

## **NATO and Lithuania**

### **What is blocking entry through an open door?**

Linus Linkevičius

Western officials now tend to emphasize that NATO enlargement is not an isolated act, but rather a process. Yet it is apparent that this process did not start in 1997, in Madrid with the signing of a declaration and the invitation of three Central European states to begin accession negotiations. NATO enlargement began with the very signing of the Washington Treaty on April 4, 1949. From that moment on, the door to NATO has not been closed.

Nevertheless, the assertions of Western political leaders that the door was open should be regarded as symbolic at best. According to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, "The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area..." But the spirit of the times dictated a somewhat different atmosphere. Already then, at "NATO's cradle," there were attempts to stop the establishment of NATO by enlisting the help of very serious analysts. Many at the time were tormented by the same question that is posed today, namely, whether the extension of security guarantees will enhance security or further increase tension.

The decision to create the Alliance has justified itself and passed the test of time, if only because no third world war has erupted. There were anxious expectations then, as there are now, that those entering the "NATO club" should be providers of security and stability, and not merely recipients of the same. Such thinking was prevalent during the first round of enlargement, which, however, does not date back to 1997, but rather to 1952, when Greece and Turkey acceded to the Washington Treaty. Have Greece and Turkey justified the hopes placed in them? They have in a strategic respect, by facilitating the expansion of the Alliance. In terms of their "individual contribution" to stability, they likely have not, bearing in mind their bilateral relations.

Incidentally, it is very interesting to examine how NATO members meet the basic criteria for membership which are applied to the aspiring members. These criteria have not been officially set forth in writing, but some officials are inclined to list a number of them. The following are considered to be basic requirements for state candidates: democratic development, in particular human rights guarantees; normalized relations with neighboring countries; market economic reforms; compatibility with NATO standards and civilian control of the armed forces. Active participation in the partnership process is also valued. It can be confidently asserted, however, that some NATO members do not meet all of these requirements. This allows us to make the assumption that accession criteria will not invariably be objective, but rather political.

The second stage of enlargement occurred in 1955. Germany's accession to the Alliance was, in a sense, a psychological, political and even geopolitical turning point for Europe.

Some analysts were absolutely convinced that Germany should remain neutral, and that this state of affairs would guarantee stability in Europe. It was asserted that the Germans had a long way to go in recovering from their wartime wounds. And there were arguments that accession to NATO would forever bury any remaining illusions of German unity. Yet the outcome was very different. Once again, the sphere of strategic influence of the Alliance expanded. Also, the values that NATO propagates received an enormous impetus through the accession of one of Europe's largest states. Spain joined NATO relatively recently in 1982, after its recovery from the wounds of a totalitarian regime. Spain's accession seemed at the time to represent the crowning of the process of Western strategic unification.

But looking at the expansion process from a historical point of view, we must conclude that the current stage of expansion is not something essentially new or very unexpected. It is a logical, consistent chain of events - in reality the fourth stage of enlargement.

### **The Paradox Of "Dual" Strategy**

As Lithuania engages in intensive dialogue with NATO (the term intensive dialogue is used to describe the ongoing Lithuanian-NATO consultations regarding Alliance enlargement), it accentuates two parallel goals: the improvement of Lithuanian defence capabilities (focussing on autonomous development) and compatibility with NATO forces (emphasizing Alliance membership). It may sometimes appear that these are different goals, but in fact they are directly and closely linked.

The key argument confirming this is inherent in Lithuania's security strategy. We often point out that Lithuania is not in a position to guarantee security on its own (i.e., autonomously), bearing in mind its size, resources, economic strength, and geopolitical situation. Lithuania, however, is obliged to take steps in preparing a defence against possible aggression, with or without the help of allies. But a readiness to defend oneself does not translate into security guarantees.

Hence the importance of international contacts, intensive cooperation in the security and military spheres as well as active participation in the Partnership for Peace process. Although international contacts do not provide direct security, they do create an "implicit" security shield. Given that we lack the resources to fully satisfy our defence requirements and develop our armaments, we must work with our partners to create a clearly-oriented and qualitatively new security environment. Our efforts in drawing into Lithuanian territory a maximum number of NATO training exercises, port calls and seminars, while simultaneously training our own forces and improving our military infrastructure will bring about a qualitatively new situation. Of course a qualitatively new relationship will not immediately follow. Quality usually lags behind quantity. But the integration process that has commenced will be irreversible.

We must learn to suitably evaluate and take advantage of the opportunities which the so-called enhanced partnership affords. To quote former US Secretary of Defence W.Perry, "Enhanced PfP should encompass all NATO activities except Article 5 of the NATO

Treaty, which refers to common defence." Nobody has provided a clearer and more advantageous (for Lithuania) interpretation of the enhanced PfP concept, nor has this been reiterated in any NATO documents. Conversely, nobody has refuted the logic of Perry's formulation.

This means that Lithuania's representatives must try to fully engage in as wide a spectrum of NATO operations, planning and training processes as their capabilities will allow. If we will be sufficiently receptive, we will acquire enough information and skills to meet the requirements of Article 5. According to NATO experts, it is not at all that simple to strictly distinguish which NATO activities fall outside the purview of Article 5 and which cross the unfortunate "red line," particularly with regard to the planning process. This especially applies to the possible activities of the partners within the command posts of the new NATO structure.

A sceptic might counter that posting one officer at SHAPE or ACLANT, or assigning one platoon to the SFOR mission will not guarantee Lithuania's security. But it is doubtful if we have any other choice. Thus it is only through active participation in these international military cooperation projects that we could strive for compatibility with the Alliance and hope to see our partnership status mature into NATO membership.

### **One State, One Vote?**

This principle truly is not new and applies to most of the democratic organizations known to us. The right to vote is shared equally within the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO, without regard to a state's size, population or level of development. As so often happens in life, however, fraternal does not always mean equal. The representatives of Iceland and Luxembourg probably will not take offence if we note that their voices are not as audible as those of Germany or France, not to mention the US. Audibility is frequently measured in terms of a state's contribution to the common NATO budget. Without questioning the legality or justice of this circumstance, it would nevertheless be appropriate to focus our attention on certain value issues. Large states should not be distinguished from small ones by assuming that their independence is greater or more genuine than that of the smaller partners. It is doubtful if this view is compatible with the Western values towards which we are actively orienting ourselves and which we are determined to defend without regard to whether we are accepted into the Alliance or not.

This question can be posed even more starkly. For example, there are active discussions in the West (which reverberate in the East) regarding the military indefensibility of the Baltic states. Military indefensibility is then cited as a reason why it is difficult to agree to the Baltic states' accession into NATO. One completely forgets that accession to such a subtle Alliance is determined by political and not the so-called "objective" criteria, which we mentioned earlier. The military indefensibility argument was not an obstacle in the case of West Berlin until 1990, nor in connection with the Island of Bornholm. And there are other examples in the history of the Alliance.

Now would be an appropriate time for the Alliance to concern itself not only with the problem of territorial indefensibility, but also with the question of the indefensibility of values. After the Madrid summit, the question of why the Alliance was being enlarged without regard to security needs was posed in Brussels, Washington and other European capitals. No one doubts that the security needs of the Baltic states are greater than those of other "realistic" candidates.

It would be useful to discuss Russia's voice separately. Although Russia is not now and probably will not be a member of the Alliance, it nevertheless expects to exert maximum influence on NATO activities. The North Atlantic Council has not replaced and likely will never supplant the Permanent Joint Council. Nevertheless it is evident that Western politicians will always consider Russia's voice as significantly more important than that of Lithuania. To put it more graphically, our key to NATO's door is guarded in the Kremlin in the minds of many Western political figures. Lithuania is guided by universally recognized norms in dealing with Russia and understandably places great value on the July 29, 1991 Lithuanian-Russian Treaty on the Basis of Interstate Relations, which recognizes OSCE principles and the right to choose one's own security guarantees.

It is difficult to compare the market for commodities with a security "market". But this analogy helps to illustrate the principle of free competition and choice which is firmly established in the democratic world. Bearing in mind its geopolitical position, our state clearly comprehends that collective security guarantees are essential for security. It is important to emphasize collective, as opposed to unilateral security guarantees, which Russia recently offered the Baltic states in a somewhat untraditional manner. Nor were unilateral security guarantees a subject for negotiations in preparing the joint US and Baltic states charter. Hence the choice of the form of guarantees is rather well-founded and clear.

With regard to choice among differing models of security, we really see no alternative to NATO, since there is no other organization of this kind. We thus have to gain our neighbors' respect for our right to choose. I believe that stability in our state depends on choosing a security model that is acceptable to us. Perhaps someday Russia's political leaders will understand that Russian security will be preserved not through a military balance of forces or various deterrence factors but by stability among its neighbors.

In 1996, when I was Minister of National Defense, I had occasion to meet with US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. He is considered to be the Clinton Administration's Russian expert and someone who is a sensitive observer of US-Russian relations. It appeared to me that I succeeded in intriguing him with the proposition that unilateral concessions and excessive fear of Russia's radical forces serve only to strengthen the latter's position domestically and, conversely, to weaken the arguments of the younger generation of Russian political leaders.

It is probably difficult, or even impossible, to quickly change the perception of the older generation of Russian officers that NATO is an aggressor. It is probably impossible to

eliminate the "sphere of influence" mentality among those who encumber their vital interests in a specific territory with the proclivity to dictate unilaterally advantageous economic relations and a certain security policy orientation. The new generation of Russian leaders comprehends that the future of the Kaliningrad region and its development are primarily dependent on economic ties and foreign investment, which have nothing in common with the presence of the military in this region. Unfortunately, this perception is emerging more slowly than the realization that the Kaliningrad region is losing its strategic importance.

Thus, an orientation towards the new generation, adherence to universally recognized principles of good neighborly relations, as well as a consistent and determined defense of legitimate state interests all have a decisive influence on Lithuania's stance in dealing with Russia and integration into NATO. Only thus can we assure indivisible security within a Europe, whole and free. Only when relations among states and their communities shall be determined by the mutual interests of those involved and not by the dictate of outside forces, shall we enjoy indivisible security.

It would be useful to discuss the question of "dividing lines" separately. Political leaders enjoy juggling this term when they continually speak out against drawing "new dividing lines." But we drew our dividing lines on March 11, 1990, when we re-established our independence, and nobody will convince us that this was wrong. It would be difficult to deny that this term is associated more often with externally-imposed influence and is only tenuously connected with national self-determination. The clearest example known to us is the division of Europe, which the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact inaugurated and whose consequences we still feel today.

That is why calls to refrain from "drawing new dividing lines" do not sound very convincing to us, since they are unlikely to make matters worse. But perhaps we might try working not with lines, but with space, which is determined by cooperation and the balancing of interests. Every state has at least the theoretical right to look for a suitable place within its environment, or perhaps to even disassociate itself from a sphere it finds unacceptable, for example, a security sphere. But one should not refer to this as a line so long as the relationship between the states and their mutual interests is determined without external force or pressure. These "dividing lines" obviously will differ from the old ones, however, their essence will not be subject to a negative assessment. We cannot abandon all of the lines dividing one state from another, for example, state borders.

### **Forecasting Russian Political Developments**

In analyzing Russian foreign policy of recent date, one may conclude that it has failed to keep pace with the spirit of the times. Russia has had trouble getting into the rhythm of Western initiatives, at times hurrying to react to accomplished facts and thereby losing the initiative. This is what happened with NATO enlargement. Russia's counter-arguments did not persuade the advocates of enlargement, for in truth, there practically were no arguments. Russia found itself in a psychological quagmire in trying to

overcome its lost status as a "super power" and inferring possible humiliation in the actions of its political opponents.

At the same time one should not overlook Russia's new, positive tactics concerning the Baltic states. Russia's official rhetoric in 1995 even included threats of military force in the event that the Baltic states should join NATO. Today, however, Moscow "contents itself" with raising the prospect of reviewing Russian-NATO relations. This would at least mean that Russia will stop pushing the Balts towards NATO and drop its harsh anti-Baltic political rhetoric in favor of positive cooperation. Following the old line, Russia itself appeared to be furnishing the Balts with their arguments favoring NATO membership. This change could have been dictated by positive intentions, or by the realization that drastic political measures (not to mention those of a military nature) could do more harm to Russian interests than the Baltic states' membership in the Alliance.

Clearly, the conviction that NATO threatens Russia is losing its hold over sober-minded Russian political figures. This is beginning to influence the feelings of Russian military officers, particularly in view of the growing number of their own domestic and social problems. Unfortunately, we will be obliged to wait a long time before there is universal acceptance of the proposition that NATO enlargement will not adversely affect the interests of third countries. Although Moscow is moving away from total negation and criticism toward cooperation, it nevertheless has not forgotten to categorically deny the possibility of NATO integration by the Baltic states.

Therefore it really is too early to consider Russian policies as predictable. By way of illustration, we could mention the letter of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister A. Avdeyev addressed to the Duma, in which he asserted that the Baltic countries had not been occupied before World War II because the international legal norms at the time did not prohibit threats of force. Admittedly, a few days later the Russian MFA clarified that the Lithuanian-Russian agreement of 1991 recognized the fact of annexation. But who can deny that similar declarations, or even actions (given appropriate circumstances) might not recur? After all, the deputy foreign minister's view should not be considered as an insignificant personal opinion.

Thus the predictability and stability of Russian policies will depend on the relationship between Russian domestic political forces, Western behavior in strengthening or weakening Russian democratic forces and, to a certain extent, on the policies of the Baltic states. Certainly, Russian isolation would harm not only Russia but also Europe.

Only by involving Russia in concrete cooperation enterprises can we convince Moscow that NATO enlargement is neither practically nor theoretically directed against Russian security interests. Possible areas of cooperation may be found within the NATO/EAPC format. Examples might be economic and scientific cooperation, the fight against terrorism, environmental protection and crisis or catastrophe management. Concrete cooperation in the implementation of security priorities (such as military cooperation) would be unlikely. But even here it would be possible to implement effective confidence and security-building measures. Obviously, if we are to achieve positive and predictable

results, we must concern ourselves not only with our dignity, but also that of our partner, Russia. There are many untapped opportunities in this kind of dialogue, and time is our common ally.

### **Three Levels of Cooperation.**

Perhaps it would not be entirely appropriate to characterize relations among states in such a schematic manner, but a certain "layering" might still be acceptable. Let us look at the matter from a Lithuanian perspective. The most intensive level - let us call it security cooperation - links our state with its strategic partners. Specifically, we are referring to those who openly support and assist our integration into NATO. We barely keep any secrets from our strategic partners, and we share our doubts and plans with them in the most open manner. Without any doubt, this embraces a rather concrete "format" of states. We could mention the US, Denmark and Poland. I could emphasize that partner states embrace this level of cooperation through their own decisions concerning our country's security priorities.

The second level of cooperation expands on the above-mentioned "format" and encompasses states which actively cooperate with Lithuania on a variety of projects and training programs. These states assist Lithuania in its efforts to achieve compatibility with Western standards. They include Sweden and Finland, which respect our decision to integrate into the Alliance, but do not openly support our strategic goal. All of them, of course, understand that we will utilize the support they provide to achieve the above-mentioned goal.

The third level of cooperation would have the least in common with concrete cooperation, but would be quite meaningful with regard to confidence and security building measures in the region. This level would embrace a large number of states, including those who openly oppose our strategic goal, such as Russia. I do not think that this kind of classification implies any discrimination or disrespect towards our partners. On the contrary, the classification reflects concrete choices each state makes with regard to its position on Lithuanian integration into NATO.

In this respect, the level of participation in various cooperation projects and initiatives, such as the Friends of the Balts, BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET and others, says a great deal about where each state stands. Let us assume, for example, that a group of Lithuanians is digging a ditch, which is regarded as having strategic significance. The Danes (representing the first level of cooperation) arrive on the scene with an excavator and proceed to help with the digging. The Swedes (representing the second level) are reluctant to help dig, but they do bring drinking water. The Russians, however, are opposed to our digging the ditch, yet they can come and see that the ditch is not a threat to them.

### **The Danish Phenomenon**

Lithuania has signed formal military cooperation agreements with eight NATO states. The first to sign an agreement with us was Denmark. It is impossible to call this a chance occurrence because our cooperation with Denmark has been developing at an accelerating rate from the very beginning to the present. I am convinced that this has been determined not only by Denmark's official policy, but also by our partners' personal attitudes. Writing from my own experience, I would like to cite the example of the Danish Minister of Defence, H. Haekkerup. He has stated on more than one occasion that he is personally committed to Lithuania's integration into NATO. Listing all of the joint projects and initiatives would require a great deal of time and probably a separate study. But it is essential to mention some of the joint endeavors, which served as "icebreakers" for a whole series of international cooperation programs, if we wish to discuss the process of Lithuania's integration into the Alliance.

We have already dealt with the significance of international cooperation in building our armed forces, pursuing interoperability with NATO and investing in the training of our personnel. All of this can be accomplished not so much through theoretical studies as by practical cooperation.

At first we were confronted by a double problem. On the one hand, it was very difficult to identify with precision our requirements and priorities. On the other hand, a no less serious problem emerged regarding the coordination of various assistance programs. A large number of visiting foreign delegations started offering us aid in nearly identical areas. We had neither the experience nor sufficient information to effectively manage this flow of assistance.

The first to tackle this undertaking were the Danes, who assumed responsibility for heading the BALTBAT project. For the first time, representatives of the most influential Western and Nordic states sat down at the same table not for an ad hoc political purpose, but to undertake concrete, joint efforts with the partners at a political and military level. Appropriate steering groups were established which held monthly meetings and discussed very concrete questions at a professional level. Thus it is with good reason that the BALTBAT project is currently regarded as a model of multilateral, regional, political and military cooperation.

I will cite another example. We know perfectly well that on-the-job training is considerably more effective than courses in study halls and seminars. This especially holds true for military training. Episodic joint training with NATO forces is far from meeting even the minimal requirements of the Lithuanian army. In 1994, during a visit by the Danish Defense Minister to Lithuania, I accompanied Minister Haekkerup on a Lithuanian Air Force helicopter flight from Vilnius to the port of Klaipeda. In the course of our conversation, the Minister proposed inviting a Lithuanian peacekeeping unit to take part in a peacekeeping mission in Croatia as part of a Danish battalion. Even before the helicopter landed, we had drafted an informal agreement, which I understand the Danish press called the "helicopter agreement." Although there were no prior written projects, we made a decision. Perhaps there is no need to explain the extent of the political and financial responsibility which the Danes took upon themselves.



Responsibility for training the troops and the attendant risk was assumed not only by Lithuania but also by Denmark. Moreover, the necessary legal norms had not been established in Lithuania, which caused me considerable difficulties with the Lithuanian parliament (Seimas).

Despite these difficulties, six Lithuanian peacekeeping platoons successfully carried out their mission, as did a Lithuania company (LITCOY). The troops participated not only in the "Blue Helmets" peacekeeping operations, but also in the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR missions. Thanks to Danish support and cooperation, many of these soldiers, after acquiring combat experience and receiving UN and NATO decorations, returned with their experience to their military units in Lithuania. Many are now serving in the Ministry of National Defense, Staff Headquarters and the defense attache corps.

Lithuanian-Danish cooperation acquired an even greater significance after the deaths of Senior Lieutenant Normundas Valteris and his Danish comrade, Arne Andersen, during a joint patrol in Bosnia. These first lessons in Danish military science will stand out in our military history as milestones in the development of our military forces.

### **Lithuania's Active Integration Into NATO: A Chronology**

If one were to search for indications of Lithuania's active stance regarding NATO integration, it perhaps would be possible to begin with the March 11, 1990 Declaration of Independence, which set in motion the process of developing a new Lithuanian security orientation. Having just rejected the Soviet Union's "security space," Lithuania nevertheless found that it lacked an elaborated national security strategy. Doubts were expressed in the Supreme Council (the name of the parliament until 1993) concerning the necessity of a Lithuanian ministry of defense. More than one political figure weighed the possibility of embracing neutrality, which supposedly would cost the state less and serve national interests more effectively. But the course of events quickly put everything in its place, and before long, not a single political grouping of any significance remained in favor of Lithuanian neutrality.

If we were to limit ourselves to a chronological approach, we would have to list the March 1992 visit of NATO Secretary General Woerner to the three Baltic states as perhaps the first clear indication of the future of Lithuanian-NATO relations. A true avalanche of events bore down on Lithuania in 1994, following the January 4 dispatch of a letter from Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas to the Secretary General of NATO, which expressed the general will of all Lithuanian political forces and the firm resolve of Lithuania to join NATO. It is interesting to note that previously there was no established practice of writing such letters of application. Nevertheless, this letter was without any doubt the first clear signal from Lithuania, a kind of starting shot.

From that moment on, Lithuania was to react to all new NATO initiatives within the twinkling of an eye. For example, the January 10-11 summit of Alliance heads of state and government in Brussels announced the Partnership for Peace initiative and invited the partner states to sign the Framework Document. That very month on January 27 (a

day later than the Romanians) the President of Lithuania signed this document. The following summer when the possibility of setting up contact bureaus at NATO headquarters appeared, Lithuania was one of the first to seize this opportunity. Lithuania's one-room bureau was established in a three-floor wing of the main NATO complex. After the death on August 13 of Secretary General Woerner, this wing was named in his honor. Lithuania's NATO contact bureau was led at the time by Vygaudas Ušackas, a counsellor at the Lithuanian embassy in Brussels.

On June 10, during a session of the NATO Council in Istanbul, MFA Secretary A. Januška, handed in Lithuania's PfP Presentation Document. Beginning in September, Lithuania became actively engaged in PfP activities and participated in all PfP training programs of that year. On November 30 NATO formally adopted Lithuania's first individual partnership program. I would like to emphasize that all this transpired within one year. In January of 1995, Lithuania sent its first representative to Mons (located about 80 km from Brussels) at SHAPE. Captain Valdas Šiaučiulis began serving there at the Partnership Coordination Cell, which currently hosts representatives of 27 states.

In the three years prior to 1996, the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense signed eight military cooperation agreements with NATO states: the US, Great Britain, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Turkey. An intergovernmental agreement was signed with the latter state. The government of Lithuania was one of the first to respond to an invitation from NATO to establish diplomatic missions in Brussels by adopting the appropriate decision on August 1, 1997. On November 12, 1997, Lithuania's Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began its work.

Certainly a chronological account of events cannot fully reflect the content of the integration process, particularly since there is no larger any need to record every day-by-day routine event. The Partnership Work Program, on which the partner states "drew" for their needs within their Individual Partnership Programs, ballooned from a few pages to a substantial book. Participation in training, which at first served as a kind of political barometer reflecting the level of activity of states, now has become a commonplace within the context of a multitude of events. In fact, the quantity of events is beginning to adversely affect their quality. Lithuania nevertheless has been regarded as one of the most active PfP participants from the very beginning. NATO integration is now seen not only as the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, but rather as an extensive process encompassing the whole state. Now is a good time to begin serious thought about this in Lithuania.

### **How to Engage State Institutions**

As I mentioned before, Lithuanian participation in NATO-organized events and programs has been appropriately noted at a political level. Their quantitative aspect has reached a saturation point, and the time has come for serious consideration of the quality of these programs. It is doubtful if we can expect to obtain any additional indulgence on the part of NATO. After the Madrid Summit, it was generally believed that the maximum had been achieved. Aside from inviting three states to initiate accession negotiations, the

Madrid Declaration indirectly mentioned the Baltic states as aspiring to NATO membership. NATO is currently preoccupied with the three candidates.

Our task, however, is to create a clear, rational and all-encompassing strategy of integration into the Alliance. For this we need no new official status or rights. What we require is active engagement by the state and an all-encompassing integration process. Nobody is surprised to learn that the foreign affairs and defense ministries have monopolized the integration process in a certain sense. With respect to coordination of this process, their engagement is welcome. Nevertheless it is obvious that Lithuania has not yet exhausted all of its possibilities of cooperating with NATO in a broader sense, including economic, scientific, transportation, communications and coordination of armaments policies. I would like to believe that the November 1997 visit by Lithuanian ministry and agency officials to NATO headquarters signals the start of engagement of Lithuanian institutions in the integration process understood in a broad sense. This would underscore the qualitative dimension of integration into the Alliance.

We need more than slogans and exhortations to maintain our chosen course. We must intensify our work and more effectively utilize opportunities and the growing support of the partners, without waiting for additional rights or enhanced status. We simply have no other choice. For we may suffer from a variety of draughts, if we stay stuck for long at NATO's open door.