, the Lithuanian Military Strategy, and the Lithuanian Defence Policy White Paper state that, in the contemporary security environment, there is an observable decrease of inter-state conflicts and increase of non-traditional threats (terrorism, WMD). The National Security

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strategy indicates that most of the risks and threats for Lithuanian security are of trans-national nature, and points out that non-democratically ruled armed forces, failing states and “frozen” regional conflicts also pose a serious risk for Lithuania. Despite the Kantian spirit of the main Lithuanian security documents, even there one could observe a display of concepts, such as national interest, balance of powers, domination and great powers, which are more related to the traditional concept of security and the Hobbesian culture. The Lithuanian Defence Policy concludes that, in the long run, force demonstration and military conflicts remain a potential threat. Noteworthy is the fact that the official security discourse in Lithuania is more Kantian than unofficial attitudes of the security elite or the society. The Lithuanian security elite tend to disagree with the broad concept of security prevailing in many European countries, deeming it unrealistic, and prefer the traditional concept of security. Meanwhile preference of the traditional security concept substantially influences certain security policy decisions in Lithuania.

A public and elite opinion survey on security issues reveals an observable mismatch between threat perception as reflected in the official security documents and ingrained in the society. The tendency for the society to be generally more interested in internal security issues is widespread across Europe, and Lithuania does not differ much in this respect. One third of the respondents mention low wages and pensions as one of the most potential risks for their security, 18% indicate emigration as a threat. Other threats mentioned by the respondents are corruption and delinquency. Nonetheless, the survey revealed a quite striking fact about the general awareness of the society on external security: only 2.7% of respondents have stated that insufficient ability of Lithuania to protect itself from external threats is important for them.

Respondents among the political elite tend to prioritize external threats over internal. Most of the respondents are worried about the energy policy of Russia and perceive it as a threat (75%); they also mention illegal human trafficking (63%).

22 (note 1), p.7.
23 Ibid.
24 Urbelis, (note 18) p.199.
26 (note 15).
and international terrorism (43%). Immigration to Lithuania is also indicated as a possible threat. Belarus is considered as a potentially problematic state, too, but it is not particularly emphasized as a threat either in national security documents, or in the attitudes of the elite or society. It is worth mentioning that views of the society and the elite coincide in naming Russia as the most threatening state (49% of the society).  

A unanimous distrust of Russia might be explained through an analysis of Lithuanian national identity, where Russia is equal to the concepts of “they” and the “enemy”. It is also worth mentioning that after Lithuania regained independence Russia has been securitized by constant public relations campaigns. Lithuanian political elite felt the need to educate the society on the possible dangers coming from the neighbour that had caused very traumatic historical experience, anti-Russian rhetoric was also used in order to mobilise public support for Lithuania’s integration into NATO and the EU. On the one hand, because of the historical experience, the Lithuanian society was very perceptive of securitization of Russia. On the other hand, Russia was and is continuously stimulating antagonism by its statements and actions towards the Baltic States. For example, Russia’s New Security Strategy, written in response to the war with Georgia and adopted in May 2009, makes claims for a stronger integration of the post-Soviet area.  

Organized very recently, joint Russian – Belarusian military exercise “West 2009” has been aimed at responding to the conventional attack of the “westerners” breaking into Kaliningrad Region. Imperialistic rhetoric supported by economical instruments, for example, growing Russian investment into strategic sectors of Central and Eastern European states (recently Russian capital has penetrated Lithuanian media sector) and rather unpredictable and aggressive international behaviour (cyber-attacks on Estonia, war in Georgia) keeps Lithuanian elite on alert and reinforces securitization.

Lithuanian is well-known in Europe for its harsh rhetoric towards Russia and its opposition to Russia’s rapprochement with Euro – Atlantic institutions. A certain change in Lithuanian stance towards Russia, however, could be observed quite

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28 There is an observable tendency that general antagonism of Lithuanian population towards Russia has dropped during last year, however it might be related to the changed rhetoric of the official Lithuanian foreign policy and therefore it might be only a short term phenomenon. Rusofobija igriso [Tired of Rusophobia] // DELFI, 20100513, http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/rusofobija-igriso.d?id=32214465
recently. Already during her election campaign, Lithuania’s new President Dalia Grybauskaitė emphasized that her foreign policy decisions will be pragmatic and constructive, especially towards Russia, and repeated it on numerous occasions when holding the position as President.\(^{30}\) Reacting to the constraints for Lithuanian transporters on the Russian border in August 2009, President Grybauskaitė telephoned Russia’s President Dmitrij Medvedev to discuss this issue also to address the problems of the export of Lithuanian diary products as well as wider issues of economic and cultural cooperation. Over the last eight years that was the first official conversation between the leaders of Lithuania and Russia. The change in the position of Lithuania towards Russia is also supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Though it might be claimed as a “New era” of the relations between Russia and Lithuania, based on mutual respect and constructivism, in essence the change of the official rhetoric towards Russia does not necessarily change threat perception. Moreover, there is no evidence that the new ideas of the President are supported by the security community, or even the society. The President’s decision to invite Medvedev and Lukasenko to the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of Lithuanian Independence was criticized by both local journalists and academics.\(^{31}\) Even *The Economist* has criticized this decision as amateurish.\(^{32}\) Some analysts even doubt if the declared pragmatism of the President does not in fact mean merely a cover for the actual personnel change in the key positions.\(^{33}\) It should also be added that on the eve of the adoption of a new strategic concept of NATO, Lithuanian

\(^{30}\) Inauguration Speech of the President of Lithuania D. Grybauskaitė, [http://www.president.lt/lt/prrezidento_veikla/kalbos/lietuvas_respublikos_presidentes_dalios_grybauskaites_inauguracijos_kalba_paskyra_iskimmingame_seimo_posedyje.html](http://www.president.lt/lt/prrezidento_veikla/kalbos/lietuvas_respublikos_presidentes_dalios_grybauskaites_inauguracijos_kalba_paskyra_iskimmingame_seimo_posedyje.html)


\(^{31}\) Pasityčiojimas iš Sausio 13-osios ir Kovo 11 – osios: D. Grybauskaitė kviečia D. Medvedevą atvykti į Lietuvą minėti Nepriklausomybės dvidešimtmėčio[ Mockery at the Memory of 13th of January and 11th of March: D. Grybauskaitė invites D. Medvedev to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Lithuanian independence] // Lietuvos rytas, 20100113 [http://www.lrytas.lt/-12633746841261958804-pasity%C4%8Diojimas-i%C5%A1-sausio-13-osios-ir-kovo-11-osios-d-grybauskaite-%C4%97-kvie%C4%8Dia-d-medvedev%C4%85-atvykti-%C4%AF-lietuva%C4%95-min%C4%97ti-nepriklausomyb%C4%97s-dvide%C5%A1imme%C4%89dio-dar-papildyta-video.htm](http://www.lrytas.lt/-12633746841261958804-pasity%C4%8Diojimas-i%C5%A1-sausio-13-osios-ir-kovo-11-osios-d-grybauskaite-%C4%97-kvie%C4%8Dia-d-medvedev%C4%85-atvykti-%C4%AF-lietuva%C4%95-min%C4%97ti-nepriklausomyb%C4%97s-dvide%C5%A1imme%C4%89dio-dar-papildyta-video.htm).


officials, including the President, still firmly emphasized the importance of Article 5; moreover, Lithuania became even more persistent in making demands for contingency plans for the Baltic States.Reacting to cyber-attacks on Estonia and the Georgian-Russian war, Lithuania’s Defence Ministry is also reviewing its strategic concept. In June 2009, new guidelines of Defence Ministry were approved. They envisaged a creation of a new high readiness battalion-size unit fit to react to the violations of Lithuanian sovereignty. Therefore, it might be concluded that, in Lithuanian security culture, Russia remains perceived as a threat, both in modern and post-modern terms, expanding throughout the entire spectrum of security issues.

4. A Strategy and Instruments to Fight Threats

Acknowledging that the majority of threats to national security are of the post-modern nature, at the official level Lithuania also chooses a post-modern complex strategy to fight those threats. This strategy involves two elements: the element of collective security and the concept of the comprehensive security. Lithuanian official documents claim that Lithuania is not only the consumer, but also contributor to the collective security. This approach has induced Lithuania’s participation in international military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. It is worth mentioning, however, that in Lithuanian official discourse the comprehensive security strategy was rather of the declarative nature, whereas in practice Lithuania tends to prefer the military instrument to other instruments in fighting security threats. By all means this choice was influenced by the prevailing Hobbesian elements within the Lithuanian security culture. Moreover, it is supported by the lack of civilian instruments and capabilities in Lithuania. Finally, a comprehensive security strategy is impossible without well-coordinated

34 Lietuvos kariuomenėje – naujas aukštos parengties bataliono dydžio kovinės vienetas [New high readiness battalion size combat unit in the armed forces of Lithuania], BNS, 2009 06 14: 14 23.
37 Government Performance Report; (note 1).
foreign and security policies, oriented towards the same goals, whereas in Lithuania the two policies are generally viewed as separate. The failure of the comprehensive security strategy could be very visibly observed in Afghanistan. Lithuania has its own Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the province of Ghowr. Although the very essence of PTR is reconstruction, in Lithuania this commitment is viewed rather as a military operation. There is a major lack of civilian projects and financing (in 2005, the civilian component of the mission was awarded 1 million LTL (approximately 290 000 EUR), in 2006 – 5 million LTL (~1 450 000 EUR), whereas e.g., to the civilian projects in Afghanistan the Netherlands contributes ~50 000 000 EUR yearly). It is also likely that the deteriorating economic situation, despite the reassurances by Lithuanian officials of their commitments, might cause reductions in the international involvement. It is also worth mentioning that public awareness and support for participation of Lithuanian troops in international missions are lacking; thus only 28 % of respondents supported them in 2007.

Although a comprehensive security strategy is hardly found in the security policy of Lithuania, the concept of the “promotion of democracy” plays a significant role in the Lithuania’s foreign policy. Noteworthy is the fact that the philosophy of the “promotion of peace” in Lithuania has a strong linkage to the strategy of “regional leaders” proposed by the USA at the end of Cold War and aimed at strengthening the relations with the countries that had a similar attitude towards the strategic environment and the use of the military instrument. According to this strategy, those countries had a “special security mission” in the region. After joining the EU and NATO, Lithuania has set ahead new priorities of foreign policy, the main

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38 Matonis, A., *Būti ar nebūti Afganistane* [To be or not to be in Afghanistan], Atrūkinimas, 2005 m. spalio 30 d.

39 (note 15).


idea of them being that the “opening window of opportunities” enables Lithuania to turn its disadvantages of being a “geopolitical crossroad” into the advantages of becoming a “bridge between the East and the West”, with the particular attention devoted to the neighbourhood policy. On the one hand, this policy has a lot in common with the Neighbourhood policy of the EU; however, Lithuania has a slightly different vision how it should be implemented. This vision has its roots in the historical heritage and the Hobbesian philosophy which, as it is believed in Lithuania, is especially applicable to the post-Soviet area. The strategy of “regional leaders” has received harsh criticism from the academia on many occasions and has been addressed by President Grybauskaitė as not bringing expected revenues for the state. The lack of a comprehensive security strategy was determining in the situation where foreign policy was limited to ad hoc initiatives and declarative statements, whereas security policy was of rather instrumental nature – fulfilling international commitments.

5. Main Partners (in the field of security)
   in the International Affairs

Opportunities of small states to shape and implement independent security policies are limited. To a great extent, their security choices depend on their security partners, be it big states or international organizations. On the other hand, differences in threat perception or contradictions about how to react to threats may cause serious difficulties for cooperation with partners.

Upon becoming a member of the EU and NATO, Lithuania sees those organizations as the main partners in the field of security. In addition, addressing threats to national security, the White Book of Lithuanian Defence Policy lists other main partners: Northern Europe, the Baltic States, the United Nations, the OSCE, the Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership, the USA, Poland, Denmark and Ukraine. However, a more thorough analysis of the main security documents of

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44 Lietuvos gynybos politikos Baltoji knyga, p.22 – 25.
Lithuania would reveal that NATO is accorded special priority in the Lithuanian official security concept. One also has to take into consideration that Lithuania belongs to the group of „new Atlanticists“ and the „new Europe“, and is a very enthusiastic advocate of NATO and, primarily, of the special role of the USA in European security. Importance of the USA in Lithuanian security policy was already touched upon in the previous section where it was related to the Lithuanian history and strategic calculations. Moreover, cooperation with the USA and NATO has also provided Lithuania with the opportunities to obtain invaluable experience in international operations and to acquire a greater international influence. Noteworthy is the fact that, although in the official discourse NATO is often named as the main security partner of Lithuania, it is largely perceived as such because of the US participation in this alliance. The White Book of Lithuanian Defence Policy states that the preservation of the attention of the USA to the Baltic region, practical cooperation in the field of defence, and direct military presence of the USA in Europe is one of the main priorities of Lithuanian defence policy. Support of the USA is also estimated as a very significant factor for the implementation of Lithuanian foreign policy. Close cooperation with the USA in the field of security has influenced Lithuanian foreign and security policy decisions on many occasions (position on the war in Iraq, Lithuanian presence in Afghanistan, position on the Russian–Georgian war). The official documents reveal the position of the security elite.

However, discrepancies do exist between the positions of the security elite and the society regarding the importance they attach to the EU and NATO in ensuring national security. Although the main reasons why Lithuanians sought to join the EU were of economic nature, the EU is increasingly perceived by the society as a security organization, too. Moreover, as the society is generally more aware and preoccupied with internal security issues linking the EU to the internal security solutions, it naturally attaches more importance to the EU in providing security. The attitudes of the elite towards the EU as a security organization are twofold. In a similar fashion, Lithuanian elite understand the importance of the EU in addressing many internal as well as external threats to national security

47 (note 44) p.23.
(e.g., smuggling (drugs or weapons through the territory of Lithuania), spread of dangerous diseases, human trafficking, illegal migrations, breach of the fundamental human rights in the neighbouring countries). On the other hand, the elite tend to prioritise external security threats to internal ones, linking them to strategic issues and threats which eventually might require military response. For a long time after the initiation of the ESDP, Lithuania’s security elite feared that the ESDP might undermine the importance of NATO and even cause the withdrawal of the USA from Europe; besides, Lithuania had concerns that Russia would play a strong role in the organization. Finally, Lithuania’s scepticism towards the ESDP was encouraged by the traditional distrust of European states, their military impotence and prevailing pacifist sentiments in Europe.

Since 2004 (after Lithuania had joined the EU) the ESDP has been viewed in a more positive perspective and is recognized as one of the key elements of Lithuanian security policy (though the involvement of Lithuania in the ESDP operations is rather symbolic). Lithuania supports the EU and its security instrument ESDP as long as it does not challenge or duplicate NATO and as long as it focuses primarily on the civilian aspects of security. Lithuanian security elite share the conviction that, unless the EU has a strong and coherent CFSP, the ESDP will not be efficient. The lack of EU’s strong and consistent position was very obviously demonstrated during and after the Georgian–Russian war.

Although there is an obvious lack of discussions on European security in general, Lithuanian society and elite are increasingly aware of the growing significance of energy security and link it first of all to the European Union. Russia is considered as a threat for energy security in Lithuania as well as in other European states, and the EU is seen as the organisation that might respond to this threat. The inability of the EU members to agree on the strategic issues, especially in the field of foreign policy, is often perceived as the main challenge and the threat for the EU security.

It is worth noticing that, despite differences in opinions concerning the importance of the EU for national security, there is a general agreement among the society and elite on what the EU or NATO has to do. The EU is viewed as an organization addressing more internal, rather external, threats of national security (though they might have external background or consequences) - smuggling (drugs

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or weapons through the territory of Lithuania), spread of dangerous diseases, human trafficking, illegal migrations, breach of the main human rights in neighbouring countries. NATO is associated with military tasks, military operations, collective security, defence against aggression of other states, fighting terrorism. Lithuanians tend to rely on NATO in circumstances where military involvement is necessary, meanwhile neither the society, nor the elite sees any role for the EU in military operations.

Conclusions

Lithuanian security culture contains elements of two very different, even contradictory, philosophies on the nature of international relations: Hobbesian and Kantian. These elements interchangeably prevail in different situations. While in majority cases, when interacting with the EU members, Lithuania tends to rely on the Kantian element of its security culture, when dealing with Russia and other countries of the post–Soviet space the Hobbesian element prevails. The twofold security culture of Lithuania might serve as an explanation of the sometimes irrational international behaviour of the state. On the other hand, it should be noted that Lithuanian security culture is still undergoing transformation. For many years the international behaviour of independent Lithuania has been guided by Hobbesian philosophy and periods of occupation have strengthened the understanding that the real world resembles more the one defined by Hobbes rather than the ”Perpetual Peace”. Kant’s world vision is rather new for Lithuania, but being part of the EU norms and institutions, it is gradually changing Lithuania’s security culture.